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GIVINGS RECAPTURE: 
FUNDING PUBLIC ACQUISITION OF 
PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS ON THE COASTS 
Daniel D. Bamhizer' 
[A] foolish man ... built his house on the sand. The rain fell, and 
the floods came, and the winds blew and slammed against that 
house; and it fell-and great was its fall. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fueled and maintained largely by government "givings"-government 
actions that increase the value of private property-to floodplain land-
owners, coastal floodplain development has increased dramatically over 
the last thirty years. Currently, coastal counties contain only seventeen per-
cent of the land in the lower forty-eight states and over half of the na-
tion's population.2 Within twenty years another twenty-six million people 
will squeeze themselves into this strip of land along our coasts.3 That in-
crease in development and population density inevitably means that coastal 
floodplains will suffer ever-greater threats to human life, property, and the 
environment unless new floodplain land use management policies are 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University-DCL College of Law. J.D., 
Harvard Law School, 1995; B.A., Miami University, 1991. The author thanks Professor 
Christine Klein, Professor Marc R. Poirier, Professor Charles Ten Brink, Professor Nicho-
las Mercuro, Adam Mossoff, and Adjunct Professor Anthony J. Franze for their comments, 
insights, and assistance; his research assistants, Linda Paynich and Brian Wutz, and the 
MSU-DCL research staff-Carol Parker, Kathy Prince, Janet Hedin, Mitchell Myers, and 
Theo Sarantis-for their hard work and extraordinary dedication; and Christa, Mairead, 
and Lydia Bamhizer for their patience and understanding. Without the support of each and 
every one of these individuals, this Article would not have been possible. 
I Matthew 7:26-27 (New American Standard Bible). 
2 DANA BEACH, COASTAL SPRAWL: THE EFFECTS OF URBAN DESIGN ON AQUATIC Eco-
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Pew Ocean Comm'n 2002). 
3 [d. at 1-2 ("At more than five times the density of the interior of the country, coastal 
population pressure is already great. Over the coming decades, the pressure will rise sub-
stantially."); see FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY ("FEMA"), NATIONAL MITIGATION 
STRATEGY: PARTNERSHIPS FOR BUILDING SAFER COMMUNITIES 1 (1995) ("From 1980 to 
1993, the value of insurable property on the Atlantic and gulf coasts increased 179 percent, 
to $3.15 trillion."); see also DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: 
RECASTING DISASTER POLICY AND PLANNING 4 (1999) ("Natural disasters have grown 
larger as more people and property have become exposed to natural hazards .... As more 
urban development takes place in such high-hazard areas, the risk of damage and injury 
from disasters multiplies."); FED. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. TASK FORCE, FLOOD-
PLAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT REPORT 3-2 to 3-6 (1992) 
[hereinafter ASSESSMENT REPORT] (noting increasing riverine, coastal, and arid region 
floodplain development). 
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adopted to curb development in high-risk and environmentally sensitive 
coastal floodplains. As geographer Gilbert F. White recognized over a half-
century ago, "[f]loods are 'acts of God,' but flood losses are largely acts 
of man."4 
Current federal, state, and local floodplain management policies have 
subsidized the costs of living in floodplains. Government entities continue to 
expend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to repair repeated and 
foreseeable damage to unwise and unsustainable private development and 
public infrastructure and facilities.s Instead of limiting flood-plain develop-
ment, those policies and practices continue to maintain development against 
rising sea levels, climate change, extreme weather phenomena, and erosion. 
Specifically, current government responses to flooding not only pro-
mote and maintain unwise development in coastal floodplains, but also 
artificially increase property values of high-risk6 or environmentally sen-
sitive properties.7 Flood insurance, construction of flood control meas-
4 Gilbert F. White, Human Adjustment to Floods, in 1 GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND 
ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED WRITINGS OF GILBERT F. WHITE 12 (Robert W. Kates & Ian 
Burton eds., 1986). 
5 See William J. Siffin, Bureaucracy, Entrepreneurship, and Natural Resources: Witless 
Policy and the Barrier Island, 1 CATO J. 293, 297-98 (1981) (describing cumulative effect of 
numerous agency programs as subsidizing programs that stimulate coastal barrier island 
development). Although the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") often is credited 
with spurring floodplain development-especially in coastal floodplains and on coastal 
barrier islands-it is not clear whether the NFIP alone provides sufficient incentives for such 
high-risk construction. See DIXIE SHIPP EVATT, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
ISSUES ASSESSMENT, A REPORT TO THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION 1 (1999) 
(review of thirty-six studies or reports on relationship between floodplain development and 
insurance availability did not conclusively demonstrate whether or not availability of flood 
insurance contributed to floodplain development). Rather, development pressure likely 
precedes, and then promotes, the flow of most federal and state subsidies in the form of 
infrastructure, flood controls, and risk allocation mechanisms. 
6 The term "high-risk development" refers to development that is economically unsus-
tainable unless the property owner can externalize some or all flood-related costs of devel-
oping that property. Examples of high-risk development include property subject to re-
peated flood losses, or to catastrophic flood events causing flood losses that exceed the cost 
of similar development in an area with lower flood risks. 
7 Floodplains embody significant environmental resources. Coastal wetlands-salt 
marshes, swamps, and estuaries-purify water and provide essential habitat for a wide variety 
of flora and fauna. See, e.g., James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings 
Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. 
REV. 1279, 1289-90 (1998); Lisa A. St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: 
Opportunities for a Peaceful Migration, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1991). Ad-
ditionally, coastal wetlands serve an important role as a flood control mechanism, provid-
ing areas that buffer upland areas against storm surges and wave action. See, e.g., John 
Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of Preserving 
Earth's Life Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929,948-49 (2001) (describing impact of 
wetland degradation on ability of coastal wetlands to filter nutrients and sewage in floodwaters 
resulting from Hurricane Floyd); Joe F. Stevenson, Louisiana's Oyster Lease Relocation 
Program: A Step Toward Common Ground, 28 S.U. L. REV. 19, 20-21 (2000) (describing 
ecological necessity of coastal wetlands as fish and wildlife habitat and flood protection 
afforded by coastal wetlands in "acting as a buffer zone, absorbing the force of the storm 
surge and wind."); see also Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems, Decisionmaking, and the 
Science of Earth's Systems: Procedural Missing Links, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1077, 1088-89 
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ures, and liberal disaster relief minimize-and in some cases may even 
eliminate-floodplain landowners' perceptions of flood risk.s Land mar-
kets then capitalize these government subsidies and warped risk percep-
tions, resulting in property values that fail to reflect accurately the real 
costs of floodplain location. Consequently, when government entities pur-
chase or condemn floodplain property, they must pay compensation based 
not only upon any "intrinsic" or improved value of the property rights con-
demned or taken, but also the additional value conferred upon the prop-
erty as a result of past government responses to flooding. These artificially 
enhanced values result in a form of "double dipping"9 by landowners who 
receive compensation for the value of past governmental givings in addi-
tion to whatever value the landowner may have created in the property 
through individual actions related to real market risks. Such double-dipping 
dramatically increases government costs of floodplain management by re-
quiring double payments, both for ineffective past flood responses and for 
the costs of correcting those past mistakes through property acquisition. 10 
Thus, the perverse incentives created by government responses to 
flooding must be eliminated before any effective response to flooding can 
be implemented. This Article proposes a three-pronged approach. First, 
government must increase its emphasis on property acquisition as a re-
sponse to repetitive flood losses and heightened flood risks on coastal flood-
plains. 
Second, government must adopt a mechanism to avoid compensating 
landowners for increases in property value attributable solely to past gov-
ernment responses to flooding. While programs that mitigate flood haz-
ards through public acquisition of high-risk private properties represent 
the best opportunity to remove unsound development and prevent new 
development from taking its place,11 the high short-term costs of acquir-
(2001) (discussing negative impact of sea level rise and development on ability of coastal 
wetlands and barrier islands to protect coasts from flooding). 
8 An example of this phenomenon is the way in which land markets appear to capital-
ize the benefits of flood control measures such as levees and seawalls by valuing properties 
protected by such structures as if those structural controls eliminated all risk of flooding. 
See infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
9 Edward Thompson, Jr., The Government Giveth, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 
26 ("For too long, we have been subsidizing the very uses of land we need to regulate in 
the interest of environmental protection. This has set the stage for double dipping in the 
public treasury by those who benefit from taxpayer largesse and then sue the government 
for damages when regulation frustrates their plans."). 
10 See id.; see also Mark W. Cordes, Takings, Fairness, and Farmland Preservation, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1033, 1035-37, 1072-75 (1999) (observing that governmental givings, such 
as farm subsidies and mortgage deductions, are responsible for substantial portion of land 
value and suggesting that imposing agricultural zoning districts is not inherently unfair 
largely because government, rather than landowner, action creates much of the value of 
agricultural land). 
II See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4104c(e) (2000) (promoting pre-disaster mitigation of high-
risk properties through property acquisition, relocation, or elevation of flood-threatened 
structures); see also FEMA, ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 28-32 (2001) 
[hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT] (describing Repetitive Loss Initiative and Hazard 
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ing coastal properties limit the effectiveness of these programs. Ironi-
cally, much of the value of coastal properties-and hence the high cost of 
acquiring those properties-is the direct result of past government pro-
grams to mitigate or reallocate the risk of flood losses on coastal proper-
ties by attempting to guard coastal landowners against the risks and costs 
of floods. This Article proposes that the federal government counteract 
the high cost of coastal property acquisition programs by making past 
government subsidies subject to recapture as a "credit" to be offset against 
the government's cost to purchase or condemn redevelopment rights or 
other interests in the subject property. 
To improve significantly the effectiveness of property acquisition pro-
grams, the government must recapture at least some past givingsl2 when 
it condemns or purchases floodplain property. Implementation of what 
this Article terms a givings recapture mechanism-based upon existing 
standards for offsetting landowners' compensation to avoid payment for 
increases in property values s'olely attributable to past government ac-
tions-would rationalize coastal floodplain management by decreasing 
landowner double-dipping. Specifically, current just compensation clause 
jurisprudence permits the government to offset or avoid compensating land-
owners for value increments created directly by government action. Such 
effects are appropriate, for example, where the purpose of the govern-
mental taking itself caused an increase in value to the landowner's re-
maining property.13 Where the government-caused increase in property 
value can be clearly distinguished from other sources of value, the just com-
pensation clause permits the government to avoid paying for increases 
solely attributable to its own activities. In the case of givings on coastal 
floodplains, the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP"), which cur-
rently provides flood insurance at below-market rates to property owners 
within flood-prone communities, provides the most dramatic illustration 
of a potential givings recapture mechanism. Rather than continuing to pro-
vide flood insurance at below-market rates, the NFIP should be amended 
to recognize explicitly the value of its rate subsidies to individual insureds 
and treat that amount as a credit to offset the cost of the federal govern-
ment's future purchase of redevelopment rights or other property rights from 
those insureds. This givings recapture mechanism would permit coastal 
landowners to maximize use of their properties until they suffer cata-
strophic flood losses, would compensate landowners fully for their prop-
erty upon condemnation or purchase by the government, and could side-
step political opposition to restrictive regulation of coastal floodplain 
land use. 
Grant Mitigation Program). 
12 See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
13 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943) (prohibiting compensation 
for value increment attributable to speculation that tract taken would be among those benefited 
by proposed government project). 
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Third, property acquisition programs and givings recapture mecha-
nisms must focus on a broad federal program specifically aimed at high-
risk or environmentally valuable floodplain properties. A federal-as op-
posed to state or local-response is necessary because of the multi-jurisdic-
tional nature of floodplains, flooding, and flood hazards. But the response 
must be targeted; too broad a scope could easily endanger such programs 
by exciting the vigorous political response that has doomed past attempts 
to effect a broad retreat from threatened shoreline. 
Part II of this Article frames the conceptual and technical problems 
of continued unsustainable floodplain development, while Part III ad-
dresses the issue of government givings within floodplains that promote 
or maintain floodplain property values. Part IV analyzes some of the 
major current federal responses to floods and floodplain development in 
terms of the effects of those responses on government givings to floodplain 
property owners. Finally, Part V suggests changes to current federal flood-
plain management policy to recapture givings attributable to past gov-
ernment responses to flooding. These recaptured givings would then be 
used as a fund to promote additional public acquisition of redevelopment 
rights for high-risk or environmentally sensitive coastal floodplains. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF COASTAL FLOODPLAIN DEVELOPMENT 
The problem of coastal floodplain development is twofold. First, 
coastal development represents a unique concordance of natural, social, 
economic, political, and climatological factors driving urbanization. Each 
of these factors is essential to understanding both the magnitude of the 
risks facing coastal development and the difficulty of reducing or elimi-
nating those risks. Second, government actions with this dynamic coastal 
landscape have and will continue to have unintended consequences that 
increase the risks of coastal development and the difficulty of limiting or 
removing that development. Specifically, any government action within 
coastal floodplains can magnify the value of coastal properties by reduc-
ing or reallocating flood risks, increasing the perceived permanence of 
coastal properties, improving access to coastal properties, or otherwise 
transferring value to coastal real estate. This problem of government 
givings in coastal floodplains raises the fundamental question of the ex-
tent to which government must compensate property owners for past 
government actions that incidentally raised property value. This question 
is particularly important on the coast, where-absent government in-
vestments in flood protection, infrastructure, and risk allocation mecha-
nisms-it is likely that property values would be substantially reduced. 
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A. The Conceptual Problem: "Takings" vs. "Givings" 
The problem of increased coastal development is inextricably in-
tertwined with the conceptual problem of when (and how much) the gov-
ernment should compensate landowners for physical takings, regulatory 
takings, and condemnations versus when (and how much) the govern-
ment should be able to avoid compensating landowners for past givings. 
The past fifteen or so years have seen an intensifying conflict over the terms 
under which government can inhibit the ability of landowners to use their 
land as they see fit-without the payment of compensation. 14 At the cen-
ter of the controversy is the inevitable tension between the rights and du-
ties appropriately allocated to political communities on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the individuals benefiting from membership in those 
political communities. This tension has long been recognized in Fifth 
Amendment takings jurisprudence as the extent to which private indi-
viduals should bear burdens intended to benefit the community at large. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Armstrong v. United States, "[t]he Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a 
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."15 This Article 
respects the takings debate but primarily explores how the community 
can avoid compensating landowners when it determines that past public 
investments that incidentally benefited the property owners must be re-
moved to forward new community goals and objectives. 
Initially, the analytical structure governing this tension between in-
dividual property and community benefits developed under the constitu-
tional analysis of "takings" of a person's property without due process of 
law or just compensation. But as the courts have defined the limits of 
government authority to limit use of private property,16 commentators have 
14 See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls: Balancing Pri-
vate and Public Interest, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629, 629-30 (1999) (discussing recent in-
tensification of debate over balance between private property rights and public interest in 
regulating uses of property); Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of 
State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 187-88 (1997) ("The last decade has 
seen a growing property rights movement in this country.") [hereinafter Leapfrogging the 
Constitution]; Julian Conrad Jurgensmeyer, Florida's Private Property Rights Protection 
Act: Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 696 (1996) 
(describing legislation requiring compensation to property owners whose property values 
decrease because of government regulation as resulting from "obsession with regulatory 
takings"); Daryn McBeth, Note, Public Need and Private Greed-Environmental Protec-
tion and Property Rights, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 112, 112-13 (1996) (noting revival of 
vigorous debate over scope of protections afforded by takings clause); William L. Inden, 
Comment, Compensation Legislation: Private Property Rights vs. Public Benefits, 5 DICK. 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 119, 119 (1996) (describing rise of property rights movement). 
15 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
16 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 315 n.lO, 335-43 (2002) (maintaining that except for categorical takings claims, 
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increasingly examined the responsive doctrine of "givings"-i.e., the extent 
to which individuals should retain increases in their property values at-
tributable solely to government action in the event of a taking. Neither doc-
trine stands on its own terms, but each symbolizes much deeper princi-
ples and assumptions that go directly to the complex nature of the role of 
government and the balance between the rights and duties of individuals 
and communities. 
Consider briefly the inherent paradox of those who argue that allegedly 
"uncompensated" restrictions on their use of property unjustly deprives them 
of benefits to which they, not the government, are exclusively entitled. In 
many instances this argument is at the center of what has been called the 
neoconservative movement. Neoconservatism is an effort to resist and 
turn back what have been seen as the abuses of the liberal state and its 
efforts to undermine individualism and free-market ideals. It is not a 
reach to suggest that the advocates of a tough takings doctrine believe in 
a package of values that elevate the right of the individual to compete in 
a competitive free-market economy and reward successful competitors 
for the contribution made by their individual skills. I? In such an idealized 
regulatory actions must be assessed for taking in light of regulation's economic impact on 
landowner, interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and character of 
government action, as factors relate to affected parcel as a whole); Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-28 (2001) (deciding that post-regulation purchaser or successive 
title holder of land not automatically barred from challenging regulation as taking); Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1994) (holding that exaction of an easement de-
manded by government in exchange for discretionary government benefit such as building 
permit must be roughly proportional to impact of proposed development); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (holding that government regulation that 
prohibits all economically beneficial use of real property effects a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment); First English Lutheran Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) (holding that regulation temporarily denying property owner all 
use of property may be compensable as taking under Fifth Amendment); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring "essential nexus" between regula-
tion requiring exaction of private property in exchange for discretionary building permit 
and the harm the regulation seeks to avoid); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-38 (J 982) (government regulation authorizing permanent physi-
cal invasion of private property by third-party cable company constitutes per se taking). 
The impact of the recent Tahoe-Sierra decision on the continued vitality of categorical 
regulatory takings claims under Lucas is unclear, but an analysis of this new Supreme 
Court regulatory takings jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article. 
17 This traditionalliberal-versus-conservative/neoconservative division on the issue of 
takings may, however, be a false dichotomy, as illustrated by recent efforts by generally 
left-leaning coastal property owners in Malibu, California, to prevent the state from im-
posing easements for beach access across their properties. See, e.g., Brian Doherty, Their 
Own Private Malibu, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2002, at A16 (describing the apparent irony of 
finding "a mostly very wealthy and very liberal enclave [Malibu] suddenly rife with born-
again property zealots"); Kenneth R. Weiss, Not All Quiet on the Beach/ront, L.A. TIMES, 
July 12, 2002, at B8 (describing efforts of wealthy beachfront property owners to block 
public access to state-owned beaches seaward of their properties); Commentary, Property 
Wrongs, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 21, 2002, 2002 WL S443901 (same). But as the lead 
from the Wall Street Journal article-"What does it take to get liberals sounding like Ayn 
Rand in defense of property rights? Having their own property threatened"-suggests, the 
traditionalleftlright division on the issue of individual property rights and a strong takings 
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context, individuals are to operate within a competitive free-market cul-
ture in which they are rewarded for their ability and not provided with 
"handouts" of the kind favored by Rawlsian welfare states. 18 
To the extent individual actors have caused the value of privately owned 
property to increase through their own efforts there should then be clear 
limits on the ability of government to take the property or substantially re-
duce its utility or value without fair compensation. In other words, a state 
based upon free-market ideals and concepts of individualism and private 
property should not permit the government to share in increases in the 
value of property-the "profit"19-attributable to the individuals' own efforts 
or risk-taking entrepreneurial enterprises. This is as true for the fictional 
Ben Cartwright,20 who helped tame the frontier wilderness by building 
the Ponderosa ranch, as it is in the case of a land speculator who does 
nothing more than take a risk to buy and hold land for the possibility of a 
market price increase.21 
Of course, the ideal of the free-market entrepreneur is incomplete. Im-
plicit within the assumption of individual rights that often accompanies 
free-market individualism and takings arguments is that the individual cre-
ates everything while the community is the ogre that steals from the vir-
tuous individuaP2 But this position conveniently overlooks the political 
clause has more to do with the fact that many on the left have not been subject to 
significant government interference with their own property rights. Doherty, supra, at A 16. 
18 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972). 
19 See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 12-14 (1985). Professor Epstein analyzes the Lockean theory of limited 
government in terms of restricting the state's ability to extract "monopoly rents from the 
exclusive legitimate use of force" ceded to the state by its citizens: 
By setting certain elements of value outside of public control, Locke provided an 
implicit answer to Hobbes's challenge by outlining a rule whereby the sovereign 
rule no longer generates monopoly profits [as it would under a Hobbesian theory 
of absolute sovereignty]. The state gets what it needs to rule-its costs-and 
nothing more . ... 
[d. at 13 (emphasis added); see also John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, 
Extent and End of Civil Government, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO 
MILL, 460-61 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939) (1690) (,"Tis true governments cannot be sup-
ported without great charge, and it is fit everyone who enjoys a share of the protection 
should payout of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be 
with his own consent, Le., the consent of the majority giving it either by themselves or 
their representatives chosen by them."). 
20 Ben Cartwright was the lead character of the 1959-73 television show "Bonanza." 
21 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1498, 1505-10 (1999) (distinguishing "wind-
falls" from situations where planning and development of superior information paid off for 
entrepreneurial risk takers). 
22 See, e.g., Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution, supra note 14, at 237 ("Our ten-
dency, however, is to accept the benefits of regulation as a given but complain about the 
burdens as an infringement of rights."); Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Con-
tinuing Need for Reform, in REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 55, 65-68 (Roger Clegg et al. eds., I 994) (arguing in favor of interpretation of just 
compensation clause that compensates condemnee fully for business and other consequen-
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community's contributions to system stability, security, capital transfer, 
law, and other mechanisms that support individuals' opportunities to ob-
tain, protect, and add value to assets.23 Absent benign and facilitative 
community infrastructures and institutions, the individual would lack the 
stable base required to protect property-or at least would incur substan-
tial transactional costs in providing for private security-and would bear 
all the cost and risk of opening new areas for development or improvement. 
Consequently, the other side of the free-market individualism coin must 
apply with equal force-those who purport to rely on the free market, indi-
vidual effort, and the sanctity of private property have no claim to benefits 
clearly and solely attributable to government actions. To the extent gov-
ernment actions have enhanced a person's property value, a rigid rule of 
valuation provides an unjust enrichment not created by the person through 
competitive efforts and abilities but rather by a communal distribution of 
benefits. 
The case of David Lucas exemplifies this tension between takings and 
givings in a purportedly free market system. Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council developed one keystone in modern takings doctrine by 
holding that where a government regulation denies a property owner all 
economically beneficial use of land, a taking has occurred unless the gov-
ernment can demonstrate that background principles of property and nui-
sance law also would forbid use of the property.24 Beyond the question of 
whether a taking occurred, Lucas raised the additional question of why 
two small lots on a regularly flooded strip of a sandy barrier island were 
worth almost $1 million in 1986:25 
Take the celebrated case of David Lucas, the real estate devel-
oper who recently won a $1.5 million takings judgment because 
he was denied permission to build houses on the beach at Isle of 
Palms, South Carolina. Whether or not one agrees with the deci-
sion in his case, the fact remains that both Lucas's ability to 
build on the beach and the value of his beachfront lots were aug-
tial losses in addition to value of property taken, without acknowledging or discussing 
value potentially attributable solely to government action); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DON-
ALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 47-58 (rev. ed. 2001) (describing in-
stances of environmental damage caused by unwise or unsound government restrictions on 
private property rights for the ostensible purpose of environmental protection). 
23 See Clynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much is lust?, 42 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 721, 733-38 (1993). Lunney observes that to a considerable degree, the value of 
virtually all property held in this country reflects the social presence of our government, its 
laws and accompanying institutions. From time to time, this reflection leads some to sug-
gest that, if a court insists on finding a taking when the government restricts certain indi-
viduals' property rights, it should award compensation based upon the difference between 
the value the property has as regulated in our civilized society, and the value the property 
would have outside our society. 
24 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
25 See id. at 1006-07. 
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mented by government action. Public authorities had constructed 
a bridge to provide access to the island, roads to drive on, water 
and sewage systems to serve the houses, and beach protection 
measures to prevent them from washing away. On top of that, 
the government has helped underwrite flood insurance to cush-
ion the loss when those measures fail. All of these taxpayer-
financed improvements contributed to the value of Lucas's prop-
erty and in all likelihood spelled the difference between its being 
attractive for development and a financially worthless strip of 
shifting sand. In effect, much of the government's financial ex-
posure for taking the Lucas property was attributable to the gov-
ernment itself.26 
After Hurricane Hugo damaged his Isle of Palms properties, David 
Lucas himself acknowledged the role of government givings in support-
ing floodplain property owners. "The flood insurance program was the 
keystone .... You have to look at what the program has accomplished: 
jobs, economic development. Because of the federal flood insurance pro-
gram, we now have tourism and a healthy economy."27 Lucas received a 
financial windfall to the extent that the state had to compensate him for 
enhanced property value that occurred through state action rather than 
Lucas's individual investments in that property, either active (such as build-
ing improvements on the land) or passive (such as waiting for market forces 
to drive up values). The state paid two or even three times for value at-
tributable to building and maintaining infrastructure, subsidizing insur-
ance and providing more expensive police and fire services, and then paying 
some portion of Lucas's compensation at inflated development prices due 
to government's own investment of resources. 
Government givings increase floodplain land values by providing or 
improving nearby infrastructure, repairing such infrastructure after floods, 
building structural flood barriers to reduce flood risks, and reallocating 
risks of flood damages from floodplain property owners to taxpayers in 
general. 
To expand the effective use of property acquisition programs, current 
floodplain management policy must change to recognize and recapture giv-
ings. A givings recapture mechanism that promotes the ability of gov-
ernments to expand the scope of property acquisition programs would have 
several advantages over current flood management policies. First, pro-
moting property acquisition over other options such as open-space zon-
ing, setback requirements, or prohibitions on development may avoid some 
26 Thompson, supra note 9, at 22 (emphasis added). 
27 Thomas G. Donlan, The Rights of Owners Don't Include a Federal Subsidy, BAR-
RON'S, June 1, 1992, at 10. 
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political opposition by compensating landowners for the value of prop-
erty rights acquired by the government. 
Second, givings recapture through treatment of subsidies as credits 
. against a future acquisition necessarily would effect a long-term retreat from 
floodplain development. Each step of the retreat would be identified by 
floods causing substantial damage to floodplain properties. The flood, in 
effect, would perform the task of identifying floodplains suitable for re-
moval of development by damaging properties where removal would be 
appropriate. Additionally, absent a flood of biblical proportions, such a 
long-term retreat would permit floodplain landowners to maximize the 
use and enjoyment of their current floodplain property uses without per-
manently externalizing the costs of that use and enjoyment to taxpayers. 
Third, such a long-term property acquisition and givings recapture 
mechanism would gradually minimize future political opposition to re-
moving floodplain development. Floodplain property owners are effective 
at mobilizing their resources for political action to increase or maintain the 
flow of government subsidies, but as property acquisition programs re-
duce the number of floodplain property owners in high-risk or environ-
mentally sensitive floodplain areas, political pressures to continue devel-
opment subsidizing in those areas should diminish. 
B. The Technical and Managerial Problem: The Case for Limiting 
Coastal Floodplain Development 
Beyond the conceptual issues of government takings, coastal floodplain 
management also demands attention to the unique problems created by 
situating human development in areas particularly susceptible to flooding. 
Flooding causes more damage in the United States than any other natural 
disaster,28 with the possible exception of droughts.29 Over half of U.S. com-
munities, representing every state in the nation and approximately seven 
28 See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Louisiana, 60 TuL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1985) ("Flooding is the most frequent and the most 
costly natural catastrophe in the United States, if not the world. Nine of every ten natural 
disasters in this country are flood related."); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FLOOD 
INSURANCE: INFORMATION ON THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD IN-
SURANCE PROGRAM 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDITION REPORT] 
(Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues); CHARLES A. 
PERRY, SIGNIFICANT FLOODS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 20TH CENTURy-USGS 
MEASURES A CENTURY OF FLOODS (U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 024-00, 2000), avail-
able at http://ks. water.usgs.gov/Kansas/pubs/fact-sheets/fs.024-00.pdf ("During the 20th 
century, floods were the number-one natural disaster in the United States in terms of num-
ber of lives lost and property damage."). 
29 Depending upon the method of measuring losses, some commentators argue droughts 
cause greater losses than flooding. See W.R. WALKER ET AL., MANAGEMENT OF WATER RE-
SOURCES FOR DROUGHT CONDITIONS: NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES SUMMARY 1988-1989, at 
150 (1991) ("When the true costs of drought are known, drought losses can dwarf the 
losses from other natural hazards."). 
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percent of the continental United States are subject to risk of flooding.30 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") estimates that, 
within the approximately 19,600 communities participating in the NFIP,31 
nine to twelve million structures are at risk of flood damage.32 
1. The Relationship Between Human Development and Flood Losses 
Despite long experience with floods and floodplains, despite a host of 
government programs designed to reduce flood losses, and despite a century 
of flood control measures, damages from flooding have only increased. 
There is no certain measure of annual flood losses, nor has the actual 
amount of land subject to flooding been accurately determined.33 The total 
costs of flooding are unknowable, partly because flood damage such as 
business losses, uninsured losses, tourism losses, and so on may be difficult 
to quantify, and partly because no agency systematically collects data on 
flooding losses. 34 It is clear though that the cost of flood-related disasters 
has increased substantially over the last century, not including billions 
expended on flood control and risk allocation measures.35 Measurable flood-
related losses now exceed an estimated $4 billion every year.36 
The increasing trend in flood-related damages has one cause: human 
development in floodplains. Flooding does not cause economic damages to 
30 See, e.g., Raymond J. Burby & Steven P. French, Coping with Floods: The Land Use 
Management Paradox, APA J., July 1981, at 289. 
31 See 2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDITION REPORT, supra note 28, at 3. 
32 See, e.g., 139 CONGo REC. SI0,857-58 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Kerry) (noting eleven million structures at risk and only nineteen percent participation 
rate); JAMES R. QUINN, THIRTY YEARS IN DEEP WATER: THE NFIP AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR 
SIGNIFICANCE 26 (2000) ("By the early 1980s some 2 million policies had been sold, out 
of a potential 12 million buildings cursorily identified by the NFIP as being in special 
flood hazards. To this date, the estimated number of buildings exposed to hazards has not 
been revised."); see also The National Flood Insurance Program and Repetitive Loss Prop-
erties: Hearing on H.R. 1428 and H.R. 1551 Before the House Comm. on Financial Serv-
ices, 107th Congo 104 (2001) (statement of Rebecca Quinn, Legislative Officer, Associa-
tion of State Floodplain Managers) (estimating number of buildings within special flood 
hazard areas at nine to eleven million). 
33 See ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-1; NANCY S. PHILIPPI, FLOODPLAIN 
MANAGEMENT-ECOLOGIC AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 22 (1996) (noting difficulties in 
measuring surface area of flood-prone land resulting from differing agency definitions of 
floodplains and dynamic nature of floodplain environments). 
34 For example, estimates of the costs of the 1993 Mississippi River floods range from 
approximately $3 billion to $15.6 billion to $20 billion. See PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 35-
37 (describing overall lack of data supporting reports on flood damages generated after 
1993 Mississippi River floods); see also PERRY, supra note 28 (assigning $20 billion loss 
estimate to 1993 Mississippi River floods). The differences between these estimates are 
due largely to varying methods of assessing whether any particular damages actually are 
flood-related and to the paucity of data available to estimators. See PHILIPPI, supra note 33, 
at 35-37. 
3S NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, HIGHER GROUND: A REPORT ON VOLUNTARY BUY-OUTS IN 
THE NATION'S FLOODPLAINS 3 (1999) [hereinafter HIGHER GROUND]' 
36 See id. at 3 & n.4; see also ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-1, 3-1 to 3-5. 
HeinOnline -- 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 307 2003
2003] Givings Recapture 307 
uninhabited beaches or to wetlands in riverine floodplains. Rather, flooding 
causes economic damages because floodplains-if one ignores their pro-
pensity for being flooded-are well-suited for many types of human de-
velopment.37 The problem of such overdevelopment has been recognized-
at least in general terms-for over a century.38 Recognition of the problem 
has not curbed development. Residential coastal floodplain development, 
with its attendant infrastructure and urbanization, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.39 Beyond the obvious economic benefits of coastal areas as 
37 See ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at I-I ("Human settlements and activities 
tend to use floodplains, frequently interfering with the natural floodplain processes and 
suffering inconvenience or catastrophe as a consequence."); Christopher City, Note, Duty 
and Disaster: Holding Local Governments Liable for Permitting Uses in High Hazard 
Areas, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2000) (noting tendency of local governments to ap-
prove permits for development in floodplains despite state and federal incentives against 
such development). 
38 "As population has increased, men have not only failed to devise means for suppressing 
or for escaping this evil [flooding], but have, with singular short-sightedness, rushed into its 
chosen paths." W. J. McGee, The Flood Plains of Rivers, II FORUM 221, 221-22 (1891). 
39 This Article addresses primarily the problems of implementing property acquisition 
programs and givings recapture mechanisms with respect to coastal floodplain develop-
ment. In contrast to coastal floodplains that have only recently been subject to development 
pressures, riverine floodplains historically have attracted urban development. Civilization 
itself arose from fertile floodplains of the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, and possibly a now-
submerged river in India, where annual floods deposited nutrient-rich sediments within 
floodplains to fertilize agricultural lands. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF 
AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 176 (1992); NewSci-
entist.com, Drowned Indian City Could Be World's Oldest, at http://www.newscientist. 
comlnews/news.jsp?id=ns99991808 (last modified Jan. 18,2002) (on file with the Harvard 
Environmental Law Review) (relating discovery of ancient city on banks of now sub-
merged river in Gulf of Cambay that appears to predate earliest Egyptian and Mesopota-
mian civilizations by approximately 4000 years). In the United States, settlement and agri-
culture congregated around river floodplains to take advantage of the prime agricultural 
land, drinking and irrigation water, riverine food sources, and access to transportation and 
trade routes. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 176. While riverine floodplain de-
velopment shares some characteristics with coastal development in terms of government 
givings that promote or maintain otherwise unsustainable floodplain development, the 
prospect of removing existing riverine floodplain development and preventing new devel-
opment in its place raises issues of equity and justice fundamentally different from those 
found in most coastal floodplain development. See H. Crane Miller, On the Brink: Coastal 
Location and Relocation Choices, in PLATT ET AL., COASTAL EROSION: HAS RETREAT 
SOUNDED? 167, 171 (1992) ("People buy on the oceanfront because they 'want to be 
there,' find the risks acceptable, and often would locate there if flood and wind insurance 
were not available. In addition, they are far more likely than their riverine counterparts to 
rebuild in the same location if a disaster destroys their home."); HIGHER GROUND, supra 
note 35, at 34-35 (noting that programs to remove existing riverine floodplain development 
potentially problematic where local officials could use programs as excuse for economic 
gerrymandering and economically disadvantaged riverine floodplain landowners likely 
could not receive sufficient compensation upon condemnation of their property to fund 
purchase of upland properties with reduced flood risks); Jim Schwab, "Nature Bats Last": 
The Politics of Floodplain Management, ENV'T & DEV., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at I (reporting 
that lower-income residential uses are often located in riverine floodplains because of 
zoning and/or market forces); Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and 
its Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE I, 3-18 (1996) (discussing theories justi-
fying disparate levels of disaster relief awarded based on disaster type and characteristics 
of victim class). I anticipate that these issues will be the subject of a future article. 
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ports, fisheries, and similar uses,40 residential coastal development largely 
lagged behind inland residential development patterns until the last three 
or four decades of the twentieth century. Before the twentieth century, 
beachfront and coastal floodplain development was uncommon.41 And 
until the 1970s, landowners were reluctant to build on the coasts because 
of the high risk of hurricanes and storm-driven floods. When they did 
build, it was typically either low-cost structures that could be replaced if 
they were destroyed in a flood, or structures built well back from the shore 
behind the protection of dunes and on higher ground.42 
Beginning in the 1970s coastal floodplain development increased dra-
matically in scale, cost, and quality.43 The combination of magnitude and 
expense obviously multiplies the costs of flood-related damages and of 
mitigation and remedial programs. Nearly half of all new construction in 
the United States over the last three decades occurred on the coasts.44 
There are now 3.5 million seasonal homes in the United States, and va-
cation home ownership rates are growing at an accelerated rate, with 
much of this development occurring on coastal f100dplains. 45 Addition-
ally, as total U.S. population continues to grow, floodplain development 
pressures will only increase, placing an ever growing number of dwell-
ings and people into high-risk or environmentally sensitive areas.46 
40 See, e.g., CORNELIA DEAN, AGAINST THE TiDE: THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S BEACHES 
(1999) (describing early affluence of Galveston, Texas, becasue of ideal location for 
trade on Gulf of Mexico). 
41 See id. at 13 ("Until this century, few people lived near the beach. It was just too 
dangerous."). Residential coastal development must, of course, be distinguished from 
commercial development along the coasts. Because of issues such as access to transporta-
tion, trade, and ocean food sources, commercial centers have always appeared along the 
coasts. See, e.g., BEACH, supra note 2, at 1 ("As long as humans have fished and traded, the 
coast has been prime real estate."). 
42 See DEAN, supra note 40, at 13. 
43 See ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-4 to 3-5 ("The coastlines of the United 
States have been attracting people in ever increasing numbers for several decades."); see 
also DEAN, supra note 40, at 13. 
44 DEAN, supra note 40, at 13 (citing PETER BENCHLEY, OCEAN PLANET 147 (1995». 
45 See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, at 601 [herein-
after 2000 CENSUS STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (Table No. 947, "Total Housing Inventory for 
the United States: 1980 to 2000"); see also Alison Stein Wellner, Seasonal AfIluenza: The 
Number of Seasonal Homes Is on the Rise, Making Wealthy Homeowners Easy to Spot, FORE-
CAST, Jan. 2002, at I (reporting that seasonal homes cluster on ocean or lake coasts or in 
mountains). From 1990 to 1995, seasonal housing increased by approximately six percent, 
and by twelve percent over the next five years. See 2000 CENSUS STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 
at 601 (Table No. 947, "Total Housing Inventory for the United States: 1980 to 2000"). 
. 46 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 4 ("The Census Bureau projects that the popu-
lation of the United States will increase to 322 million by the year 2020, a 23 percent rise. 
This popUlation increase, combined with the shrinking availability of developable land, 
will intensify pressure to use high-risk areas."). Following the demand for developable 
coastal land, markets have reacted predictably by raising land values along the coasts. And 
individual property owners have responded by building ever larger and more expensive 
beachfront homes. See Dan R. Anderson, Catastrophe Insurance and Compensation: Re-
membering Basic Principles, 53 CPCU J. 76 (2000) (stating that development growth in 
high-risk floodplains is comprised of disproportionately wealthy individuals who tend to 
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The coastal development boom occurred largely as a result of three 
factors. First, the last thirty years have seen increased public perception 
of recreational opportunities within coastal floodplains.47 People have 
flocked to the coasts to take advantage the interaction of land and sea.48 
Second, access to the coasts has improved over the last thirty years. 
This is attributable to rising real incomes during the 1990s, more favor-
able capital gains treatment for the sale of existing homes,49 and members 
of the so-called "baby boomer" generation seeking retirement housing 
and investments. These factors will continue to feed the high rate of de-
velopment for the foreseeable future. 5o Furthermore, increased desire for 
security and "family retreats" away from crowded metropolitan areas since 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may continue to fuel vacation 
home sales despite a falling stock market and relatively slow economy.51 
Additionally, federal and state infrastructure improvements and subsidies-
such as roads,52 bridges, navigation aids and improvements,53 wastewater 
treatment facilities,54 flood insurance, disaster relief, and others55-opened 
build relatively more expensive housing). These larger houses permit owners to rent their 
beachfront properties as vacation homes, offsetting a portion of the increased lot costs. See 
EVATT, supra note 5, at 24. 
47 See EVATT, supra note 5, at 17-18 (stating that reasons for surge in floodplain de-
velopment beginning in late 1960s "include growing appreciation for the kind of recrea-
tional opportunities offered on the coast paired with greater disposable income and more 
leisure time"). 
48 Most notably, beachfront owners enjoy a perception of privacy from being able to 
step out their back door and partake of the illusion that their domain extends to the hori-
zon. See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the Beach-
front, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 259-69 (1993). Other amenities include access to water 
recreation and a pleasant climate. See id. 
49 In 1997, Congress amended the Tax Code to eliminate the capital gains tax on the 
first $250,000 (or $500,000 for married couples filing jointly) of capital gains from the sale 
of a home. See 26 U.S.C. § 121(a) - (b) (2000). "Thus, many families can now sell their 
homes and use the proceeds to buy both a smaller residence and a second vacation home-
a strategy that is particularly attractive to the growing number of baby boomer families in 
the 'empty nest' phase of their lives." A Yen for Homes Away From Home, Bus. WK., Oct. 
16,2000, at 40. 
50 See, e.g., Anne Marshall, Home Sweet Second Home, BRANDWEEK, Apr. 15,2002, at 
26. 
51 See Wellner, supra note 45, at 1. 
52 Road development may be primarily responsible for initial development in previ-
ously inaccessible floodplain areas, especially on coastal floodplains and coastal barrier 
islands. See DAVID R. GODSCHALK, COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION: PuBLIC NOTIFICATION, 
EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS, AND HAZARD AREAS ACQUISITION 41 (1998). 
53 See EVATT, supra note 5, at 18 ("[D]evelopment on barrier islands could not have 
taken place without decisions by officials at various levels of government to improve ac-
cess to these islands through construction of causeways, bridges and roads.") (citing 
SHEAFFER & ROLAND, INC., BARRIER ISLAND DEVELOPMENT NEAR FOUR NATIONAL SEA-
SHORES 7 (1981». 
54 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is authorized to make grants to local 
communities for the construction of wastewater treatment works. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281 
(2000); see also Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 191-93 (3d Cir. 1983) (ana-
lyzing authority of EPA to refuse grants for otherwise permissible wastewater treatment 
facilities where facilities would tend to promote additional coastal development). 
55 See, e.g., GODSCHALK, supra note 52, at 39-42. State and local infrastructure subsi-
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new areas for development. Local governments seeking tourism-generated 
tax revenues have promoted coastal development.56 
Third, coastal development has increased because the weather has 
cooperated. Hurricane severity waxes and wanes over an approximately 
twenty-five- to thirty-year cycleY Nearly all coastal floodplain develop-
ment from the 1970s through the mid-1990s occurred during a lull in hurri-
cane activity.58 Because hurricane activity appears to be increasing over the 
long-term, due in part to global warming, sea level rise, and the natural 
hurricane cycle, coastal floodplain development is at risk of suffering previ-
ously unheard-of flooding losses.59 
The end result of this boom is heavily developed coastal floodplains 
that place a line of human beings, along with billions of dollars worth of 
development and public infrastructure, between the uplands and the sea. 
As this development intensifies, we may reach a point-if indeed we have 
not already passed it-where it will be too expensive to pull back, even if 
the cost of not doing so includes enormous economic and human losses 
and catastrophic environmental damage. 
dies appear to provide the initial base for coastal floodplain development, while federal 
subsidies promote "later expansion, improvements, repair, rehabilitation, or replacement of 
existing access or infrastructure necessary for community growth." Id. at 39. 
56 See Rutherford H. Platt, Congress and the Coast, ENVIRONMENT, July-Aug. 1985, at 
12 ("Because they are also usually eager to increase their tax base and to share in the boom 
in coastal development, local governments are often more closely allied with the interests 
of the private developer than with those of the broader region, the state, and the nation."); 
see also City, supra note 37, at 1536-37 (2000) (describing tendency of local governments 
to interfere with state and federal flood hazard mitigation programs by permitting devel-
opment in flood hazard areas). 
57 See, e.g., Report Says Conditions Favor More Hurricanes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
July 20, 2001, at lOA (describing predictions of likely decades-long period of increased 
hurricane activity along East and Gulf Coasts); Maya Bell, Building Code Will Take State 
by Storm: Lost Lives and Billions in Damages from Hurricanes Drove the Effort to Impose 
Uniform Rules Next Year, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 2001, at Bl ("After all, if the 
1990s were indeed the beginning of a more ferocious cycle, hurricane specialists say it 
could last another 20 to 30 years."); see also John Herke, Comment, Teething Pains at Age 
25: Developing Meaningful Enforcement of the National Flood Insurance Program, 7 TuL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 165, 182-83 (1993) (noting early 1990s potentially marked the beginning of a 
new, more active hurricane cycle). 
58 See William K. Stevens, Storm Warning: Bigger Hurricanes and More of Them, N.Y. 
nMES, June 3, 1997, at Cl (discussing trend of escalating hurricane damage in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s and attributing damage to "expanding population and exploding devel-
opment rather than more frequent or powerful storms"). 
59 
[Olver the past thirty years, while the coastal population has soared, the nation 
has experienced a relative lull in hurricane activity. But experts believe that the 
late-1990s mark the beginning of a period of unusually high hurricane activity. It 
may be in coastal areas especially that the inadequacies of the current mitigation 
systems will become the most evident. 
GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 36; see EVATT, supra note 5, at 15 (coastal and riverine 
floodplain development "grew at roughly twice the rate of population growth in the rest of 
the nation during a comparable period in the 1970s."). 
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Likewise, property values along the coasts-measured by the value 
of insured property-increased substantially during the last three dec-
ades.60 This population growth shows no signs of slowing. By 2020, a pro-
jected twenty-seven million additional people will reside along the coasts.61 
Increased development increases the exposure of floodplain property owners 
to growing flood losses that are subsequently transferred, in large part, to 
taxpayers.62 As a result of this concentration of ever more expensive de-
velopment in the nation's coastal floodplains, property owners, govern-
ments, and private insurers face a growing certainty of catastrophic flood 
losses while merely paying lip service to evidence of changing weather 
patterns, rising sea levels, and global warming: 
Evidence increasingly points to global warming, whether caused 
by carbon emissions or a long term climate cycle, and the possi-
bility of even more frequent and severe storms and flooding. Com-
pounding the problem is the rapid population growth in high-
risk areas. Currently, fifty percent of the population lives within 
fifty miles of the coastline and the percentage is growing. Three 
populous and high-risk states-California, Florida, and Texas 
(twenty-five percent of the U.S. population)-grew at twice the 
average growth of the United States in the period 1980 to 1993.63 
60 See INSURANCE IN ST. FOR PROPERTY Loss REDUCTION & INSURANCE RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, COASTAL EXPOSURE AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION: HURRICANE ANDREW'S 
LEGACY 8-9 (1995) [hereinafter COASTAL EXPOSURE AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION). 
During the period 1980-1993, for example, insured property values in coastal counties 
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts experienced percentage increases of at least 89% (Lou-
isiana) and up to 248% (New Hampshire). See id. 
61 See BEACH, supra note 2, at ii ("Over the next 15 years, 27 million additional peo-
ple-more than half of the nation's population increase-will funnel into this narrow cor-
ridor along the edge of the ocean."). 
62 "Natural disasters have grown larger as more people and property have become ex-
posed to natural hazards." GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 4. One commentator noted that in 
the face of estimated sea level increases of one to seven feet over the next century, 
"[ w)e 've essentially drawn a line in the sand and said, 'the sea shall not cross.' If it does 
it'll hit 2 trillion dollars worth of real estate." Bob Dart, America's Threatened Coastlines, 
ATLANTA CONST., June 4, 1994, at El. 
63 Anderson, supra note 46, at 76 (internal citations omitted). From 1990 to 2000, 
Florida's resident population increased by 23.5%, Texas's by 22.8% and California's by 
13.6% compared to 13.1 % for the United States as a whole. See 2000 CENSUS STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT, supra note 45, at 21 (Table No. 18, "Resident Population-States: 1980 to 
2000"). 
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2. The Relationship Between Floodplain Dynamics and 
Flood Losses 
[Vol. 27 
While floodplains may seem in many senses ideal for development, 
, after one factors in the dynamic nature of floodplains, the unsustainabil-
ity or impropriety of most floodplain development is obvious. In the most 
general sense, a floodplain is any area subject to flooding.64 Riverine and 
coastal floodplains include areas adjacent to rivers or shorelines subject to 
inundation when water volumes exceed the carrying capacity of the river or 
stream channel or when storm surge, subsiding coastline, erosion, or wave 
action carry ocean or lake water inland from the shoreline. Coastal flood-
plains are part of a dynamic system extending both landward and seaward 
from the waterline. This system includes numerous landforms-inner conti-
nental shelf sand banks, coastal barrier islands, dunes, coastal wetlands 
and estuaries, beaches, and uplands.65 The coastal floodplain system be-
gins on inner continental shelf sand banks. These sand banks often provide 
sand for maintenance of barrier islands and mainland beaches.66 Land-
ward, coastal barrier islands-unstable, sedimentary landforms found pre-
dominately from the coasts of southern New England to the Texas Gulf 
coast-shield the mainland from the full force of incoming stormsY Still 
further landward, beaches and coastal wetlands form the first mainland 
barrier against the destructive effects of wave action, storm surge, and 
coastal flooding. 68 Behind these landforms lie dune lines-accumulations 
of sand topped with salt-resistant vegetation that mark the boundary of 
inland sand transport by storm and wave action.69 
The risks that a particular floodplain will suffer flooding in any given 
year are unpredictable and unquantifiable. First, coastal floodplains them-
selves-and by extension shorelines contained within those floodplains-
are dynamic, ever-changing landforms. "The boundaries of a floodplain 
are in a constant state of flux, which makes it important ecologically .... 
64 See PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 20-26. 
6S RUTHERFORD H. PLATT ET AL., COASTAL EROSION: HAS RETREAT SOUNDED? 2 
(1992). 
66 Barrier islands are typically an Atlantic Coast landform, stretching from New Eng-
land to the Texas Gulf Coast. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING COASTAL ERO-
SION 23 (1990) [hereinafter MANAGING COASTAL EROSION]. 
67 See id. at 23-25; Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Common Cents 
Approach to Coastal Protection, 21 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018-19 (1991). 
68 See Platt, supra note 56, at 14. 
69 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION 20 (1995) 
[hereinafter BEACH NOURISHMENT] ("[A] precise or universal physical definition of a 
beach is not practical. For purposes of this study, 'beach' is defined in terms of its mobility. 
The landward edge of a beach, which in this broad definition often includes backing dune 
fields, is set by the maximum shoreward movement of water during a severe storm. The 
seaward extent is determined by the point at which substantial shore-perpendicular motion 
of sand ceases. Both of these limits depend on storm intensity during the period of obser-
vation."). 
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It is that fluctuating boundary that defines the ecologic floodplain."70 Coastal 
floodplains constantly are subject to forces of erosion or accretion that 
cause dynamic shifts in the way these floodplains react to flooding. Wave 
action transports sediment landward from offshore sand sources, moves 
sand laterally "down shore" or "downdrift" from up shore or updrift beaches, 
or erodes sediment from shoreline bluffs to deposit the sediment as a nar-
row strip of constantly changing sand between dry land and the ocean.7l 
Closer inland, beaches form from the erosion of headlands by wave ac-
tion and by sediment transport from inland rivers.72 Over time, beaches, 
dunes, and barrier islands alter their size, shape, location, and topography 
in reaction to erosive and accretive forces of wave action, storm surge, 
and rising sea levels. Each of these changes alters the ability of the coastal 
floodplain to protect inland areas from flooding. 73 
As a result, floodplains are uniquely impermanent and changeable 
landforms, subject to destruction or catastrophic alteration through erosion 
during flood events. Oceanfront property-including beaches, barrier is-
lands, and other coastal landforms-is eroding constantly and hundreds 
of feet of beach may disappear in a single storm.74 Compared to "dry" real 
estate that remains permanently in place and responds only to tectonic 
forces, floodplains are not "real land," but rather may disappear under the 
property owner's feet at any time. 
70 PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 21. 
71 See MANAGING COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, at 23-29, 36-38 (describing 
beach formation along Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Great Lakes coastlines). 
72 See id. at 36-40 (describing beach formation by river transport of sand or from 
eroding headlands along Atlantic and Pacific coasts). 
73 For example, along the Atlantic Coast, shorelines are eroding at an average of 2.6 
feet per year. FEMA, PROJECTED IMPACT OF RELATIVE SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE NATIONAL 
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 9 (1991) [hereinafter PROJECTED IMPACT OF RELATIVE SEA 
LEVEL RISE]. Although the Pacific Coast also has localized areas experiencing erosion, 
much of that shoreline consists of crystalline rock bluffs that are relatively resistant to 
erosion. See id.; see also BEACH NOURISHMENT, supra note 69, at 20. But the rate of 
change on coastal floodplains can vary widely between different locations. See Miller, 
supra note 39, at 2-4 (noting widely varying rates of coastal erosion). Records of erosion 
rates are also difficult to maintain over the time scales necessary to provide meaningful 
measurements. In the late 1880s, surveyors established 200 survey monuments along the 
east coast of Cape Cod. See DEAN, supra note 40, at 17 (describing efforts of Henry L. 
Mandarin to map the Outer Cape). By the 1950s, surveyors could find only seventy-four of 
these monuments, and by '1979, only eighteen of the monuments remained. See id. at 18-
19. Other coastal shorelines have similar long-term records of erosion, while still other es-
timates of coastal erosion rates depend on less accurate sources such as aerial photographs. 
See Miller, supra note 39, at 3. Although in some cases these records provide evidence of 
historical and projected erosion rates, many other areas are eroding at unknown rates for 
which there are no reliable historical records. Additionally, predicted and historical aver-
age rates of erosion fail to capture potentially rapid erosion reSUlting from extreme events. 
A single coastal storm can inundate large areas of coastline, cutting new inlets across bar-
rier islands or wiping out entire beaches, bluffs, or other shoreline structures. See id. at 3-4 
(noting shoreline erosion can manifest over periods of months, hours, or minutes during 
seasonal weather activity or during high-energy storms). 
74 Beaches respond to the forces of waves, tides, currents, and winds "on time scales 
ranging from hours to millennia." MANAGING COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, at 23. 
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Second, flooding is a weather-driven phenomenon. For many rea-
sons, predicting weather beyond a few days' forecast remains a specula-
tive process at best and pure fiction at worst. Historical climate records 
are inadequate to provide accurate and reliable predictions of flood risk. 75 
Additionally, the cyclic nature of weather phenomena introduces greater 
complexity to models attempting to predict where, when, and how much 
flooding will occur in any given region. For instance, precipitation and 
temperature can vary widely over decades-long cycles,16 and hurricane ac-
tivity in the United States apparently waxes and wanes on a twenty-five-
to thirty-year cycle.77 Finally, global warming-whether human-induced 
or otherwise-is also intensifying the unpredictability of flooding. With 
these rising temperatures come predictions of rising sea levels-from one 
to three feet-and potentially more extreme weather patterns and hurri-
cane seasons.78 
75 See id. ("Barrier beaches are perhaps the most dynamic coastal land masses along 
the open-ocean coast .... Barrier islands are typically low-lying, flood prone, and under-
lain by easily erodable, unconsolidated sediments. Thus, these land forms are especially 
difficult to develop because they are so dynamic."). In many cases, historical records of 
climate, temperature, and precipitation have been maintained for only a half century. See 
PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 13-14 ("Systematic observations of climactic phenomena go no 
further back than, on average, 35 years .... "). "Considering the nation's short history of 
hydrologic record-keeping as well as the limited knowledge of long-term weather patterns, 
flood recurrence intervals are difficult to predict." INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. RE-
VIEW COMM., SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST 
CENTURY 3 (1994) [hereinafter SHARING THE CHALLENGE]; see also HIGHER GROUND, supra 
note 35, at 58 (noting "concerns about the accuracy of some flood insurance rate maps, and 
further concerns that some home buyers may be critically uninformed about a building's 
flood history and risks .... "). It is possible to infer some information about climate before 
the twentieth century from sources such as tree rings and ice cores, but that information 
discloses only that temperature and precipitation vary widely over decades-long cycles 
while maintaining consistent long-term averages. See PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 13-14. 
76 See PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 14-15 ("Analysis of tree rings tells us that there have 
not been any long-term changes in mean annual precipitation over the past 400 years, but 
within that time frame there have been wide swings in precipitation variability over 20- to 
30-year periods. The 45 years between 1920 and 1965, for example, was a period of low 
variability and low precipitation. As most of our precipitation gauges have been providing 
systematic data, on average, only since 1942, the historical record is probably of no more 
use in predicting precipitation than it is in predicting temperature trends."). 
77 This cycle last peaked in the 1940s and 1950s, when there was little development on 
the coasts. The 1970s and 1980s were, in contrast, a relatively mild period in which hurri-
canes struck the U.S. coasts with less frequency and intensity. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 
67, at 1024-26. Many experts now believe that the lull in hurricane activity that lasted 
from the late 1960s through the early 1990s has ended and such vastly destructive storms 
as Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Fran are merely harbingers of hurricane seasons 
lashing the coasts with multiple storms of ever greater magnitude. See supra note 57. 
78 Along the U.S. coasts, FEMA has estimated that a one- to three-foot rise in relative 
sea levels over the next century could cause the loss of twenty-five to eighty percent of 
U.S. coastal wetlands, increase the total amount of shoreline subject to erosion, potentially 
increase the rate at which that erosion occurs, and increase extreme weather phenomena 
such as hurricanes and tropical storms. See PROJECTED IMPACT OF RELATIVE SEA LEVEL 
RISE, supra note 73, at 13-14 ("If global temperatures increase, changes in climate could 
occur that would affect hurricane activity. There has been scientific speculation about the 
effect of global warming on the frequency, intensity, and tracks of hurricanes."). FEMA's 
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Third, human-induced changes to floodplains can have dramatic im-
pacts upon drainage within a floodplain and the ability of floodplain land-
forms to protect human development from flooding. Examples of such 
changes include urbanization of floodplains, flood control measures, and 
errors in mapping floodplains and flood risks. For example, urban devel-
opment within coastal floodplains can substantially increase the amount 
of impervious surface within the floodplain and alter flood risks within 
that environment.79 Moreover: 
A study by the American Geophysical Union found that popu-
lation growth in high-risk states is disproportionately composed 
of wealthy individuals. Such individuals would tend to build 
more expensive properties, which increases the exposure. The 
combination of increased frequency and severity of catastrophes 
with exploding growth in high-risk areas raises ominous ques-
tions for the insuranc~ industry and society in general.80 
Although the potential losses from flood-related damages to coastal 
floodplain development are staggering-a Category 5 hurricane making 
landfall in Miami, Florida, for example, would cause an estimated $52.5 
billion in insured losses81-these losses would be understandable if the 
report on sea level rise, however, also noted that other researchers have concluded that 
rising sea levels and increasing global temperatures may actually decrease the intensity of 
hurricanes and tropical storms. See id at 14. Other researchers have' speculated that even 
temperatures on the low end of the possible range of projected increases could extend the 
annual hurricane season by twenty days, increase the severity of storms that do make land-
fall, introduce greater unpredictability in hurricane activity cycles, and potentially increase 
projected hurricane losses by thirty percent by 2010. See COASTAL EXPOSURE AND COM-
MUNITY PROTECTION, supra note 60, at 12. 
79 ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-11 to 1-12 (noting that local drainage con-
ditions caused by increased development may cause flooding. "One study found that as 
population density increased from 100 to \3,000 persons per square mile, the peak rate of 
surface runoff became about 10 times greater."); see also BEACH, supra note 2, at 7-11 
("When more than ten percent of the acreage of a watershed is covered in roads, parking 
lots, rooftops, and other impervious surfaces, the rivers and streams within the watershed 
become seriously degraded."); The National Flood Insurance Program and Repetitive Loss 
Properties: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportu-
nity of the Committee on Financial Services, I07th Congo 56 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing 
on Repetitive Loss Properties] (prepared statement of Rep. Richard H. Baker) (arguing that 
homeowner who was not subject to flood risk when property was purchased, but now 
owning a repetitive loss property because urban development with poor drainage planning 
has diverted floodwaters onto homeowner's property should not be responsible for losses 
and should not be forced to move). 
80 Anderson, supra note 46, at 76 (internal citations omitted). 
81 See COASTAL EXPOSURE AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION, supra note 60, at 11 figs. 2-
6. The same intensity hurricane would cause $51.9 billion in insured losses in Ft. Lauder-
dale, Florida, $42.5 billion in Galveston, Texas, $33.5 billion in Hampton, Virginia, and 
$25.6 billion in New Orleans. See id. Importantly, these figures represent only potential 
insured losses, and do not include flooding damages (which are insured-with few excep-
tions-through the National Flood Insurance Program), uninsured property damages, or 
public costs of repairing damaged public infrastructure and disaster assistance payments. 
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individuals ·who made the decision to live in high-risk flood zones bore 
the costs of their decisions. But, as discussed in Part IV, numerous state 
and federal programs spread the burden of flood risks and damages across 
the nation as a whole, meaning that upland taxpayers who suffer rela-
tively few floods must subsidize the lifestyle choices of those who choose 
to live and build in flood-prone areas. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT GIVINGS IN COASTAL FLOODPLAINS 
Programs for the public acquisition of floodplain properties are ex-
pensive because they must compensate landowners for the fair market 
value of the purchased property rights, whether the government purchases 
the entire fee interest, a subsidiary right such as a conservation easement, 
or development or redevelopment rights. Some of the value to be purchased 
can be measured either as the "intrinsic" value of the land or property 
rights-i.e., the value of bare ownership of the property-or as the value 
of improvements added to the property. Other components of the value of 
a parcel of real property arise not from the mere intrinsic value of owner-
ship of the land (if any) or the value of improvements or rents, but rather 
from government action that increases the value of the parcel. Such gov-
ernment actions-known as "givings"-are the mirror image of govern-
ment takings under the Fifth Amendment.82 Where takings jurisprudence 
has long attempted to define those situations in which the government 
must compensate a property owner for some regulatory interference with 
property rights, scholars have only recently begun to ask the corresponding 
givings question: When may the government force owners to pay (or 
forego compensation) for the value of givingst3 
The givings issue fundamentally concerns who should retain the in-
crease in market value accruing to a particular parcel subsequent to a gov-
The total cost of such a storm event would thus be far higher. 
82 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky. Givings. III YALE LJ. 547. 550 
(200 I) ("Like a reflection in a mirror. the massive universe of takings is everywhere ac-
companied by givings. For every type of taking. there exists a corresponding type of giv-
ing."); see also Cordes. supra note 10. at 1033. 
83 Givings jurisprudence has received little scholarly attention as a discrete field be-
yond Professors Bell and Parchomovsky's detailed taxonomy and analysis. See Bell & 
Parchomovsky. supra note 82. at 549 & n.3 ("[G]ivings-government distributions of 
property-have been largely overlooked by the academy.") (citing WINDFALLS FOR WIPE-
OUTS (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds .• 1978); Louis Kaplow. An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Transactions. 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); C. Ford Runge et al.. Gov-
ernmental Actions Affecting Land and Property Values: An Empirical Review of Takings 
and Givings (Lincoln lnst. of Land Policy. Working Paper No. WP96CRI. 1996) as primary 
exceptions to perceived lack of attention to field of givings by "mainstream of legal litera-
ture"). It is not the purpose of this Article to build on that analysis. but rather to explore 
the capacity for givings recapture mechanisms to affect floodplain management policy. 
Additionally. many scholars and commentators have recognized and explored some aspects 
of the givings issue in connection with other analyses. See generally EpSTEIN. supra note 
19; Cordes. supra note 10. at 1033; Thompson. supra note 9. 
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ernment project or regulation that provides some measurable benefits to 
that parcel.84 For example: 
Assume a property owner has a tract of remote land worth 
$10,000. The government then builds a major highway near the 
property, creating new commercial opportunities and raising the 
total value to $60,000 over several years. A short time later, the 
government imposes an environmental restriction on the prop-
erty, decreasing its value to $30,000. Although it might initially 
appear that the government actions diminished property values 
by 50% in this example, in fact the cumulative effect was to in-
crease value by threefold.85 
Givings jurisprudence is important in floodplain management because 
givings arguably make up a large portion of the value of a floodplain parcel. 
In the context of floodplain management, the $10,000 property is located 
on a coastal barrier island, formerly accessible only by ferry. Addition-
ally, the property is improved with a small cottage worth an additional 
$10,000. After· a bridge to the barrier island improves access to additional 
recreational uses for the state's growing tourism industry, and after sub-
stantial highway improvements to accommodate the increased traffic 
flow, the value of the land increases to $120,000 and demand for vacation 
rentals in the immediate area rises. Because of the availability of federal 
flood insurance, together with state and federal funds for improving local 
infrastructure and public facilities, the owner demolishes the cottage and 
erects a $250,000 beachfront mansion. Additionally, speculators, inves-
tors, and individuals wanting a vacation home on the beach purchase lots 
on the newly accessible barrier island, and land prices rise as the market 
reacts to the island's new accessibility. Suddenly the $10,000 lot is sell-
ing for $1 million. 
The growth in givings and value does not stop with the sale of land. 
As the barrier island begins to erode-as it must if it is to remain an ef-
fective protective barrier for mainland communities-startled r~sidents 
discover their back yards disappearing. Because of the highly concentrated, 
easily defined political interest group forming along the eroding beach, 
state and federal officials must react. The most effective short-term solu-
tion requires the Army Corps of Engineers and state agencies to begin sand 
replenishment projects-dredging sand from offshore littoral banks to 
deposit on the eroding beach at a· cost of nearly $1 million per year.86 As 
84 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing need to discriminate between 
value created by individual efforts and that created by government action). 
8S Mark W. Cordes, The Public/Private Balance in Land Use Regulation, 1998 DE-
TROIT c.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 698. 
86 See BEACH NOURISHMENT, supra note 69, at 45-49 (discussing costs and benefits of 
beach nourishment projects). 
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this hypothetical illustrates, not only are government givings inextricably 
intertwined with private actions improving the value of coastal flood-plain 
properties, but coastal floodplain location also dramatically magnifies the 
impact of government givings. 
In assessing the importance of the givings issue to coastal floodplain 
properties, it is necessary to recognize the sources of such givings. Gov-
ernmental givings in floodplains take two forms-either direct givings or 
what this Article will call "fiat givings." 
A. Direct Givings 
Direct givings involve both physical infrastructure improvements that 
permit development to take place or expand and flood control measures 
that reduce the risk of flooding and flood-related damagesY Direct giv-
ings may include physical infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, 
and wastewater treatment facilities that permit, promote, or maintain de-
velopment within floodplains. 88 Alternatively, direct givings include struc-
tural and nonstructural flood control mechanisms, such as levees, dams, 
beach nourishment, disaster assistance, and flood insurance. All of these 
governmental responses to flooding reduce the risk of loss to floodplain 
property owners, transferring that risk to the taxpayers at large. 
B. Fiat Givings 
Additionally, floodplains-in contrast to "dry" or upland real estate-
incorporate a source of givings value not found in other real estate. Where 
dry real estate generally suffers significant changes in topography, elevation, 
shape, etc., only on a tectonic time scale,89 floodplains by their nature suffer 
87 Professors Bell and Parchomovsky classified direct givings into a taxonomy of three 
categories-physical givings, derivative givings, and regulatory givings. See Bell & Par-
chomovsky, supra note 82, at 550-51. Physical givings result from direct grants of prop-
erty interests by the state to a private actor, such as an issuance of broadcasting rights. See 
id. at 551. Regulatory givings occur when state regulations enhance the value of private 
property, such as a removal of regulatory restrictions on development. See id. And deriva-
tive givings, according to Professors Bell and Parchomovsky, arise "whenever the state 
indirectly increases the value of property by engaging in a physical or regulatory giving or 
taking," including state construction of public facilities that increases nearby property 
values. [d. Because this Article addresses reforms to floodplain management policy to 
permit and promote recapture of givings to floodplain property owners, it is not necessary 
to assess whether or where the concept of fiat givings introduced herein fits within the 
taxonomy described by Bell and Parchomovsky. 
88 See H. CRANE MILLER, TuRNING THE TIDE ON TAX DOLLARS: POTENTIAL FEDERAL 
PROGRAM SAVINGS FROM ADDITIONS TO THE COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES SYSTEM 2 
(1989) (noting that increasing areas within the Coastal Barrier Resources System that are 
ineligible to receive federal spending of any kind would result in substantial savings in 
sewers, water supply, construction of bridges, causeways and roads, disaster relief, flood 
insurance, and shore protection). 
89 Of course, catastrophic geomorphological events such as volcanic or earthquake ac-
tivity may also alter the properties of any real property in minutes or hours. But such 
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regular and predictable-in the sense that we know it will happen within 
some near-future time frame-inundation, erosion, and potentially cata-
strophic alteration. In other words, floodplains, as discussed above, are dy-
namic systems in which the boundary between land and water must change 
to reflect the impact of water on erodable land formations. 90 
In light of the substantial and knowable risks that floodplain prop-
erty may cease to exist in useable form, land markets should discount 
floodplain property values versus upland property values to reflect these 
increased risks. Despite this impermanence of floodplain landforms, there is 
no clear relationship between land values and flood risk-"the existence 
of a discount for primary flood damages has never been empirically dem-
onstrated.,,91 Some of this lack of a discount for flood risks may be ex-
plained by the presence of flood control measures such as levees and other 
structural protections.92 Additionally, land value discounts could be obscured 
by increased costs of construction in a floodplain to comply with regulations 
requiring elevation above designated flood levels or other "attributes unique 
to the floodplain" location.93 Risk allocation measures may further obscure 
land value discounts by making taxpayers bear some of the risk of flood-
events account for less than ten percent of all disaster-related economic losses. In compari-
son, climatological events, including floods, cause over eighty percent of all disaster-related 
economic losses in the United States. See DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A 
REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1999). 
90 Coastal barrier islands best illustrate this fact. Barrier islands are loose conglomera-
tions of unconsolidated sediment that form seaward of beaches generally found along the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts from New York to Texas. See supra notes 66-67 and accompany-
ing text. These landforms are not permanent-they constantly alter their shape and size 
through erosion and accretion, sometimes disappearing altogether only to form again fur-
ther down the shore. "Barrier islands also move with relation to the roads, buildings, and 
bridges. In some areas of the country, barrier islands are becoming narrower by action of 
the sea; in other areas, the islands are translating shoreward; and in still other areas, the 
islands are translating seaward." William J. Donovan, Barrier Islands: Public Values and 
Public Commitment, Remarks Prepared for a Barrier Islands Workshop Panel Discussion 
at the National Symposium on Preventing Coastal Flood Disasters 2 (May 23-25, 1983) 
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
91 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE EFFECT OF FLOOD 
RISK ON HOUSING PRICES 5 (1998) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
The Army Corps of Engineers study did observe a few instances where property values 
may reflect increased flood risk, including properties that recently experienced flooding 
and some floodplain properties that capitalized the cost of flood insurance into the property 
value. See id. at 13. But see Janet Furman Speyrer & Wade R. Ragas, Housing Prices and 
Flood Risk: An Examination Using Spline Regression, 4 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 395, 
406 (1991) (concluding that floodplain land values are discounted largely to capitalize cost 
of flood insurance with some additional portion of property value discounts possibly at-
tributable to inconvenience or other factors, but noting that repeated flood losses do not 
cause further discounts to land values). 
92 See James M. Holway & Raymond J. Burby, The Effects of Floodplain Development 
Controls on Residential Land Values, 66 LAND ECON. 259, 269 (1990) (noting generally 
higher values for parcels protected by flood control devices). 
93 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 91, at 5; see also Holway & Burby, su-
pra note 92, at 260 ("Once houses are built [on floodplain property I extra construction 
costs incurred in elevating or floodproofing residences may equal any decline in the value 
of vacant land, hence no effect is observed."). 
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plain development. Moreover, particularly with respect to coastal proper-
ties located on beaches or barrier islands, it may not be reasonable to 
compare the value of beachfront properties with those located further 
inland, solely because ocean frontage may be such a unique asset that any 
capitalization of flood risk is obscured.94 Finally, a primary factor in the 
lack of obvious discounts for the risk of flood damages to properties lo-
cated within a floodplain is the length of time since any particular prop-
erty has experienced flooding. Communities with recent floods appear to 
suffer flooding-related property value discounts, but the longer a commu-
nity goes without experiencing a significant flood, the less likely the land 
markets are to discount property values for flood risk, even though rela-
tive flood risks may be equivalent.95 
Structural protections alone, however, should not completely elimi-
nate flood-risk discounts to property values. As the 1993 Mississippi floods 
conclusively illustrated, even the most extensive levee system in the world 
fails, and when levees fail, they fail completely and empty the river into 
the formerly protected areas.96 Likewise, all other structural protections-
including groins, seawalls, dams, and channel improvements-fail during 
floods that exceed their design characteristics. Similarly, risk allocation 
measures such as disaster assistance and flood insurance do not cover even a 
majority of most flood-related losses.97 Land markets should incorporate 
this information, but there is no clear indication that they do SO.98 
The concept of fiat givings may resolve at least a part of this di-
lemma. This Article defines "fiat givings" as givings that result where the 
government declares-either expressly or by implication-that it will not 
94 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 91, at 5 (noting potential benefits 
for properties within floodplains such as water access and "nice views" are difficult to 
assess separately from negative factors of floodplain location). 
95 See, e.g., Holway & Burby, supra note 92, at 269 (noting difference in apparent 
property value discount between cities experiencing recent floods and those that had not 
experienced recent flooding); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 91, at 13 (not-
ing no studies showing long-term negative effects of recent flooding on property values). 
96 See White, supra note 4, at 18 ("Levees and flood walls carry a special disadvantage; 
if overtopped by a flow greater than the design flood, the maximum loss occurs."); cf. 
RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF EXTREME NATU-
RAL EVENTS 6 (1999). 
97 Flood insurance covers only approximately four million of twelve million eligible 
structures. See infra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
98 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 91, at 31-32 (stating that studies 
of the effect of flood risk on real estate values indicate that land markets may discount 
property values for location within a floodplain, but there is no clear indication that any 
discount for flood damages is capitalized into the fair market value of floodplain proper-
ties). The tendency of floodplain property owners to underestimate or minimize flood risks 
has long been recognized. See Gilbert F. White, Strategic Aspects of Urban Floodplain 
Occupance, in I GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT 84, 92 (Robert W. Kates & 
Ian Burton eds. 1986) (1960) ("There is widespread ignorance of the flood hazard and a 
tendency to minimize it. Many people building or buying in floodplains are unaware of the 
precise hazard they are running or grossly misinterpret the technical estimates. This ap-
plies even in places where there have been public plans for flood protection. A man says he 
need not worry about floods because a 200-year flood occurred the year before.") 
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permit a floodplain landowner's property to move, erode, or disappear. By 
declaring its intent to guard floodplain properties against future encroach-
ments by nature, government has in effect created "dry" land by fiat. 99 
Land protected by this fiat is no longer subject to the risk that it will one 
day disappear under water, but rather is "backed by the full faith and credit" 
of the federal or state government issuing the fiat. 
The West Hampton Dunes beach restoration project on Long Island 
provides a strong example of fiat givings. Following litigation over rapid 
erosion of beachfront property caused by poorly designed erosion control 
structures, the federal government, together with state and local govern-
ments, promised in a 1994 settlement agreement with the residents of 
West Hampton Dunes to invest approximately $80 million in beach nour-
ishment projects over thirty years to restore and maintain properties and 
beaches within the West Hampton Dunes community.1°O Despite the fact 
that the project presumably will terminate at the end of thirty years, re-
opening the area to threats of erosion and inundation, property owners ex-
pect that the government will be there to continue funding an implied 
guarantee that their property will continue to exist: 
In theory, in year 31, long after the time when most here will 
have any concern about the area, that project will terminate .... 
But we're betting for our heirs that having spent $80 million and 
having created one of the most beautiful public beaches in the 
United States that, thirty-one years from now, government is not 
going to walk away from that. 101 
99 In commenting on a draft of this Article, Professor Poirier suggested that the term 
"fiat givings" could be more accurately characterized as government-created reliance that 
the existing state of events will be maintained. I prefer the "fiat givings" construct in the 
.context of givings because, in addition to the element of reliance on a sovereign entity, 
"fiat" also connotes that value has been created where it did not exist before, purely by the 
exercise of the sovereign will. By declaring that it will essentially maintain in place coastal 
floodplains as if they were dry land, the federal and state governments have created a sys-
tem in which heretofore non-valuable real estate can now be traded in the land markets as 
if it possessed the relative permanence of dry land, similar to a fiat money system in which 
non-valuable paper can be exchanged for valuable goods and services because the govern-
ment has declared that the paper shall be recognized as valuable. The fiat givings there 
result both from the governmental declaration that something without value or with only 
limited value now possesses such and from the degree of reliance land markets and prop-
erty owners place on that declaration. 
100 DEAN, supra note 40, at 42-43. The village of West Hampton Dunes was incorpo-
rated to advance the interests of coastal floodplain property owners whose properties had 
been completely eroded and wiped out during storms in 1992 and 1993. The "village" was 
largely underwater at the time it entered into a settlement agreement that required federal, 
state, and local agencies to construct a new beach and pump millions of tons of sand to 
restore properties submerged by erosion. [d. 
101 [d. at 43 (quoting LONG ISLAND COASTAL ALLIANCE, INC., PRESERVING LONG Is-
LAND'S COASTLINE: A DEBATE ON POLICY 22 (1995) (reporting statement of attorney John 
J. O'Connell at the Alliance's 1994 annual conference)). 
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Fiat givings arise from government actions declaring that some gov-
ernment entity will do what is necessary to protect floodplain properties 
from ceasing to exist. And government entities reinforce and increase the 
value of fiat givings whenever they protect private property at taxpayer ex-
pense. Government must pay for these fiat givings when it purchases 
floodplain property. Although the value of these givings is unclear, it is 
absurd that government must pay these increased costs in a buyout pro-
gram that amounts to a tacit admission that the fiat has been rescinded. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT FLOODPLAIN 
MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
Floodplain management draws from two opposing schools of thought: 
(1) "stand your ground," and (2) retreat. 102 Current policy favors the for-
mer. Federal and state approaches to floodplain management have suc-
ceeded to some extent in preventing losses from relatively minor floods, 
but have largely failed to move development from high-risk floodplains 
and to prevent new development in those floodplains. This failure has 
occurred primarily because current floodplain management policy ac-
tively promotes-even mandates-structural flood control measures and 
risk allocation mechanisms, yet provides incentives only for local gov-
ernments to promote land use management within floodplains. In other 
words, current programs minimize the risks and costs of floodplain de-
velopment-thus providing substantial givings to floodplain property own-
ers-while failing to place any meaningful burden on individuals who 
choose to build within the floodplains. 103 
It is unclear whether federal and state flood hazard mitigation pro-
grams drive initial floodplain development. 104 The relationship-to the 
102 Neither school has ever held absolute sway on federal and state policy. 
Obviously, the floodplains of the United States will not be permanently evacuated 
and returned to nature merely because of the annual bill for their occupancy .... 
Neither will they be occupied as intensely as consistent with other relevant physi-
cal and cultural conditions solely because, irrespective of cost, suitable engineer-
ing and land-use devices can be developed to curb or prevent floods .... Wher-
ever the adjustments are not satisfactory, as attested by crippling flood losses, 
wherever a regressive occupance obtains, or wherever the floodplain resources 
are not used as fully as practicable, a readjustment may be in the public interest. 
White, supra note 4, at 15-16 (emphasis added). 
103 See City, supra note 56, at 1542-43 (federal and state programs that provide 
benefits to local governments that purport to regulate land use within floodplains but that 
do not hold local governments accountable for unwise development fail to create any 
meaningful incentive to prevent floodplain developments); see also Burby & French, supra 
note 30, at 296 ("[I]t is far easier to allow floodplain encroachment and qesign new con-
struction to withstand flood' damage than it is to keep development away from valuable 
natural areas."). 
104 See EVATT, supra note 5, at I ("None of the studies [of the impact of the NFIP on 
floodplain development incentives] offer irrefutable evidence that the availability of flood 
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extent it can be observed-is likely a function of preexisting development 
pressures, perceived flood risks, and access to political institutions by 
affected property owners.105 After the initial phase of floodplain develop-
ment, however, "federal involvement in community development tends to 
increase with population and with each program that expands the capac-
ity of individual systems to accommodate growth."I06 With each wave of 
expanded public support and public infrastructure, floodplain development 
increases and thereby expands its ability to claim an ever larger share of 
federal flood control and mitigation subsidies. This, in tum, further exposes 
the community to greater potential losses from flooding. 107 
Government responses to flooding fall into three categories: struc-
tural mitigation, risk allocation, and land use management. lOS For pur-
poses of this Article, structural mitigation comprises those acts taken to 
reduce physically the impact on persons and property directly damaged 
insurance is a primary factor in floodplain development today. Neither does the empirical 
evidence lend itself to the opposite conclusions .... Development pressure in most of the 
areas studied existed before NFIP and continued even after NFIP was selectively with-
drawn (as in the case of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act)."); see also Siffin, supra note 
5, at 298: 
Many people want to live at the ocean's edge and can afford to buy land and 
housing on the barrier islands-under existing conditions. These conditions have 
largely been created by the concatenating effects of a number of federal pro-
grams. None of these bureaucratic enterprises were intended primarily to foster 
and promote barrier-island settlement. Some of the most important were estab-
lished with no attention to their effects on the islands. But at least one may have 
been created with some awareness that it would encourage urban settlement on 
floodplains and other valuable locations: the Federal Flood Insurance Program. 
Evatt's 1999 review of studies on the impact of the NFIP on floodplain development dis-
putes Siffin's argument that the NFIP is primarily responsible for floodplain development, 
and similar arguments by others, as myth. See EVATT, supra note 5, at 26-27. 
105 For example, development on coastal barrier islands almost always precedes federal 
funding of infrastructure improvements and risk allocation mechanisms: 
Federal subsidization on the coastal barriers has been most evident in roads, 
bridges, and causeway access; water storage and water treatment facilities; 
wastewater treatment facilities; shore protection; flood insurance subsidies; and 
disaster assistance. In almost all instances, federal funding came after initial de-
velopment of the community was financed by private capital, by local or state 
revenue bonds, or by other non federal sources. 
H. Crane Miller, Shifting Sands of Coastal Barrier Development Subsidies 6 (May 1983) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (published 
in Preventing Coastal Flood Disasters: The Role of the States and Federal Response, Ass'n 
of State Floodplain Managers, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information 
Center Special Pub. No.7, May 1983) (emphasis added). 
106ld. at 7. 
101 Id. at 7; see also Siffin, supra note 5, at 298 (while each federal flood control and 
risk allocation program by itself serves a plausible purpose, in aggregate federal programs 
act to stimulate barrier island development). 
108 See RAYMOND J. BURBY & STEVEN P. FRENCH, FLOOD PLAIN LAND USE MANAGE-
MENT: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5 (1985). 
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by natural disasters such as flooding. On coastal floodplains, structural miti-
gation measures include groins, jetties, seawalls, beach nourishment proj-
ects, and other mechanisms to prevent or reverse erosion at a particular point 
on the coastal floodplain. Risk allocation mechanisms share or pool risks 
of catastrophic losses of different magnitudes across a broad population. 
These mechanisms may include relatively focused risk allocation mecha-
nisms such as flood insurance under the NFIP or more broad-based risk 
sharing mechanisms such as disaster relief. Land use management and plan-
ning attempts to minimize the actual population at risk from floods by 
guiding development away from high-risk floodplains.109 
Land use planning efforts, unlike physical and visible structural miti-
gation measures and politically advantageous risk allocation payments, 
have only recently begun to receive significant attention as a floodplain man-
agement technique. IIO As a result, government givings under structural miti-
gation and risk allocation programs continue to promote and maintain the 
very development that land use management and planning would other-
wise limit. 
A. Structural Mitigation: Armoring and Beach Nourishment 
The best, and most obvious, example of government givings to flood-
plain property owners occurs with the public funding of structural miti-
gation measures. Structural mitigation confers both direct givings and, to 
a lesser extent, fiat givings on floodplain landowners. II I Specifically, these 
109 See RAYMOND J. BURBY ET AL., CITIES UNDER WATER 1-2 (1988): 
Floodplain land use management can reduce the susceptibility of property to flood 
damage by affecting where and how new urban development takes place. By 
guiding growth to locate outside of identified flood hazard areas, for example, 
land use management programs seek to eliminate the possibility of flood damage. 
Since many communities believe floodplains have locational advantages that 
should not be foregone, floodplain land use management also includes measures 
that allow building on the least hazardous portions of the floodplain if that devel-
opment is elevated or constructed in such a way that the potential for flood dam-
age is minimized. 
[d.; see also Schwab, supra note 39, at 1 (describing role of floodplain land use manage-
ment on reducing flood risks and providing for economically efficient uses of floodplains). 
110 See, e.g., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 3, at 31-33 (describing 
growth of land use management approaches to floodplain hazard mitigation since the 1970s); 
Schwab, supra note 39, at 1 ("More than any other disaster in recent U.S. history, ... the 
Mississippi Valley floods of 1993 brought home to dozens of communities the importance 
of implementing effective land use regulations in floodplains."). See generally BURBY & 
FRENCH, supra note 108. 
III Some commentators use the terms "hazard mitigation" and "land use management 
planning" interchangeably. See, e.g., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 3, at 5 
(defining "natural hazard mitigation" generally as "advance action taken to reduce or 
eliminate the long-term risk to human life and property from natural hazards" and includ-
ing both physical measures such as building grades and dune maintenance as well as plan-
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physical projects, which include beach armoring (such as construction of 
groins, jetties, breakwaters, seawalls,and revetments) and sand replen-
ishment programs,112 promote direct givings by reducing risks from floods 
within their design capacities and promote fiat givings by creating the impli-
cation that if the government funded such projects once, it will likely do so 
agam. 
Although state and local governments, as well as private property own-
ers, have built flood control structures since the colonial period, the fed-
eral government was virtually absent from this process until the Flood 
Control Act of 1936. \13 Since then, however, the federal government has 
taken on an expanding role in building, financing, and regulating struc-
tural flood control measures. 114 Today, primary responsibility for funding 
and regulating flood control structures lies with the federal government. 115 
Structural responses to flood risk have produced mixed results. Some 
structures are effective at reducing damages from floods within their de-
sign capacityY6 Properly constructed groins, seawalls, revetments, and 
breakwaters can be used successfully to reduce coastal erosion and increase 
the flood protection capacity of the natural shoreline. 117 Likewise, re-
quirements that buildings and other floodplain improvements be elevated 
above a base flood elevation level are effective at preventing damage to 
those structures for many floods below the base flood elevation. 118 And 
beach nourishment programs have been successful at counteracting wave 
and storm erosion by providirig soft barriers119 that absorb energy from 
ning measures to guide new development away from hazards). 
112 See id. at 33-34 (explaining that early coastal flood responses focused on hard struc-
tural controls such as "[sJeawalls, revetments, groins, jetties, and offshore breakwaters" 
while later efforts employed more soft controls such as beach nourishment); MANAGING 
COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, at 29-35 (describing uses and effects of inlets, jetties, 
dredged entrances, dams, groins, seawalls, and breakwaters on coastal erosion and flood 
control). 
113 33 U.S.c. §§ 701a-709b (2000). 
114 For a discussion of the history of federal and state flood control efforts as a facet of 
government responses to natural or human-induced disasters, see generally PLATT, supra 
note 96, at 1-26. 
115 See id. 
116 See, e.g., MANAGING COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, at 56-61. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 67 (noting "[ dJamage to structures located along the shore in some cases 
can be reduced by relatively straightforward engineering and construction procedures to 
ensure the building's survivability of a 100-year storm event" and recommending elevation 
above 100-year wave crest elevation); see also Miller, supra note 73, at 30 fig. 2.2 (dis-
playing intact beachfront house elevated on pilings with remains of completely destroyed 
"slab-on-grade" structure in foreground). 
119 Structural protections on coastal floodplains often are divided into "hard" or "ar-
moring" structures and "soft" structures. See MANAGING COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, 
at 56. Hard structures include seawalls, groins, offshore breakwaters, and jetties. See id. 
Soft shoreline protection structures include beach nourishment and sand transport mecha-
nisms. See id. Importantly, only beach nourishment projects increase the net amount of 
sand in the near shore littoral system. And other structural controls have either no effect or 
protect shorelines by interfering with littoral transport along the shore to cause accretion of 
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waves and storm surge before the water reaches inland structures. 120 Al-
though these structural flood control measures are expensive, they do 
reduce flood risks for properties located within the protected area. 
Structural responses to flooding, however, transfer substantial giv-
ings to floodplain property owners, leading to both unsustainable develop-
ment choices within the floodplain and increased property values. 121 Struc-
tural flood control measures often induce the misperception that the flood 
risk within the protected area has been eliminated-rather than merely re-
duced-creating a false sense of security in property owners behind the 
structural protection. 122 As a result of this underestimation of remaining 
flood risks, property owners tend to overdevelop properties behind the 
structural barriers.123 And underestimation of flood risk may also lead some 
floodplain property owners to ignore building codes requiring elevation 
above flood levels or to increase the density and value of their develop-
ment. l24 Consequently, even structures that eliminate flood risk for all floods 
sand at the structure. See id. at 60. 
120 It is unclear whether beach nourishment projects provide any substantial net 
benefits outside of the community. On the one hand, beach nourishment provides substan-
tial benefits, including reduced storm damages to properties insured under the NFIP or that 
would be eligible for disaster relief, increased net-foreign tourism revenue, and increased 
property values. See BEACH NOURISHMENT, supra note 69, at 48-49. But many of these 
benefits may be offset by the dynamic nature of the coastal floodplain community-as the 
community is improved, property owners within the improved community increase the 
density of their development. Additionally, neighboring coastal communities may attempt 
to compete for tourism revenue by engaging in their own high-density development, which 
in turn may lead to greater beach degradation downshore. See id. at 48-49,4-5 (describing 
flaws in current cost-benefit analysis used by Army Corps of Engineers to assess whether 
to proceed with any given beach nourishment project). 
121 Structural flood controls are public goods, and consequently, structural flood con-
trols subsidize land values and may promote additional development in floodplains pro-
tected by those flood controls. "If a flood control project (e.g., levee) is constructed, there 
is no easy way to market the demand for flood control since nonpaying individuals cannot 
be excluded without government intervention such as taxes." David J. Plazak, Flood Con-
trol Benefits Revisited, 112 J. OF WATER RESOURCES PLAN. AND MGMT. 265, 265 (1986) 
(noting that willingness of floodplain property owners to pay for flood repairs is underes-
timated). 
122 See. e.g., White, supra note 98, at 90 ("Although most federal flood-control works 
are built to protect against a project flood and conceivably will one day, however infre-
quently, be exceeded by a larger flow, there is a universal disposition to believe that the 
rare flow will never come."); PLATT, supra note 96, at 6; NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, 
supra note 3, at 31 ("Structural projects may also create a false sense of security, increas-
ing the amount of property at risk of flooding as people and businesses locate behind lev-
ees and flood walls."); Houck, supra note 28, at 11 0-11 (describing increased development 
of St. Tammany parish as result of levee construction). 
123 See White, supra note 98, at 90 (discussing tendency of completion of flood control 
structures to "accelerate[ 1 movement into the floodplain"); see also HIGHER GROUND, supra 
note 35, at 7 (describing tendency of floodplain landowners and developers to treat land 
protected behind levees as uplands, rather than floodplains subject to flood losses in the 
event of levee failures). 
124 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 7-8 (describing tendency of floodplain 
landowners to ignore flood risks in construction planning when properties are protected by 
levees and other structures); Houck, supra note 28, at 110-12 (describing Corps of Engi-
neers benefit-cost analysis taking into account assumption that property owners behind 
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within their design capacity may perversely cause even greater damages 
in the event of a flood in excess of that capacity.125 Property owners in 
floodplains without flood control structures may tend to estimate accu-
rately, or even overestimate, the risk of flooding. This is likely, given that 
individuals tend to be most aware of, and most responsive to, flood risks 
within the few years immediately following a flood. 126 When floodplains 
are left unprotected, floods are relatively common events and their regu-
lar occurrence may cause individuals to estimate correctly the most benefi-
ciallevel of investment in floodplain improvements. But "[s]ince floodplain 
investments are made in the expectations that floods can be controlled, 
the damages from infrequent, but major, floods are astronomical."127 
Additionally, some structural flood control measures-in reducing 
flood risks at a particular point along the shoreline-may also transfer flood 
risks downshore or increase flood risks at the structure's location over 
time. Small, cumulative changes to floodplains upshore may have significant 
impacts upon how the downshore beaches and floodplains react to later 
flooding. For example, jetties, groins, breakwaters, and other hard struc-
tures meant to trap sand within a particular beach and coastal floodplain 
provide substantial givings to protected properties, at least in terms of 
reduced short-term flood risks. 
Those same flood and erosion control measures have well-documented 
negative impacts on nearby, unprotected beaches. Waves and ocean cur-
rents transport sand and sediment laterally along the coastline, as well as 
perpendicular to the coastline. Structures such as jetties attempt to trap 
sand at a particular point in this littoral transport system. When poorly 
constructed, these structures trap sand that would otherwise nourish down-
drift beaches, causing the downdrift beaches to erode at increased rates. 
At their worst, these structures can carve deep inlets in barrier islands, or 
destroy downdrift mainland beaches. 128 As in the West Hampton Dunes 
case,129 government may end up paying for both the initial project con-
stituting the giving as well as property damages caused downshore by 
new levee would build below base flood elevations). 
125 See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 96, at 74 ("In the event of a flood or coastal storm ex-
ceeding the design capacity of the project, the ensuing losses on the new development were 
much larger than if that area had remained unprotected and relatively less developed."). 
126 See sources cited infra note 326 (describing heightened awareness of need for miti-
gative action immediately following flooding and waning of that awareness within months 
or years immediately after the flooding). 
127 James B. Tripp, Flooding, Who is to Blame?, USA TODAY, July I, 1994, at 32. 
128 See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 40, at 42-43 (discussing Corps of Engineers jetty and 
groin system that caused rapid erosion and inundation of large sections of Westhampton 
beach); Jeremy N. Jungreis, Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sands of Cape Canaveral: Why 
Common Beach Erosion Should Not Yield a Compensable Taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 375, 376 (1996) (analyzing takings claims of wealthy 
beachfront property owners suing under theory that harbor improvements by federal gov-
ernment "obstructed 130 years of sand that would otherwise have reached their beach"). 
129 See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
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that same project. Such risk transfers provide givings to property owners 
protected by the structure while transferring additional flood risks to 
downshore property owners. Because down shore owners will not imme-
diately perceive the increased flood risks, there will not be any effect on 
down shore property values, resulting in an average net positive increase 
in value for all properties affected by such flood controls. 
B. Risk Allocation: Disaster Assistance and Flood Insurance 
In contrast to structural flood control mechanisms that create givings 
by attempting to reduce overall flood risk, risk allocation techniques pro-
vide givings to floodplain property owners by transferring a portion of 
the risk of flood damages from the floodplain property owner to taxpayers 
without decreasing the actual risk of flood losses. While the federal govern-
ment maintains several programs with risk allocation components, the 
primary mechanisms for risk allocation with respect to flood-related risks 
are disaster relief and flood insurance. 
I. The Disaster Relief Act 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act ("Disaster Relief Act")130 is the flagship federal risk allocation pro-
gram. The Disaster Relief Act establishes procedures l31 under which the 
President may declare that a "major disaster"132 or an emergencyl33 exists 
within a defined area upon request of the governor of the State where the 
flooding or other disaster occurs.134 This determination releases federal 
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000). 
131 See id. §§ 5122( 1 )-(2), 5170. 
132 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) provides: 
"Major disaster" means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, 
storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any 
fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determina-
tion of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitUde to war-
rant major disaster assistance under this Chapter to supplement the efforts and avail-
able resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. 
133 42 U.S.c. § 5122(1) defines "emergency" as: 
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Fed-
eral assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to 
save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or 
avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. 
134 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170 & 5191 (setting out procedure for declaration of major dis-
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funds and agency aid to individuals and local governments. 135 Originally, 
Congress intended disaster relief to be a limited program to supplement 
efforts of states to respond to large-scale emergencies that could exceed 
the capacity of the state infrastructure. 136 However, since the 1950s, the Dis-
aster Relief Act has burgeoned into a massive "entitlement" program while 
localities and states have largely abandoned their disaster response roles. \37 
Vice President Al Gore's 1993 National Performance Review laid the blame 
for this expansion squarely on states and localities: 
The system as a whole encourages state and local elected officials 
to ask for maximum federal disaster assistance. Requests have 
increased approximately 50 percent over the last 10 years. Even 
minor emergencies have been awarded full compensation .... 
To prevent the federal government from becoming the states' 
first-line resource in every emergency, objective criteria are 
needed to replace political factors affecting decisions about dis-
aster declarations and ensuing response. 138 
Although the scope of disaster relief has been increasing for some 
time, recent expansions of the program have increased dramatically the 
ability of the executive and legislative branches to engage in "disaster ger-
rymandering" and to award disaster aid as off-budget pork to their con-
aster and procedure for declaration of emergency, respectively). 
135 A declaration of a disaster or emergency opens a broad array of federal assistance to 
the affected region. Federal agencies may respond by making available federal equipment, 
supplies, facilities, personnel, medicine, and food. See id. §§ 5170(b)( l)-(b )(2), 5192-5193(b) 
(providing for limited assistance by federal agencies to communities suffering declared 
emergency, up to a maximum of $5 million, although greater assistance may be available 
in limited circumstances). A disaster declaration also authorizes federal agencies to pro-
vide "work and services to save lives and protect property," including debris removal, 
search and rescue, emergency medical care and facilities, and construction of temporary 
public facilities. See id. § 5170(b)(3). Individuals in disaster-stricken areas may be entitled 
to receive unemployment and lost income assistance, id. § 5177(a); grants of up to $10,000 
(adjusted for inflation) per individual or family, id. § 5178(a), (f); food stamps or supplies, 
id. §§ 5179(a), 5180(a); relocation assistance (in limited circumstances), id. § 5181; legal 
services, id. § 5182; and crisis counseling, id. § 5183; among other disaster-related aid. See 
also 44 C.ER. §§ 206.1-12, 206.61-206.67, 206.141-206.191 (2002). 
136 See 42 U.S.c. § 5122(1), (2) (defining "emergency" and "major disaster" as events 
in which federal aid is necessary to "supplement" State and local recovery efforts); id. 
§ 5121(a), (b) (relating Congress' findings and intent to assist "[s]tate and local govern-
ments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which 
result from such disasters .... "); PLATT, supra note 96, at 15, 17-23 (describing how 
"supplemental" nature of federal disaster assistance to states and local communities has 
eroded as federal government shoulders ever-larger shares of disaster relief burden). 
137 See PLATT, supra note 96, at 12-26 (describing gradual expansion of federal role in 
providing disaster relief). 
138 FEMA, RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTIONS, FEMA 03: CREATE RESULTS-ORIENTED 
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE THE COST OF A DISASTER, available at http://govinfo.library.unt. 
edulnprllibrary/reportslFEMA3.html. (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW]; see also PLATT, supra note 96, at 58. 
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stituencies. 139 "Decisions about federal disaster relief are not constrained 
by immediate budget considerations. Most funds for disasters in the re-
cent past have been provided by supplemental appropriations, which are 
exempt from federal discretionary spending limits."I40 The George H. W. 
Bush and Clinton administrations issued record numbers of disaster dec-
larations and expanded the amount of federal aid available to disaster 
victims, while state and local governments attempted to garner an ever 
larger slice of the disaster aid pie. 141 
The availability of federal aid promotes givings to floodplain property 
owners through the promise of direct aid to offset losses from flood dis-
asters, and through the promise that future aid will likewise protect property 
owners from the consequences of living or building in a flood-plain.142 Crit-
ics have charged that the increased number of disaster declarations and 
amount of disaster aid flowing to state and local governments are inequi-
table and may promote development within disaster-prone areas, especially 
floodplains. 143 
139 See PLATT, supra note 96, at 57-58. Platt argues: 
This gradual expansion of the federal role has been accompanied by a growing 
sense of entitlement to federal disaster assistance on the part of state and local gov-
ernments and individual disaster victims. At the same time, there has been increasing 
politicization and nationalization of natural disasters, fueled by the virtually in-
stant national media attention given to disaster events. This media attention makes 
it hard for state and local officials not to seek the maximum amount of aid from 
the federal government and makes it equally difficult for federal officials to deny 
such requests. 
NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 3, at 28. 
140 NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 138. 
141 See Damon Darlin, A New Flavor of Pork (Federal Disaster Aid), FORBES, June 5, 
1995, at 146 (reporting that the George H. W. Bush administration, during 1992 elections, 
promised to increase federal disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Andrew from 75% of 
uninsured costs to 85% of uninsured costs; the Clinton administration increased these 
amounts to 90% of uninsured costs for victims of 1993 Mississippi River floods and 100% 
of uninsured costs for victims of 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake). The Clinton 
administration issued more disaster declarations than any previous administration. See 
PLATT, supra note 96, at 22. 
142 The Disaster Relief Act allows individuals who were eligible to obtain flood insur-
ance under the NFIP but did not do so as of the time of the disaster one opportunity to 
receive disaster assistance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5154, 5154a(a), 5172(d) (2000). Those indi-
viduals thereafter are prohibited from receiving specified types of disaster assistance for 
previously damaged property unless they thereafter obtain and maintain flood insurance for 
the property. See id. §§ 5154(b), 5154a(a). 
143 See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 96, at 38-41 (noting growing recognition by govern-
ment, environmentalists, floodplain management experts, and other commentators that 
disaster relief has questionable moral justification and likely supports unsound develop-
ment decisions within disaster-prone areas); COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra note 
52, at 39 ("[F]ederal disaster assistance and flood insurance also has facilitated coastal 
development by transferring much of the risks and costs of development from the private 
sector to the public sector"); see also City, supra note 56, at 1537-39 (noting connection 
between disaster relief and development). 
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Besides direct givings, disaster relief also may promote fiat givings 
to floodplain property owners. The federal government gradually has ex-
panded the number of presidential disaster declarations by decreasing the 
magnitude of the disaster necessary to qualify for such a declaration.l44 Dis-
aster aid has become an implied promise that the federal government will 
always provide states, communities, and individual property owners with 
a disaster safety net. 145 States and localities in turn have incorporated this 
disaster entitlement and spend fewer resources on hazard mitigation, while 
individuals ignore or discount flood risks. 146 
2. National Flood Insurance Program 
Congress created the NFIP through the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968147 in response to the perceived problem created by mounting 
disaster relief payments for flooding,148 the inefficacy of flood protection 
and prevention measures,149 and the unavailability of commercial flood in-
surance to owners of property in floodplains.15o Pursuant to the Act, FEMA 
must identify and map all communities containing floodplain areas subject 
to a one percent (or greater) average yearly risk of flooding-also known 
as "100-year floodplains."151 These maps-Flood Hazard Boundary Maps 
144 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. 
145 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 39, at 8 (discussing increasing role of federal 
government in providing disaster assistance and decreasing allocation of resources by 
states and individuals to hazard mitigation). 
146 See, e.g., id. (noting reductions in state hazard mitigation budgets and fact that 
"[tJhe widespread assumption that the federal government will pay to rebuild flooded-out 
homes following a disaster declaration has proven to be a substantial disincentive for 
homeowners in high-hazard areas to purchase or renew federally sponsored flood insurance 
policies."); see also NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 138 (recommending 
development of objective criteria to prevent federal government "from becoming the 
States' firstline resource in every emergency ... "). 
147 Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001 
(2000». 
148 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (a)(\) (noting increasing burden on national resources caused 
by disaster relief payments to victims of flood disasters); see also id. § 4002(a)(I) ("annual 
losses throughout the Nation from floods and mudslides are increasing at an alarming rate, 
largely as a result of the accelerating development of, and concentration of population in, 
areas of flood and mudslide hazards"); H.R. REP. No. 90-1585, at 89-96 (\968); S. REP. 
No. 93-583, at 2-3 (\973). 
149 See 42 U.S.c. § 4001(a)(2) (noting that "despite the installation of preventive and 
protective works and the adoption of other public programs designed to reduce losses 
caused by flood damage, these methods have not been sufficient to protect adequately 
against growing exposure to flood losses ... "). 
150 See id. § 400 I (b)(\) ("many factors have made it uneconomic for the private insur-
ance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such protection 
on reasonable terms and conditions"); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text (de-
scribing withdrawal of private insurers from coastal markets). 
151 42 U.S.c. § 4101(a); see also 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (defining "Area of special flood haz-
ard" as "the land in the flood plain within a community subject to a I percent or greater chance 
of flooding in a given year," and defining a "100-year flood" as a "flood having a one per-
cent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year"). 
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("FHBMs")152 or Flood Insurance Rate Maps ("FIRMs")153-delineate areas 
at elevations expected to be flooded during such lOO-year floods. 154 
Based upon these FHBMs, FEMA offers flood insurance to residents 
of communities containing any portion of a lOO-year floodplain, provided 
that the community has opted to participate in the NFIP.155 To qualify for 
participation within the NFIP, a community containing a lOO-year floodplain 
must adopt local land use ordinances and building codes that meet mini-
mum federal standards for floodplain development, primarily requiring 
all new construction to be flood-proofed or elevated above base flood eleva-
tion levels. 156 Based upon flood maps for the participating community, 
FEMA establishes premium rates at which NFIP flood insurance will be 
offered within the community. For most structures, premium rates must 
reflect actuarial flood risks for the insured structures. 157 
For structures insured before January 1, 1975, or the effective date of 
the original FIRM for the community in which the structures are located, the 
Act authorizes FEMA to charge subsidized risk premium rates that-al-
though not actuarially sound-would increase participation in the pro-
gram. 158 Although FEMA and Congress initially anticipated that such 
pre-FIRM structures would gradually be eliminated from the NFIP insur-
ance pool through attrition, the absolute number of pre-FIRM structures 
has not appreciably diminished since the program's inception. 159 Conse-
152 44 C.ER. § 59.1 ("Flood Hazard Boundary Map (FHBM) means an official map of 
a community issued by the Administrator, where the boundaries of the flood, mudslide 
(Le., mudflow) related erosion areas having special hazards have been designated as Zones 
A, M, and/or E."). The zones designated on the FHBM refer to the type of hazard existing 
in each area mapped: "Zone A" refers to an area of special flood hazard ("SFHA"), "Zone 
M" refers to an area of special mudslide hazard, and "Zone E" refers to an area of special 
flood-related erosion hazard. See id. 
153 A FIRM is "an official map of a community on which the Administrator has deline-
ated both the special hazard areas and the risk premium zones applicable to the commu-
nity." 44 C.ER. § 59.1. 
154 For a discussion of the likelihood of increasing inaccuracy in mapping flood hazard 
boundaries and other flood-related risks, see supra note 74 and accompanying text. Im-
portantly, only the outer boundaries of a mapped floodplain (Le., the highest elevations 
within the floodplain) have a one percent risk of flooding. Lower elevations within the 
floodplain may have substantially higher risks of flooding in any given year. 
ISS See 44 C.ER. § 59.22(a). While the NFIP now requires that FEMA complete a risk 
study and FIRM for a community before allowing that community to participate in the 
program, Congress and FEMA established an "emergency" phase of the program to permit 
flood-prone communities to opt into the program before flood risks had been mapped for 
those communities. See 42 U.S.C. § 4056(a); 44 C.ER. § 59.3. 
156 See 42 U.S.c. §§ 400l(b), 40l2(c)(2), 4102; see also 44 C.ER. §§ 59.22,60. 
157 42 U.S.C. § 40l4(a)(1). These rates are referred to as "actuarial rates." See 44 
C.ER. § 61.7(a). 
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 40l4(a)(2). These subsidized rates are referred to as "chargeable 
rates." See 44 C.ER. § 61.7(b). Chargeable rates were deemed necessary to induce com-
munity participation in the NFIP. See 42 U.S.C. § 4015(a)-(c) (authorizing use of charge-
able premium rates "consistent with the objective of making flood insurance available 
where necessary at reasonable rates so as to encourage prospective insureds to purchase 
such insurance"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2) (same). 
159 See, e.g., HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 57 ("FEMA has operated the NFIP on 
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quently, approximately thirty percent of all structures insured under the 
current NFIP pay subsidized rates. l60 In some cases, the subsidy is substan-
tial. Some repetitive loss structures would pay over ten percent of the in-
sured value in annual premiums if insured at actuarial rates. 161 
Even if FEMA eliminated subsidized rates for pre-FIRM construc-
tion, the NFIP still would provide substantial direct givings because even 
its actuarial rates are likely to be below what the private market could charge 
as a result of built-in programmatic advantages associated with government-
backed insurance. 162 First, the NFIP has the right to borrow directly from 
the U.S. Treasury to pay c1aims. 163 Thus, the program need not maintain loss 
reserves or reinsurance comparable to those that would be required by 
private insurers. 
Second, the NFIP can avoid to some degree adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems that would plague private insurers attempting to provide 
flood insurance. Although recent reforms have increased market penetra-
tion of-the NFIP to approximately thirty-five percent of structures at risk, 
the fact that about sixty-five percent of floodplain property owners do not 
perceive flood risk as worth insuring against indicates a substantial ad-
verse selection problem still exists within the NFIP.I64 The low rate of 
market penetration strongly suggests that primarily the highest-risk prop-
the assumption that the Nation's floodplains would be gradually cleared of the higher-risk 
stock of pre-FIRM properties (properties located in the floodplains before FIRMs were 
drawn), as pre-FIRM buildings, when substantially damaged by floods, would be aban-
doned, removed from the floodplain completely, or elevated above the 100-year flood 
level."). 
160 See 2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDITION REPORT, supra note 28, at 6-7 (ratio of pre-
FIRM policies to post-FIRM policies has declined to approximately thirty percent of ap-
proximately four million policies in force). 
161 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 16 (stating that FEMA charges only $450 to 
$900 per year in premiums for some coastal areas despite fact that coverage is actually 
worth $10,000 to $18,000 per year from an actuarial standpoint). 
162 See 2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDITION REPORT, supra note 28, at 8 n.ll ("making 
all rates actuarially based would not make the program actuarially sound . . . . [I]nitial 
capitalization would be necessary to establish some reserves in the event that a cata-
strophic year were to occur before sufficient reserves had accumulated from income from 
premiums."). 
163 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOT-RCED-00-23, FLOOD INSURANCE: INFOR-
MATION ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 5 n.6 
(1999) [hereinafter FLOOD INSURANCE] (citing Stanley J. Czerwinski's testimony before 
the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services that FEMA is authorized to borrow up to $1.5 billion from 
U.S. Treasury to meet claims obligations). 
164 See Anderson, supra note 46, at 78 ("But today the program [NFIP] is over 30 years 
old; a 75 to 80 percent noncoverage rate can only indicate that the program has certain en-
demic flaws."). Since the early 1990s, the number of properties insured under the NFIP has 
expanded from approximately 2.3 million to over 4 million. See FLOOD INSURANCE, supra 
note 163, at 6. But even assuming no increase in the approximately eleven to twelve mil-
lion structures at risk of flooding (see supra note 32 and accompanying text), the recent 
increases in NFIP policies raise the program's market penetration to only thirty to thirty-
fi ve percent. 
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erty owners opt in and stay in the program. 165 The most obvious aspect of 
the adverse selection problem lies in the NFIP's repetitive loss properties. 
Repetitive loss properties account for twenty-five percent of total NFIP 
losses and forty percent of total NFIP flood insurance payments, but only 
two percent of the total number of insured properties. 166 Attempts to ad-
dress the repetitive loss problem routinely have failed in Congress. Two of 
the most recent legislative sallies-the colorfully named Two Floods and 
You're Out of the Taxpayer's Pocket Act of 2001 167 and the Repetitive Flood 
Loss Reduction Act of 2001 168-foundered in committee. Property rights 
advocates have lobbied Congress to protect the availability of NFIP in-
surance at "reasonable" rates that necessarily cannot take account of re-
petitive losses. 169 Without similar mandatory insurance requirements, it is 
likely that private insurers would primarily write relatively small pools of 
insurance policies for owners of high-risk properties. 
Third, NFIP premium rates are based upon the "expected losses of 
an average historical loss year based on experience under the program since 
1978."170 These rates are set below what private insurers could charge for 
similar coverage because the NFIP has never· suffered a catastrophic loss 
year, 171 meaning that even actuarial premiums based upon the average his-
torical loss year are insufficient to permit the program to build loss re-
165 See EVATT, supra note 5, at 24; see also Miller, supra note 39, at 186; Anderson, 
supra note 46, at 78; cf. George Wyeth, Regulatory Competition and the Takings Clause, 
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 101 n.38 (1996) (observing that if compensation for risk is provided 
to a landowner, the landowner will ignore the risk, even if such action produces an other-
wise economically undesirable result). Tellingly, much of the adverse selection problem 
may manifest on coastal floodplains-"[albout 58.7 percent of policies in force and 62.8 
percent of insurance coverage in force pertain to coastal communities .... The program is 
greatly in demand by the owners of recent and opulent development at the ocean's edge." 
PLATT, supra note 96, at 31. 
166 See, e.g., HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 57. 
167 H.R. 1428, 107th Congo 
168 H.R. 1551, 107th Congo 
169 See PLATT, supra note 96, at 32; see also Hearing on Repetitive Loss Properties, 
supra note 79, at 56 (arguing against imposing penalty on homeowners who refuse mitiga-
tion and/or buyout offers following repetitive flood losses); Odds and Ends: Jefferson Par-
ish Council Actions on Wednesday, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 9, 2001, at A4 
(reporting on Jefferson Parish Council resolution "asking Louisiana congressional delega-
tion and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to oppose any flood insurance rate 
increases or proposals to cut off residents who have filed repeated flood claims."). 
170 HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 17 (quoting GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FLOOD 
INSURANCE: INFORMATION ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM, (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (statement of Judy A. England-
Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development Issues; Resources, Community 
and Economic Development Division) 83 (Sept. 14, 1993)). 
171 A catastrophic loss year would occur when the NFIP suffers approximately $2 billion 
in losses during any given year. See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 17 n.39. But see 
2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDITION REPORT, supra note 28, at 7 (defining catastrophic loss 
year as year in which NFIP suffers $5.5 billion to $6 billion in claims losses). As of 1998, 
the average historical loss year was defined as approximately $690 million in losses. See 
HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 17 n.39. 
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serves necessary to cover potential losses from a catastrophic loss year, 
or potentially even a series of years with high successive 10sses.172 In con-
trast, private insurers would necessarily base rate projections not only on 
historical losses, but also on projected future losses, including the possi-
bility of catastrophic loss years to ensure a large enough reserve to cover 
infrequent but devastating flood losses.I?3 
The clearest indicator that even NFIP actuarial rates are below mar-
ket value is the lack of private alternatives to NFIP flood insurance. Po-
tentially, the NFIP's programmatic advantages-such as avoiding some 
adverse selection problems by mandating coverage within 100-year flood-
plains-may prohibit private competition within areas served by the NFIP.I?4 
Even in areas where NFIP flood insurance is unavailable, the only reli-
able source for non-NFIP flood insurance is underwriting groups such as 
172 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 17; see also 2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDI-
TION REPORT, supra note 28, at 7-8 ("Since [the NFIP's inception], no catastrophic year 
($5.5 billion to $6 billion in claims losses) has occurred, and many years in the 1980s were 
characterized by fairly low actual loss levels as compared to the historical average losses 
experienced in other years. Therefore, the historical average loss year involves fewer losses 
from claims than the expected annual claims losses in future years."). "In recent years, the 
NFIP has remained solvent by using present premiums to pay for past claims. Because of 
its low rates, the program does not maintain a large cash reserve against a bad claims year 
as any commercial insurance underwriter does, making it especially vulnerable during a 
period of high hurricane activity." H.R. REP. No. 104-452, at I3 (dissenting views of Reps. 
Miller, Studds, Vento, Pallone, and Kildee). 
173 Cf Hearing on Repetitive Loss Properties, supra note 79, at 4 (testimony of Rep. 
Doug Bereuter) (noting problems for NFIP caused by repetitive loss properties and argu-
ing, "I certainly know of no private insurance company that can long stay in business if it 
disregards good actuarial practices."). 
174 It is likely that even without these programmatic advantages, private insurers would 
refuse to enter many coastal floodplain insurance markets. Since Hurricane Andrew caused 
between $15.5 and $20 billion of insured losses in 1993, many insurers have engaged in 
"shorelining"-refusing to sell property insurance of any kind within a certain distance of 
the coast. See, e.g., Maggie Mahar, Eden for Sale, BARRONS, July 3, 1995, at 23,26 ("On 
the East Coast, private insurers usually don't provide coverage against wind damage within 
1,000 feet of the shore. 'If you were willing to pay enough, Lloyd's might write it; sug-
gests one broker."); Jane Bryant Quinn, Disasters Have Broad Impact on Homeowners 
Insurance, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1994, at H3 (noting that insurers responded to high 
natural disaster insured losses by shorelining-"accepting no business from homeowners 
within about a mile of a coastline"); Sharon Harvey Rosenberg, Clouds Over Insurance 
Reform Plan, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 14, 1999, at Al (discussing difficulty Florida 
insurance authorities have had convincing property insurers to resume selling property 
insurance in Florida). After Hurricane Andrew, many insurers refused to sell policies in 
Florida, prompting Florida to create its own catastrophe fund that would limit insurers' 
overall liability in the state. See Jeff Harrington, 6 Years After Andrew, Insurance Options 
Return, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 14, 1998, at IH. The responses of Florida and other 
storm-prone states may have convinced some insurers to return to writing policies in those 
states, but the resumption has not been total. See David Sedore, Owners Finqing Home 
Policies, PALM BEACH POST, June 3, 1999, at 10; Nicole Ostrow, Moratorium-on Hurri-
cane Policies Ends, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 1,2001, at 10 (discussing 
stabilization of property insurance market throughout most of Florida); DEAN, supra note 
40, at 193 (describing withdrawal of insurance companies from writing policies in coastal 
areas). 
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Lloyd's of London that specialize in small, uncertain risk pools.175 The ac-
tual amount of the subsidy between the actuarial rates and the rates that a 
private insurance market would charge likely cannot be determined, how-
ever, with any degree of certainty. One study did find that residents in a 
Coastal Barrier Resource Act ("CBRA") unit l76 near North Bethany Beach, 
Delaware, paid on average $6.38 per $1,000 of private insurance cover-
age, while residents of the non-CBRA portion of the community paid only 
$3.54 per $1,000 of NFIP coverage. 177 
Finally, the NFIP lacks accurate predictive mechanisms to set actuarial 
rates, which would insure against a degree of risk that is both unknown 
and likely larger than estimated. This is especially true in light of rising 
flood risks generated by climate change, sea level rise, and waxing hurri-
cane cycles. Much of this inaccuracy derives from the fact that NFIP 
rates are established by a political and administrative process subject to 
influence not by market forces-which would tend to eliminate actuari-
ally unsound rates l78-but by political forces and special interests: 
Nominally, [FEMA] has discretion over its premiums. In reality, 
it is politically blocked from using those premiums to deter set-
tlement. It cannot appeal to the principle of actuarial soundness 
because it was created to cover untenable risks .... It is a prod-
uct of one-sided interest politics, in which one powerful claim is 
neither checked nor balanced by opposing forces. 179 
175 See EVATT, supra note 5, at 24 (noting that some coastal floodplain owners may find 
it reasonable to self-insure or insure through private insurers because of the high rental 
rates they can charge for their properties) (citing Miller, supra note 39, at 186); Chris Kid-
der, Buying a Home? You Need Flood insurance, VIRGINIAN PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, May 
31, 1998, at Y6 (noting that while "limited, private coverage for flooding is available in 
[CBRAl areas, companies in that market 'come and go"'). 
176 Areas covered by the CBRA are ineligible for federal flood insurance. See infra 
notes 190-196 and accompanying text. 
177 See Heather Colleen Daniel, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: Impact on Devel-
opment in the Coastal Zone 40 (2000) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Delaware) 
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Although the lower NFIP rates 
shown in this study included some pre-FIRM subsidized rates, the fact remains that NFIP 
rates, on average, are substantially subsidized versus the market rates for private insurance. 
178 See Anderson, supra note 46, at 81 ("You can manipulate any system, but it is much 
easier to manipulate a public insurance system than a private insurance system."). 
179 Siffin, supra note 5, at 298; see also James Bovard, More Flood Damage, Courtesy 
of FEMA?, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at A13: 
[Blut, according to one agency analyst: 'the way they advertise the flood insur-
ance is disgusting. It is a Ponzi scheme-and they have to replenish that sucker 
because it is running dry. The NFIP is amazingly generous. You are talking of up 
to $250,000 for property damage coverage for only $300 a year for people living 
in a flood zone-that is absurd.' Private insurance companies in some cases would 
charge a $10,000 annual premium for an insurance policy FEMA gives away for a 
few hundred dollars a year. 
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As a consequence of the relatively affluent special interests in coastal 
floodplains, attempts to reform the NFIP rate structure and repetitive loss 
provisions usually fail to have significant impacts. And-especially in 
the case of repetitive loss provisions-even where statutory and regula-
tory provisions clearly require removal of the repetitive loss structure from 
the insurance pool, local program officials have in the past often failed to 
enforce these requirements. 18o Because of the political pressures on the 
system, rate structures remain favorable to both the subsidized and the actu-
arial insureds within the NFIP, and provisions designed to reduce total 
insurance exposure over time are not enforced. 
Beyond the actuarial inaccuracies introduced by political pressures, 
the NFIP suffers from substantial difficulties in predicting the actual rate 
of occurrence for major flood events. Premium rates are established ac-
cording to FIRMs that delineate the area within each floodplain commu-
nity subject to a risk of flooding from a lOO-year flood, but the FIRMs them-
selves are based only on systematic historical records from the last fifty 
years, plus another fifty years of non-systematic or anecdotal data. 181 In 
other words, the statistics on the rate of occurrence of "lOO-year floods" 
are based upon a sample set of a single lOO-year period. The NFIP itself 
"has never weathered a severe storm cycle,"182 making it likely that its rates 
underestimate actuarial flood risks. Additionally, although some effort has 
been made to assess the impact of sea level rise on the NFIP,183 the actual 
impact of climate change, sea level rise, and increased cycles of hurricane 
activity on flood risks is unquantifiable until such changes actually occur. 
C. Floodplain Land Use Management: The Coastal Barrier 
Resources System 
The best means of limiting flood damages to human development is 
to keep the development away from high-risk areas. Floodplain land use 
management seeks to maximize the total utility of floodplains while mini-
ISO See Anderson, supra note 46, at 81 ("It is clear that for these [repetitive loss] prop-
erties that relocation or elevation has not occurred" as required by the NFIP after the prop-
erties suffer substantial damage in a flood event); see also HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, 
at 57-58 (noting lack of enforcement of NFIP requirements that properties suffering sub-
stantial damages from flooding be relocated or destroyed). Much of the lack of enforce-
ment of NFIP requirements for building codes and moving or demolishing substantially 
damaged structures by local and state officials may arise from the fact that efforts at en-
forcement by states vary dramatically. Florida, with over two million structures in special 
flood hazard areas, has only six state employees monitoring compliance with floodplain 
regulations. See EVATT, supra note 5, at 31. Likewise, Texas, with over one million at-risk 
structures and a high percentage of total repetitive loss properties, allocates only $50,000 
to floodplain regulation enforcement. See id. 
181 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
182 See Poirier, supra note 48, at 312. 
183 See generally FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, PROJECTED IMPACT OF 
RELATIVE SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (1991). 
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mizing the risk of losses by adjusting human uses of floodplains. 184 Flood-
plain land use management may also attempt to preserve the ecologic values 
of leaving floodplains undeveloped, thereby increasing both the eco-
nomic and environmental benefits of floodplain use. 185 
Unlike other governmental responses to flooding, land use manage-
ment systems are proactive and forward-looking responses to flooding. Land 
use planning should be an ex ante, non-crisis-based decision-making proc-
ess, ideally based upon careful deliberations by experts. Land use plan-
ners must look not only to the uses currently occupying floodplains, but 
also to how future uses may affect present floodplain occupation. 186 In so 
doing, planners can anticipate future floodplain changes and incorporate 
flexible responses to flood-induced changes. 
While the land use planning process holds great promise for manag-
ing human uses of floodplains, the process still is subject to disadvantages 
that have rendered it largely ineffective at reducing flood risks. First, flood-
plain land use management is a redistributive mechanism, prohibiting flood-
plain land uses that, if costs of flooding were externalized, would maxi-
mize the property's value. 187 Consequently, floodplain property owners have 
strong economic incentives to oppose restrictions on floodplain property use. 
Second, land use management is a strategy best employed before 
floodplain development has occurred. After the development is in place, 
land use management programs must incur the additional costs of removing 
that development, either by shifting those costs onto property owners who 
have invested in improvements with the expectation of rents or returns or 
by compensating those property owners if subsequent use restrictions 
constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. Additionally, land use management 
traditionally has not been employed as a tool for floodplain management 
until the need for it becomes pressing: 
184 See BURBY & FRENCH, supra note 108, at 5 ("Increasingly, however, attention is 
shifting toward the third strategy for coping with flood hazards-reducing the susceptibil-
ity to flood damage by keeping people and property away from flood-prone areas (the land 
use management approach)."); see also WHITE, supra note 4, at 17-21. The goals of 
floodplain land use management are to (1) reduce flood-related deaths, (2) reduce actual 
flood losses, and (3) reduce the loss of natural and cultural resources in floodplains. See 
ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. Notably, the report of the Federal Interagency 
Floodplain Management Task Force describes these three goals with the apparently implicit 
assumption that some human use of floodplains is unavoidable, and possibly desirable. 
185 See, e.g., PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 95 (describing relatively recent inclusion of 
environmental protection as goal of floodplain land use management). 
186 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 4, at 19-21. 
187 See, e.g., Pierre Ouellette et a\., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Flood Plain Zoning, J. WATER 
RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT., May 1988, at 326: 
While the [floodplain zoning program] is cost-effective for all parties of the soci-
ety, it is redistributive. Landowners are the main beneficiaries, while the benefit-
cost ratio for governments is consistently less than 1. Owing, however, to market 
imperfections, landowners gain no advantage from promoting such programs. 
This is an explanation why such programs are not more widely implemented. 
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At this point the land use management paradox facing planners 
and policy makers should be apparent. Communities often do 
not become concerned with flood plain land use management 
and do not begin to adopt vigorous management programs until 
after they have created a problem by allowing flood plain inva-
sion. However, once extensive (and intensive) development of 
the flood plain has occurred, land use management may not be 
the appropriate management approach. ISS 
Additionally, local governments historically have zealously guarded 
local control over land use. But floodplains, coastlines, and watersheds 
often span two or more states and multiple localities. The multi-jurisdic-
tional nature of floodplains can create a patchwork approach to land use 
within floodplains. Measures to protect coastal floodplains upward of the 
littoral drift may have dramatic consequences downdrift. For example, jet-
ties designed to trap sand for beaches updrift of the littoral flow along the 
coastlines deprive downdrift beaches of sand, increasing the rate of ero-
sion along those downdrift beaches. ls9 Without some larger land use man-
agement unit, local approaches to floodplain management may be coun-
teracted by upstream or updrift uses. 
The federal CBRA 190 has achieved limited success at floodplain land 
use management. The CBRA assumes that market forces, absent government 
intervention, would not support development on the unstable coastal barriers.191 
Coastal barriers are "sediment-composed landforms-islands, spits, bay mouth 
barriers, and wetlands-lining much of the perimeter of the continent and the 
shores of the Great Lakes."192 These landforms are the first line of defense 
against storm surge and flooding and exist in a dynamic and constantly mobile 
state, a mobility that is destroyed by human construction. 193 The CBRA desig-
nates undeveloped coastal barriers for inclusion in the Coastal Barrier Resource 
System ("CBRS")194 and then deriies federal funds for new construction for any 
area within the system. 195 The CBRA specifically denies direct federal grants 
188 Burby & French, supra note 30, at 294-95. 
189 See MANAGING COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, at 29 (explaining that the effects 
of jetties, inlets, and dredged entrances "can extend for miles from the entrance"). 
190 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (2000). 
191 See id. § 3501; see also Jones, supra note 67, at 1017; PLATT, supra note 96, at 80-
81 (saying that CBRA represents Congress' acceptance of proposition that "flood insurance 
and other federal incentives were inducing development in hazardous and ecologically 
fragile coastal barriers ... "). 
192 Jones, supra note 67, at 1018. The best-known example of coastal barrier landforms 
in the United States is the 2700-mile-long chain of 400 barrier islands along the Atlantic 
and Gulf coasts. Id. at 1019. 
193 See id. at 1022-23. 
194 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3502-3503. Currently, the CBRS contains almost 200 units that 
protect almost half a million acres of coastal barrier landforms. See MANAGING COASTAL 
EROSION, supra note 66, at 56; Jones, supra note 77, at 1037. 
195 See 16 U.S.c. § 3504 (2000); see also MANAGING COASTAL EROSION, supra note 66, at 
56. 
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for infrastructure improvements, coastal protection projects, and NFIP insur-
ance for any new construction.196 
The CBRA has had only limited success in preventing coastal barrier is-
land development. A 1992 General Accounting Office study determined that 
while the CBRA's prohibitions on federal expenditures within the CBRS had 
discouraged some development on some coastal barrier islands, the Act had not 
prevented development on other attractive or accessible barrier islands.197 The 
continued development of coastal barrier islands highlights the conclusion that 
merely denying federal subsidies to coastal floodplains would not prevent their 
development. Rather, especially in the case of barrier islands, property owners 
may find it profitable to incur occasional flood damages in exchange for the 
high rental returns possible from desirable beachfront properties. 198 
Further, federal agencies occasionally have failed to comply with the Act's 
prohibition against federal expenditures within the CBRA, potentially promot-
ing new development within the CBRS. 199 And agencies are not required to 
comply with the requirements of the CBRA, nor is agency compliance ade-
quately monitored.2°O Despite amendments in 1990 that nearly tripled the area 
protected within the CBRS, the CBRS still covers an area that is inadequate to 
protect coastal barrier resources.201 Finally, the CBRA has little impact upon 
existing development-the Act applies to undeveloped barrier islands desig-
nated within the CBRS, and cannot affect the removal of structures and devel-
opment from high-risk floodplains. 
Despite its shortcomings, the CBRA is important because it demonstrates 
that the federal role in floodplain land use management can be effective in re-
ducing the incentives to develop floodplains. Although development will con-
tinue in some areas without positive disincentives or even outright prohibitions, 
reductions in federal infrastructure subsidization and other givings may in turn 
reduce the burden on government entities attempting to remove existing devel-
opment from high-risk areas through land acquisition programs in the future. 
196 16 U.S.c. § 3504; see also 42 U.S.c. § 4028 (2000) (prohibiting federally insured 
financial institutions from making loans to fund any new construction or substantial im-
provements to properties within the CBRS). 
197 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COASTAL BARRIERS: DEVELOPMENT OCCURRING DE-
SPITE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 17-21 (1992) [hereinafter DEVELOP-
MENT OCCURRING DESPITE PROHIBITIONS] (discussing successes and failures of CBRA in 
preventing development within CBRS). 
198 See EVATT, supra note 5, at 24. 
199 See DEVELOPMENT OCCURRING DESPITE PROHIBITIONS, supra note 197, at 26 (report-
ing that FEMA has erroneously written flood insurance policies for properties within the 
CBRS). 
200 For example, the Department of Transportation has three times ignored the deter-
mination by the Department of the Interior that reconstruction of Highway 87 in Texas 
would violate the terms of the CBRA. See Jones, supra note 67, at 1041-42. Similarly, 
following Hurricanes Bertha and Fran, approximately $4 million of federal funds is re-
ported to have been spent on development on the CBRS portion of Topsail Island, North 
Carolina. See Greg Jaffe & Motoko Rich, To the Rescue-Building in Waves: Mere Hurri-
canes Won't Stop This Barrier Island, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1998, at AI. 
201 Jones, supra note 67, at 1048. 
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Additionally, the CBRA provides a model under which the federal government 
can engage in "environmental zoning." Specifically, a programmatic response 
to facilitate a retreat from high-risk floodplains must be sufficiently flexible to 
recognize both those floodplains of such environmental value or high risk that 
no development could exist therein without externalizing its costs, and those 
floodplains in which some uses would be economically beneficial and at least 
not environmentally hannful. 
V. A STRATEGY FOR FLOODPLAIN PRESERVATION: 
PROPERTY ACQUISITION THROUGH RECAPTURING PAST GIVINGS 
Current government approaches to flood risk have failed to reduce 
losses from floods. As a result of substantial givings, government policies 
have increased the value of floodplain development, and therefore the scale 
of flood damages. Ratqer than make an orderly retreat from high-risk 
coastal floodplains, property owners, developers, and government entities 
have rushed into those areas, building to greater densities than ever be-
fore. The problem is produced by several key factors. First, coastal 
floodplain property owners do not have to capitalize the full costs of their 
decisions to live on the coast. Rather, their ability to externalize a portion 
of the cost of floodplain development, through higher rents, subsidized 
insurance, beach armoring and nourishment, or other means, allows eco-
nomically inefficient and unsustainable coastal development to flourish. 
Second, the ability to externalize the true costs of coastal floodplain de-
velopment increases floodplain property values, which in turn draws 
wealthier property owners who are better able to fund political resistance 
against floodplain land use restrictions. Third, higher coastal floodplain 
property values also restrict the ability of governments to limit the uses 
to which such properties may be put through regulation202 or public ac-
quisition of those properties.203 
202 Specifically, as property values increase, government actions that restrict use of those 
properties will cause progressively greater economic impacts on affected landowners. See, 
e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 315 
n.1O (2002) (absent categorical per se taking, court must apply ad hoc Penn Central bal-
ancing test involving "a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on 
the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government action") (quoting Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001». As property values increase, governments must 
incur the full costs of those increases in the event that a regulation is found to constitute a 
categorical taking under Lucas. And while the direct impacts of categorical takings will be 
rare, see Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 ("the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for 
the 'extraordinary case' in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value"), 
even under the three-pronged Penn Central analysis, increases in property values will indi-
rectly increase the likelihood of a taking by increasing the economic burden of regulatory 
actions on affected landowners. 
20) Higher property values also increase incentives for local governments to permit 
floodplain development to the maximum extent possible to maximize their tax base. See supra 
note 56 and accompanying text. 
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Every major flood event identifies areas within the floodplain where 
the costs of repairing and rebuilding flood-damaged development out-
weigh the economic benefits of that development, but risk and cost allo-
cation mechanisms such as disaster relief and flood insurance do not use 
flood damages as indicators of where to pull development back from flood-
plains. Instead, the "remedy" of choice is to continue funding repairs and 
reconstruction of new structures in the same locations under the same risk of 
loss calculations. And even in areas where federal givings are largely pro-
hibited, such as the CBRS, political and economic pressures continue to 
press for reopening those floodplains for development because they expect 
to have the costs of their beachfront development externalized at least in 
part to taxpayers. 
The result is that current government responses to flooding cut 
against apparently rational individual behavior. Landowners, developers, 
and local governments have expanded floodplain development and rede-
velopment, heightened risks of flooding and expanded flood losses caused 
by greater floodplain urbanization, and increased taxpayer exposure to 
fund this cycle of repair and reconstruction. Increased coastal floodplain 
investment by government and individuals in turn reinforces the percep-
tion that government will support such development in perpetuity. Ex-
amined more closely, however, the primary actors responsible for devel-
opment-property owners and local governments-are behaving in an 
entirely rational way. Unless the rules of the game change, the coastlines 
will be consumed, and disaster costs will rise to unanticipated levels. 
The current approach to floodplain management is unsustainable. To 
avoid continued and growing flood losses in the future, the federal gov-
ernment must adopt a fundamentally different policy toward floodplain 
management. That policy must, at a minimum, adopt three significant 
changes from current approaches: 
• First, government must increase its emphasis on public acqui-
sition of floodplain property; 
• Second, government must recognize and compensate landown-
ers for legitimate, investment-backed expectations while avoid-
ing compensating landowners for governmental givings attribut-
able to past government flood responses; 
• Third, property acquisition programs must focus upon a broad 
federal program aimed at high-risk or environmentally valuable 
floodplain properties. 
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A. Increasing Emphasis on Public Acquisition of Property Rights 
Taking Coastal Floodplains Out of Circulation 
343 
Many experts and commentators have recommended a host of land use 
management tools and reforms either to prevent new floodplain develop-
ment or to roll back development from the coasts. Of all of the proposed 
reforms, only property acquisition has proven truly effective at removing 
existing floodplain development and preventing new development from 
taking its place. 
I. Overview of Potential Floodplain Land Use 
Management Approaches 
Proposed reforms to current policy usually fall into several catego-
ries. First, many recommendations focus upon immediate restrictions or 
prohibitions on floodplain development. As early as 1945, Gilbert White 
advocated land use restrictions such as zoning, public subsidy of property 
abandonment, and public acquisition of land to "curb unsound urban oc-
cupance of undeveloped land."204 More recently, Raymond Burby and Steven 
French have recommended a combination of police power regulations 
(e.g., floodplain zoning, subdivision regulations, flood-proofing building 
codes, sanitary codes, and transfer-of-development-rights programs), capital 
improvement programs to locate public infrastructure out of floodplains, 
public acquisition of flood-prone properties, relocation of improvements 
on flood-prone properties, higher tax rates on floodplain development, 
actuarial rates for properties insured under the NFIP, watershed-based 
regulations to limit the effect of urban development on flooding, and edu-
cation of the public about flood risks.205 
Second, legislators and other federal budget hawks perennially call 
for limitations on federal expenditures that subsidize and support floodplain 
development.206 The proposed Two Floods and You Are Out of the Tax-
payers' Pocket Act of 2001, for instance, would deny any federal disaster 
aid to property owners making repetitive claims under the NFIP that ref-
use mitigation aid to prevent future flood losses.207 Elimination of subsi-
dies to floodplain development may involve prohibitions on all expendi-
tures of federal funds within high-risk floodplains (as with the CBRA)208 
or limitations on the ability of some class of floodplain property owners, 
204 White, supra note 4, at 19. 
205 See BURBY & FRENCH, supra note 108, at 36-42. 
206 Numerous state programs also purport to limit expenditures of state funds within 
designated coastal areas. For an overview of state programs restricting public subsidies to 
high-risk coastal areas, see generally GODSCHALK, supra note 52, at 39-58. 
200 H.R. 1428, 107th Congo (2001). 
208 See supra notes 190-201. 
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such as owners of repetitive loss properties, to continue receiving some 
government subsidies. 
Third, recent reform efforts have focused on more direct approaches 
to preventing the principal actors-floodplain property owners and local 
governments-from permitting and maintaining development in hazard-
ous floodplains. James Titus of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
for example, has recommended the purchase of rolling conservation ease-
ments on coastal properties to prohibit flood control structures2Q9 such as 
seawalls and other hard armoring that would prevent coastal wetlands 
from migrating inland with sea level rise.210 Another commentator has rec-
ommended holding local governments that knowingly or negligently 
permit development in high-risk floodplains liable for flood-related dam-
ages caused by their permitting decisions.2l1 
209 See James G. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize that the Sea is Rising? How 
to Restructure Federal Programs so that Wetlands and Beaches Survive, 30 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 717, 737-39 (2000) (discussing merits of rolling conservation easements); Ti-
tus, supra note 7, at 1308-18 (discussing costs and benefits of rolling easements, develop-
ment prohibitions, and deferring action as possible actions to preserve coastal wetlands 
from rising sea levels); see also Lisa A. St. Armand, supra note 7, at 18-24 (discussing 
reservations of use and occupancy, buyouts required for substantially damaged structures 
insured under the NFIP, and private land trusts as possible tools for reducing coastal 
floodplain development). Specifically, both Titus and St. Amand recommend creating a 
presumption that coastal property owners have no right to hold back encroaching seas. For 
Titus, the government should purchase or legislatively reserve for itself property interests, 
called rolling easements-"a broad collection of arrangements under which human activi-
ties are required to yield the right of way to naturally migrating shores." Titus, supra note 
7, at 1313. These rolling easements involve government condemnation (or legislative res-
ervation) of options to purchase, easements, restrictive covenants, or similar property in-
terests under which government could prohibit the construction of coastal armoring struc-
tures that would otherwise block rising sea levels from permanently inundating coastal 
landowners' property. See id. The end result of Titus's proposal would be to permit coastal 
wetlands to migrate inland with rising sea levels, pushing "the boundary between publicly 
owned tidelands and privately owned dryland ... inland to the natural high water mark, 
whether or not human activities artificially prevent the water from intruding." [d. St. 
Amand likewise recommends "institutionalizing the presumption that humanly constructed 
structures will have to give way to migrating wetlands as sea level rises." St. Amand, supra 
note 7, at 3. Although St. Amand analyzes a wide array of potential options for institution-
alizing the presumption of wetland migration, I will refer to her and Titus's recommenda-
tions collectively as "rolling easements." 
2\0 Titus's proposed solution focuses on preventing the loss of coastal wetlands along 
estuarine bay-front properties, which are less susceptible to catastrophic erosion because of 
their relatively protected locations away from direct frontage on the ocean. See Titus, su-
pra note 7, at 1298-1302. Because of the lack of catastrophic erosion, estuarine bay-front 
properties can be preserved against rising sea levels with hard armoring that is inexpensive, 
effective, and permanent relative to similar structures to protect ocean beachfront proper-
ties. See id. Although the hard armoring will likely prevent inundation of property behind 
such structures, those same structures will prevent coastal wetlands and estuaries from 
migrating inland with sea level rise. See id. Consequently, Titus's rolling easement pro-
posal may be particularly effective in preserving environmentally sensitive coastal wet-
lands where preserving development in place against rising sea levels is nonetheless eco-
nomically efficient for affected landowners. 
211 See City, supra note 56, at 1539-40. 
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More recently, both FEMA and numerous commentators have agreed 
that floodplain management policy must focus more on moving existing 
high-risk development out of floodplains while preventing new develop-
ment from moving in. Recent FEMA reports specifically address the net 
benefits of moving properties at high-risk of flood damage that are insured 
under the NFIP out of the floodplain to higher ground.212 Similarly, the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, in its influential 1999 report, Higher Ground, on 
voluntary buyouts of repetitive loss properties argues that federal flood con-
trol projects, disaster assistance, and flood insurance have created incentives 
for floodplain development that will suffer disastrous losses unless it is 
removed from high-risk or environmentally sensitive floodplains. 213 
2. Limitations of Land Use Management on Coastal Floodplains 
These proposed floodplain management policies and reforms-indeed, 
virtually all approaches to floodplain management-suffer to varying ex-
tents from three common problems: inflexibility in the face of uncertainty, 
high costs of implementation, and lack of political will to overcome estab-
lished interests of current and future floodplain property owners. First, 
most government-mandated limitations on floodplain development are 
inflexible and imprecise, leading to economically inefficient allocations 
of floodplain resources. Not all floodplain development-even in the 
highest-risk areas-is economically inefficient. Rather, any given devel-
opment may be economically beneficial, economically detrimental (Le., 
either the value of the development does not exceed the internalized or 
externalized costs of that development, or the value of the development was 
positive at some point in the past but through technological or environ-
mental changes is no longer positive), or economically neutraL214 Moreo-
212 See, e.g., FEMA, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 2S-32 (2001) [hereinafter FY 2000 ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT] (discussing Repetitive Loss Initiative designed to mitigate cost of repetitive insur-
ance payments for structures suffering multiple instances of flood damage and Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program designed to minimize disaster assistance costs by, among other 
things, acquiring and relocating real property and improvements and elevating improve-
ments located in floodplains); 2001 NFIP FINANCIAL CONDITION REPORT, supra note 2S, 
at 10 (describing implementation of Repetitive Loss Initiative targeting 10,000 worst re-
petitive loss properties for purchase or remediation). 
213 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 125-29 (identifying major problems with 
federal floodplain management policy and recommending increased use of voluntary prop-
erty buyouts and other non structural approaches to flood control to remove improvements 
from high-risk floodplains); see also BURBY & FRENCH, supra note lOS, at 21-22 (dis-
cussing drawbacks of land use management approaches focusing on building codes that 
purport to "flood proof' structures through elevation and other site-specific techniques, rather 
than preventing development in high-risk floodplains); PLATT, supra note 96, at 69-72 
(noting growing acceptance of nonstructural flood hazard mitigation efforts by federal 
government); White, supra note 4, at 19 (advocating land use readjustment for non-
floodplain-dependent agricultural uses and "unsound urban occupance of undeveloped land"). 
214 See White, supra note 4, at 20-21 (discussing need for flexibility in assessing eco-
nomic validity of different types of floodplain development). 
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ver, the economic benefits of any particular unit of floodplain develop-
ment will change in relation to new development elsewhere in the flood-
plain, changing weather patterns and climate, and changes in society's 
tastes and preferences. 
Ideally, floodplain management would not only permit economically 
beneficial floodplain development, but also accurately identify and remove 
or prevent economically detrimental development. Such determinations 
are better suited to market-based mechanisms, which can react to chang-
ing conditions and needs on the scale of individual parcels. No a priori 
bureaucratic determination to remove or prevent development in defined 
floodplain areas can accurately reflect the dynamic nature of this environ-
ment and any such restrictions will necessarily over- or undercompensate for 
such unforeseen and unknowable risks.215 
Notably, and in contrast to direct prohibitions on future floodplain 
development and proposals to limit or deny givings to floodplain owners 
altogether, rolling easements and voluntary buyouts largely avoid this 
inflexibility. Voluntary buyouts depend on determinations by individual 
floodplain property owners that the costs of continuing to live in a floodplain 
outweigh the benefits of selling, elevating or relocating their structures.216 
Although this decision can be distorted by the continued availability of 
government givings, it promotes flexibility by granting control over that 
decision to landowners, who are in the best position to weigh the costs of 
remaining in the floodplain. Rolling easements similarly promote flexible 
land use choice by allowing nature to take its course with respect to sea 
level rise and inland migration of coastal wetlands and forcing landown-
ers to incorporate into individual land use decisions the risk that their 
properties will suffer inundation.217 In addition to purely financial calcu-
lations, both rolling easements and voluntary buyouts institutionalize the 
recognition that individual property owners have subjective and purely per-
sonal values invested in their properties that cannot (and would not) be 
compensated with a monetary award. 
Second, reforms prohibiting floodplain development may impose sub-
stantial short-term costs upon the government entity seeking to impose 
those controls or upon the individual landowner subjected to new floodplain 
management controls. Any regulation limiting the uses to which floodplain 
215 See, e.g., Titus, supra note 7, at 1327 (noting that limitation of a priori government 
determinations of where to prohibit coastal development "prevent either too much or too 
little development" in the face of uncertainty as to scope of future sea level rise and ero-
sion); SHARING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 75, at 59 (describing substantial errors in 
maps of IOO-year floodplains). 
216 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 35 ("[Bluyouts involve intensely personal 
issues, such as leaving a home."). 
217 See Titus, supra note 7, at 1322 ("If a property owner wants to build in spite of the 
knowledge that the house will have to be abandoned a few decades hence, her reason may 
be that the rental value of a bayfront house-even for a short period of time-exceeds the 
cost of the structure."). 
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property may be put necessarily lowers the value of that property. Where 
floodplain land use restrictions diminish only a part of a property's value 
and do not unreasonably interfere with the property owner's investment-
backed expectations, the property owner generally must bear the cost of 
the restriction in the form of reduced property values. 218 And regulations 
that go "too far"219 in limiting the uses to which an owner may put his or 
her property-either by unreasonably interfering with investment-backed 
expectations or by prohibiting all economically beneficial uses of the 
property220-will require that the entity promulgating such regulations pay 
just compensation for the injury to property rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Even if courts ultimately determine that any given regulatory re-
striction does not rise to the level of a taking, restrictions that impose higher 
burdens on property owners will necessarily give rise to greater amounts 
of litigation challenging those restrictions and impose litigation costs on 
all parties. In each of these situations, land use restrictions-especially 
on the large scale necessary to remove existing development from high-
risk or environmentally sensitive floodplains-impose clear, immediate 
costs that exceed the year-to-year costs of responding to flood disasters 
piecemeal. 
Likewise, limitations on the availability of government subsidies to 
certain classes of floodplain properties can' have unintended consequences 
that may actually increase government costs. For example, proposals to 
eliminate subsidized rates and require all pre-FIRM properties to pay actu-
arial rates under the NFIP likely would cause many owners of pre-FIRM 
properties to cancel their flood insurance policies and place greater bur-
dens on federal disaster relief.221 
218 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 335-43 (2002) (holding that absent categorical prohibiting of all economically 
beneficial use of property burdened by regulation, court must balance economic impact of 
regulation, interference with landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and 
character of government action with respect to parcel as a whole to determine existence of 
valid takings claim); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(identifying three principle factors-economic impact of the regulation, extent regulation 
interferes with investment-backed expectations, and character of government action-as 
focus of regulatory taking analysis and holding use restrictions of airspace above historic 
landmark did not constitute taking); Esposito v. South Carolina, 939 F.2d 165, 170 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that coastal setback restrictions that did not deprive coastal floodplain 
owner of any current uses of property and only limited right to rebuild in event property 
was destroyed reduced market value of property but did not constitute taking). 
219 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking."). 
220 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335-43; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
221 See Hearing on Repetitive Loss Properties, supra note 79, at 58 (prepared statement 
of Rep. Richard H. Baker arguing that an increase in premiums would drive property own-
ers away from NFIP, diminishing amount by which NFIP premiums would offset future 
disaster relief); HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 16-17 (charging actuarial rates to pre-
FIRM properties-on average raising premiums threefold-"would force many of those 
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Third, political realities dictate that floodplain property owners will 
continue to manipulate the political system to promote and support flood-
plain development. Floodplain property owners, especially in coastal flood-
plains most likely to be severely affected by global warming, sea level rise, 
and changing weather patterns, are disproportionately wealthy.222 Conse-
quently, as a group coastal floodplain property owners are able to over-
come barriers to political action and more easily fund lobbying efforts to 
prevent restrictions on uses of their floodplain properties.223 Additionally, 
floodplain property owners are an easily identifiable and discrete interest 
group with substantial incentives to maintain any protections for their prop-
erty.224 And the subsidies to floodplain landowners are concrete and sub-
stantial, measurable as a significant dollar amount in terms of higher prop-
erty values, perceived reductions in flood risks, and avoided insurance 
premiums that the private insurance market would otherwise charge, if 
private flood insurance were even available.225 These attributes make flood-
plain landowners a powerful lobby, even in light of occasional public outcry 
over the inequity of continuing to subsidize the lifestyle choices of 
floodplain property owners with tax dollars. As one commentator observed, 
"[i]f public choice theory has one key finding, it is that small groups with 
high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political pro-
cess."226 
In contrast, upland property owners have little incentive to organize 
sufficiently to overcome the floodplain owners.227 The general public lacks 
the means to overcome obstacles to political action as well as the con-
crete financial incentives to do so: 
[T]he main obstacle to the elimination of perverse incentives is 
that the social and economic benefits of doing so are broad-based 
and diffuse, whereas the loss is concentrated on a few private 
actors who often have considerable political influence. Thus, elimi-
nation of perverse incentives will require educating a wide range 
now paying the subsidized premiums to drop the insurance, thereby increasing the chance 
they would require federal disaster assistance after a flood."). 
222 See Anderson, supra note 46, at 76. 
223 See FRANK J. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFORM 122-23 (1981) (dis-
cussing need for continuous public involvement in land use planning and management 
agency decision-making to avoid agency capture by regulated entities). 
224 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
225 Mitigation and Cost Reduction Act of 1998: Hearing Before the House Subcommit-
tee on Water Resources and Environment of the Committee on Transportation and Infra-
structure, 105th Congo 16 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gene Taylor) "[I]f you are going to 
count on us to insure your property, which we do-and in most cases we do because no 
private sector insurer will do it-then, like any private sector insurer, we're going to take 
some steps to minimize the potential for losses."). 
226 Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 125, 130 (1992) (describing incentives of community landowners to resist govern-
ment takings by seeking compensation). 
227 See Levmore, supra note 39, at 3-18. 
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of stakeholders on the benefits of conservation as well as the 
fiscal dr~wbacks of perverse incentives.228 
349 
Once floodplain development has occurred, upland taxpayers face an 
uphill battle to place restrictions on the flow of subsidies to floodplain resi-
dents.229 And even if upland taxpayers do manage temporarily to overcome 
the public choice problem, it is likely that as soon as pressure for reform 
relaxes, floodplain property owners will again increase the flow of subsi-
dies to their development. 
Thus, coastal floodplain property owners constitute a focused, well-
funded special interest group with substantial political influence. "Where 
developed beachfront property is concerned, interest group pressures will 
systematically create a subsidy flowing towards beachfront property owners 
and dwellers."23o Not surprisingly, then, reform measures, such as pre-
mium increases,231 elimination of subsidized rates for pre-FIRM proper-
ties,232 and denial of continued insurance for some insureds making large 
or repetitive claims against the NFIp233 have all met with political resis-
tance on behalf of floodplain owners threatened with losing their subsidies. 
Perhaps more than any other obstacle, it is the political opposition to 
meaningful restrictions on coastal land use that limits the effectiveness of 
attempts to initiate a retreat from coastal floodplains. Professor Marc 
Poirier describes these obstacles in terms of (1) implementing restr~ctive 
legislation in the first place, and (2) keeping that legislation in place fol-
lowing a waning of public interest and a waxing of the political power of 
affected coastal landowners following some event such as a storm or flood 
that raises public sympathy for that group.234 The South Carolina Beach-
228 Ian Bowles et aI., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conser-
vation, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 209,238 (1998). 
229 See Poirier, supra note 48, at 254. 
230 [d. at 256. 
231 See 42 U.S.c. § 4015(e) (2000) (limiting increases in chargeable premium rates to 
no more than ten percent per year). 
232 See Hearing on Repetitive Loss Properties, supra note 79, at 58 (prepared statement 
of Rep. Richard H. Baker arguing against increases in premium rates for owners of repeti-
tive loss properties that would drive people away from the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram). 
233 See id. at 6-7 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Baker) (arguing against inequity of 
withholding flood insurance from innocent owners of repetitive loss properties); id. at 22 
(statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski) (observing that, despite prohibition against those property 
owners who were eligible for flood insurance but did not get it receiving repetitive disaster 
assistance payments, "I don't know of any examples of us denying [disaster] assistance to 
them."). 
234 See Poirier, supra note 48, at 256, 268 (analyzing disproportionate political influence 
of beachfront property owners); see also POPPER, supra note 223, at 122-23. Titus de-
scribes the same phenomenon in terms of "backsliding" -the ability of local interests to 
reverse or upset regulatory restrictions on coastal land use. See Titus, supra note 7, at 
1331-34 (arguing for regulatory programs that limit possibility of repeal through pur-
chases of rolling easements because "the public can more easily accept relaxation of a 
regulation than the relinquishment of a public property interest for which the government 
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front Management Act235 at issue in Lucas, for example, has encountered 
substantial resistance, and state enforcement of the Act has .been limited 
to some degree by political and judicial action from private property in-
terests.236 Continued pressure for development of highly desirable beach-
front and coastal floodplain properties will tend to defeat or repeal purely 
regulatory prohibitions on coastal floodplain development and limit or ne-
gate the effectiveness of restrictions on government subsidies such as 
flood insurance, disaster relief, or infrastructure improvements along the 
coasts.237 
3. The Potential for Public Acquisition of Floodplain Property To 
Limit Flood Losses 
Of all proposed reforms to current federal floodplain management 
policy, only public acquisition of floodplain property has achieved meaning-
ful success, measured in terms of permanently removing high-risk struc-
tures from floodplains, preventing repetitive disaster assistance and flood 
insurance payments to floodplain properties, and maintaining the invest-
ment-backed expectations of floodplain property owners.238 Current buyout 
programs have achieved some success in reducing flood losses.239 Following the 
has paid."). 
235 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002). 
236 See Ellen P. Hawes, Coastal Natural Hazards Mitigation: The Erosion of Regula-
tory Retreat in South Carolina, 7 S.c. ENVTL. LJ. 55, 70-72, 73-79 (1998) (assessing 
limitations on South Carolina's attempt to effect regulatory retreat from coastal floodplains 
caused by judicial recognition of takings issues and development pressures along coast). 
237 See infra notes 251-252 and accompanying text (describing continued chipping 
away of CBRA restrictions by barrier island property owners); see also COASTAL HAZARDS 
MITIGATION, supra note 52, at 63-64 (describing costly impact of development within 
CBRA areas requiring maintenance of infrastructure within high-hazard areas). 
238 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 130-32 (recommending that the federal 
government emphasize voluntary buyouts of high-risk, repetitive loss floodplain properties 
and enforce NFIP guidelines requiring elevation or removal of substantially damaged 
properties); see also DEAN, supra note 40, at 213 ("There is only one sure way to preserve 
the coastal landscape from unwise and unsafe development: buy it."); PHILIPPI, supra note 
33, at 4-5 (concluding that buyouts are the only effective means of managing floodplains 
to maximize both environmental and economic values). 
239 Buyouts of high-risk floodplain properties, along with other requirements for re-
moval of substantially damaged properties from the floodplain, have achieved only limited 
acceptance as a flood control measure in the past. For example, the Upton-Jones Act, Pub. L. 
No. 100-242, § 544,101 Stat. 1815, 1940-42 (1988), attempted to address problems of beach front 
developments facing rising water levels and rapidly eroding shorelines by buying out structures in 
imminent danger of collapse and destruction caused by flooding. Prior to that act, the NFIP 
authorized payment only in the event of physical damage caused by erosion or flooding. 
See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 4019 (2000) (authorizing Secretary to prescribe regulations by which 
actual claims may be adjusted for damage to or loss of property); id. § 4053 (authorizing 
insurance pool to adjust and pay claims for actual losses); see also MANAGING COASTAL 
EROSION, supra note 66, at 79. The Upton-Jones Act was a failure-only 266 claims were filed 
during the first two years, id. at 84, and the National Flood Insurance Act was amended in 1994 to 
eliminate the Upton-Jones program. See Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 552, 108 Stat. 2160, 2269 
(1994). 
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1993 Mississippi floods, for example, FEMA engaged in several high-profile 
buyouts, including moving two entire towns out of the Mississippi floodplain.240 
And pursuant to section 404 of the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act ("Stafford Act"), FEMA may use a portion of fed-
eral allocations for hazard mitigation to engage in voluntary buyouts of 
high-risk, repetitive loss properties.241 This has increased use of property 
acquisition as a flood hazard mitigation technique.242 
Floodplain management experts and academics have, in the last dec-
ade, begun to emphasize the benefits of land acquisition over other flood 
control or risk allocation responses. Much of this attention to land acqui-
sition in the floodplain management context comes from the National Wild-
life Federation's 1998 Higher Ground report on voluntary property buy-
outs. The report concluded that for many floodplain communities, vol-
untary buyouts of repetitive loss structures would generate substantially 
greater long-term cost savings than continuing to rebuild these properties 
after every flood. 243 Specifically, past buyouts of repetitive loss structures 
have generated $2 in reduction of future flood insurance payments alone 
for every $1 invested. 244 Although the Higher Ground report focused on 
mitigation of repetitive loss properties within the NFIP, it is clear that the 
economic benefits of property acquisition programs likely would be even 
greater if other benefits were included in calculating the savings. For in-
stance, relocation of large areas of high-risk development would elimi-
nate many federal, state, and local expenditures for flood response, in-
cluding: 
• Expenses of maintaining and repamng flood control struc-
tures that formerly protected the relocated development; 
• Expenses of maintaining, repairing and rebuilding public in-
frastructure and buildings; 
• Costs of disaster relief and flood insurance subsidies and pay-
ments; and 
240 In contrast to the relatively unsuccessful Upton-Jones Act property acquisition pro-
gram, recent federal and state property acquisition programs have purchased thousands of 
repetitive loss properties. See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 29-33. For an overview 
of state and federal property acquisition programs in high-hazard coastal areas, see gener-
ally COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra note 52, at 65-87. 
241 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(b) (2000) (establishing program for purchase or mitigation 
of repetitive loss properties). 
242 See ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note II, at 28-30 (describing increased em-
phasis on, inter alia, public acquisition of properties suffering repetitive flood losses under 
Repetitive Loss Initiative). 
243 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 60-63 (describing savings generated by 
past buyouts and overall costs of repetitive loss structures to NFIP); id. at 130-32 (recom-
mending substantial increases in voluntary buyout programs and vigorous enforcement of 
NFIP regulations requiring elevation or removal of substantially damaged structures). 
244 See id. at 60 (citing DONNA ERAT, THE 1993 AND 1995 MIDWEST FLOODS: HAZARD 
MITIGATION THROUGH PROPERTY ACQUISITION AND RELOCATION PROGRAM 7, 9 (1995» 
(on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
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• Costs of future development.245 
Beyond savings generated by avoiding costs associated with existing 
development, property acquisition programs also avoid negative exter-
nalities that would otherwise be generated by increased future develop-
ment within the floodplain.246 And preserved floodplains may create in-
creased opportunities for recreational activities, including fishing and 
hunting, boating, hiking, and education.247 Preservation and restoration of 
floodplains as open space also would tend to increase nearby property val-
ues.248 
One of the reasons property acquisition programs can be so effective 
at reducing flood-related losses is that they eliminate many of the factors 
that drive political action on behalf of floodplain property interests. For 
instance, much of the resistance to traditional zoning regulations that limit 
uses of land arises from the perception that the zoning entity has imposed 
substantial costs on private property owners for public purposes without 
compensation. This characterization, espoused most vocally by property 
rights advocates who gained recognition following the 1994 congres-
sional elections,249 is largely defeated where the property owner actually 
receives compensation for the property rights acquired by the government. 
Further, property acquisition, over time, reduces the size of the poten-
tial special interest group of floodplain landowners. Eventually, the po-
litical will to continue the flow of subsidies to the floodplains should di-
minish as floodplain property owners are bought out and relocate. In con-
trast, other reforms that fail to compensate landowners for private property 
rights acquired will generate political resistance that, at best, will slow 
the rate of reform, and at worst will prevent reform altogether. For exam-
ple, prohibitions on constructing permanent seawalls and other structural 
barriers against storm surge have met with substantial legal and political 
resistance, and in some cases outright civil disobedience.25o 
Finally, property acquisition programs protect floodplain land use 
management programs from future political and economic pressures. For 
example, the CBRS has been subjected to numerous "technical correc-
tions" on behalf of developers seeking to remove private property from 
245 See, e.g., H. CRANE MILLER, TuRNING THE TIDE ON WASTED TAX DOLLARS: Po-
TENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS FROM ADDITIONS TO COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES SYSTEM 1-
4 (1989) (arguing that expansion of CBRS to limit federal spending on additional coastal 
barrier island units would provide substantial savings in the form of avoided capital ex-
penses for structural flood controls, disaster relief, and flood insurance subsidies). 
246 Cf. id. 
247 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS 176-77 
(1992). 
248 See id. 
249 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
250 See St. Amand, supra note 7, at 17-18 (discussing difficulties faced by local Mas-
sachusetts officials attempting to prevent homeowners from erecting permanent revetments 
to protect oceanfront properties from erosion and flooding). 
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the program.2S1 Many of these "technical corrections" may be legitimate at-
tempts to correct over inclusive CBRS maps, but many more are likely to 
be legislative responses to political pressures by barrier island property 
owners to reopen their properties to valuable federal subsidies.2S2 In con-
trast, property acquisition avoids such post-hoc pressures to permit de-
velopment back into floodplains. Because the property rights necessary 
for development are held by government entities, or other entities such as 
conservation organizations, wetlands banks, or similar agencies, political 
pressures are less likely to force redevelopment of floodplains.2S3 
But buyouts and similar mitigation programs have not reached their 
full potential as floodplain management tools because, at least in the 
short-term, they are "prohibitively costly."2s4 Buyouts require visible budget 
251 See, e.g., 145 CONGo REC. H12,844 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. 
George Miller) (arguing in favor of technical correction of alleged mapping error on 
ground that there was no evidence "to prove conclusively that Congress intended to include 
private lands abutting the boundaries of the State park when it created this OPA in 1990."); 
145 CONGo REC. HI2,844-45 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Saxton) (dis-
cussing proposed bill to remove 32 acres of private land from CBRS and add 245 acres of 
existing state park land to CBRS for alleged net increase of 213 acres). The alleged "net" 
increases in CBRS acreage resulting from withdrawing private land and purportedly re-
placing it with existing state park lands may be a legislative shell game intended to pre-
serve the illusion of net increases in the size of the CBRS. Adding state park lands to the 
CBRS may not provide any additional protection against development on those lands, 
while excluding or withdrawing private land under the guise of a technical correction im-
mediately opens that property to receive development-maintaining or -promoting federal 
subsidies. See 145 CONGo REC. H8418 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1999) (statement of Rep. Blu-
menauer) (arguing that in removing 272 acres of private land from CBRS and replacing it 
with 3390 acres of existing state park lands, "[ w]e are whittling away, bit by bit, pulling 
land out of [the CBRS]."). 
252 See, e.g., DEAN, supra note 40, at 194-95 (describing efforts of developers to re-
move Florida barrier island units from CBRS); see also H. REP. No. 104-452, at 12 (1996) 
(reporting dissenting views of Reps. Miller, Studds, Vento, Pallone, and Kildee) ("We op-
pose H.R. 2100 [104th Congo (1995)] because it does not make technical corrections to the 
[CBRS]. It makes substantive changes to the [CBRS] .... If we continually re-examine the 
[CBRS] in light of new and creative interpretations of the mapping criteria, we will un-
dermine the integrity of the [CBRS]."); S. REP. No. 103-398 (1994) (conference report on 
H.R. 4598, 103d Congo (1994), directing technical corrections to maps of CBRS areas in 
1994 by property owners claiming that their property was sufficiently developed prior to 
1982 passage of CBRA to merit exclusion from CBRS). The "technical" nature of these 
corrections is especially dubious where property owners apparently waited years after the 
initial inclusion of these areas within the CBRS before attempting to obtain legislative 
action. Affected private property owners with development preexisting the CBRS would 
likely notice and dispute immediately their inclusion within the system. In Bostic V. United 
States, 581 F. Supp. 254, 255 (E.D.N.C. 1984), for example, the landowners filed suit to 
enjoin CBRS designation of their property one day before the CBRA's prohibition on 
writing federal flood insurance policies for CBRS properties went into effect. In contrast, it 
is more likely that legislative changes more than a decade after that prohibition went into 
effect reflect post-designation development that property owners now seek to remove from 
the program. 
253 See Titus, supra note 7, at 1329-34 (noting public less likely to surrender property 
rights than to relax regulatory restrictions). 
254 PHILIPPI, supra note 33, at 115; see also DEAN, supra note 40, at 213-14 (noting 
that rising coastal real estate prices have made buyouts increasingly more expensive, but 
some individuals, organizations, and government entities have engaged in a limited number 
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appropriations for which the agency, and ultimately Congress or state legis-
latures, must account.255 In contrast, disaster relief costs are largely de-
termined, in recent years, by politicians competing to show their constituents 
that they can deliver aid to disaster-stricken areas. While other floodplain 
management techniques may fail to control flood damages or protect flood-
plain economic and environmental values long-term, the short-term costs 
of using taxpayer dollars to purchase high-risk floodplain properties have 
prevented that technique from gaining either political or fiscal acceptance. 
As a consequence, floodplain management policy must adapt to find some 
means of reducing the cost of public acquisition of high-risk and envi-
ronmentally sensitive floodplain properties. 
B. Avoiding Unjust Compensation for Past Givings: Crafting a Givings 
Recapture Mechanism 
The high cost of purchasing high-risk or environmentally sensitive 
properties to remove floodplain development is ironic since much of the 
value of the properties to be purchased derives directly or indirectly from 
governmental givings through past responses to flooding. To succeed on 
the large scale necessary to effect a meaningful retreat from high-risk flood-
plain development and preserve or restore floodplain environments, prop-
erty acquisition programs must begin to recapture or otherwise avoid over-
compensating landowners for government givings attributable to past 
flood controls. 
Additionally, recapturing givings directly traceable to past govern-
ment flood responses makes sense as a matter of policy and justice. First, 
givings recapture promotes and protects the principles of equity and fair-
ness that lie at the heart of the Fifth Amendment's just compensation 
clause.256 "Just compensation" requires, tautologically, that the compen-
sation to a condemnee be just, i.e., "the full monetary equivalent of the 
property taken."257 But justice in affording compensation for private property 
taken for public use works both ways. While condemnees are entitled to 
of buyouts to counteract coastal development); Platt, supra note 56, at 12 ("Public acquisi-
tion of shoreline property (at thousands of dollars per front foot in some areas) is prohibi-
tivelyexpensive."). 
255 Cf Hearing on Repetitive Loss Properties, supra note 79, at 59 (prepared statement 
of Rep. Richard H. Baker that appropriators are hesitant to pay for disasters before they 
happen). 
256 U.S. CON ST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation"); see, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) ("The 
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic 
equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law.") (inter-
nal citation omitted); see also United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1949) (assessing 
fairness of market value criterion for determining "just compensation" due condemnee). 
257 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473 
(1973). 
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receive the value of condemned property, they may not demand more 
than that: 
[Market value paid as just compensation] may be more or less 
than the owner's investment. He may have acquired the property 
for less than its worth or he may have paid a speculative and ex-
orbitant price. Its value may have changed substantially while 
held by him. The return yielded may have been greater or less 
than interest, taxes, and other carrying charges. The public may 
not by any means confiscate the benefits, or be required to bear 
the burden, of the owner's bargain. He is entitled to be put in as 
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. 
He must be made whole but is not entitled to more.258 
Second, compensating floodplain property owners for past givings 
from government flood responses provides a windfall or unjust enrich-
ment that can distort market reactions to flood risks.259 At the moment a 
government entity determines that it should acquire a floodplain property, 
it has implicitly acknowledged that past flood control measures have been 
ineffective at preventing flood losses to the property.260 In other words, 
past responses to flooding have an actual value below the value placed 
upon those responses by the market because of the inability of land mar-
kets to account accurately for flood risks. 261 
258 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (internal citation omitted, empha-
sis added). 
259 
The fairness principle embodied in the Takings Clause is that it is inequitable to 
"forc[el some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole." By the same token. it is inequita-
ble to bestow a benefit upon some people that. in all fairness and justice. should· 
be given to the public as a whole. In a giving, a small group is able to force the 
public as a whole to subsidize the group's preferential treatment. 
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 554 (emphasis added). 
260 Alternatively, the government has implicitly determined that the environmental costs of 
continuing to preserve the floodplain development in place outweigh the costs of acquiring 
the property. 
261 Importantly, the acquiring entity is not increasing flood risk to the property in any 
way by making this acknowledgement. Actual flood risks are a function of physical fac-
tors, including the existence and scope of structural flood controls, floodplain dynamics, 
weather and climate, location and elevation of the property within the floodplain, and value 
of improvements to the property. All these factors predate the government's decision to 
acquire the property and should be incorporated fully in the value of the property. Moreo-
ver, even where land markets do incorporate the risk of flooding, it is most often through 
the proxy of capitalizing the cost of flood insurance into land values. This proxy use of 
flood insurance to affect land values may indicate why some researchers concluded that 
land markets may discount land values for flood risks but do not adjust values to reflect the 
number of times that a property has been flooded. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 
supra note 91, at 11-12, 13; Speyrer & Ragas, supra note 91, at 406 ("However, repeated 
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As a result of these factors, floodplain property values include value 
solely attributable to government givings in the form of past flood re-
sponses. Overcompensation for those givings reinforces market misper-
ceptions of flood risk and distorts property owners' investment-backed ex-
pectations. Given that property owners are inclined to underestimate flood 
risks, they are more likely to fail to take protective me~sures against flood-
ing and to invest in property improvements that are not supportable under 
actual flood risks.262 Additionally, overcompensation further shifts the 
risk of flood losses to taxpayers, requiring them to subsidize the decisions of 
floodplain property owners at ever greater rates. And overcompensation 
reduces the number and rate of possible property acquisitions for flood miti-
gation purposes. As a result, government entities must continue to main-
tain and build structural flood controls, build and repair supporting public 
infrastructure and facilities, and pay disaster relief .and flood insurance to 
protect floodplain structures that would otherwise have been acquired. 
Although there is a clear case against overcompensating landowners in 
property acquisition programs for the value of past flood control and risk 
allocation, severing government givings from the compensation package is 
naturally problematic. Where there is an active market for the private prop-
erty taken, the just compensation clause generally requires that the land-
owner receive fair market value for any condemned property.263 The mar-
ket value of the condemned property at the time of the taking, however, 
will tend to capitalize the value of government givings into the overall 
value of the property. The difficulty arises in attempting to discern where 
just compensation ends and unjust or inequitable overcompensation begins. 
Importantly, courts and legislatures have already developed jurispru-
dential and statutory approaches to offsetting or recapturing givings arising 
from past or present government actions affecting the value of nearby prop-
erty. While not specifically recognized as givings recapture mechanisms, 
courts and legislatures have attempted to limit such overcompensation 
through both statutory and judicial doctrines requiring that the amount of 
flooding incidences do not seem to change the insurance cost capitalization."). Because the 
NFIP typically cannot raise premium rates to reflect repetitive flood losses, and because 
many properties developed before their communities adopted FIRMs continue to receive 
substantial subsidies from NFIP's actuarial rates, the flood insurance proxy cannot supply 
the additional market information that would otherwise cause repetitive flood risks to be 
accurately incorporated in land values. 
262 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 7-8. Where flood controls, such as levees, 
are constructed to protect landowners from periodic floods, development proceeds as if the 
area has been removed entirely from the floodplain and bears no risk of flood loss. See id. 
263 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001) (holding that taking 
compensation requires owner's damages to be based upon fair market value of property 
taken); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 & n.14 (1984) (holding that 
just compensation clause typically requires payment of fair market value of property taken 
unless market value is too difficult to determine or would result in manifest injustice to 
owner or to public). 
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just compensation for a taking be offset against some increases in value 
created by government action. 
1. Statutory Givings Recapture Mechanisms 
Statutory givings recapture mechanisms include specific statutory in-
structions to offset special benefits that government actions may have con-
ferred on condemned property-or, in the case of a partial taking, on the 
remaining portion of the owner's property-as well as less direct means 
of givings recapture such as exactions and impact fees. 264 For instance, 
the River and Harbors Improvement Act provides that in the case of a 
taking of only a portion of a parcel for improvement of navigable water-
ways "the jury or other tribunal awarding the just compensation ... shall 
take into consideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation 
or damages any special and direct benefits to the remainder arising from 
the improvement."265 The River and Harbors Improvement Act recognizes 
government givings affecting the condemnee's remaining parcel as an 
offset against the compensation due to the condemnee as a result of the tak-
ing. Consequently, where the value of the remaining parcel is dramati-
cally increased by the improvements to the navigable waterway, that in-
crease may altogether offset the value of the condemned tract. 
Thus, in United States v. Fort Smith River Development Corp., river 
channel improvements necessitating the condemnation at issue rendered 
the remainder more suitable for industrial use, rather than agricultural use, 
by constructing revetments to prevent the remainder from eroding.266 The 
court held that the River and Harbors Improvement Act required considera-
tion of whether the taking rendered the land more valuable by improving 
its suitability for the more intensive industrial use.267 The increase in the 
value of the remainder was to be set off against the value of the taken 
parcel to determine the net value to be paid as just compensation.268 
State and local governments have developed other statutory mecha-
nisms to recapture givings by forcing floodplain land markets to (1) exclude 
value attributable to past flood controls or risk allocation mechanisms, or 
(2) recapture that value from property owners.269 To exclude the value of 
264 Statutory givings recapture mechanisms, of course, cannot ~onstitutionally exceed 
the limits on givings recapture under the just compensation clause. 
265 33 U.S.C. § 595 (2000). 
266 349 F.2d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 1965). 
267 [d.; see also United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216,222 (5th Cir. 1967) (reversing and 
requiring lower court to reconsider government's "evidence of comparable sales to prove 
that special benefits to the remainder nearly offset the landowners' loss of 210 acres") (em-
phasis added); accord United States v. 2,477.79 Acres of Land, 259 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th 
Cir. 1958) (finding that development of darn and reservoir potentially conferred on remain-
der special benefits in excess of value of land taken for reservoir). 
268 See Fort Smith River Dev., 349 F.2d at 525. 
269 For a discussion of statutory and regulatory attempts by local or state governments 
to recapture benefits conferred on landowners by government action, see generally Kades, 
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past flood controls, state and local governments have employed land use 
planning techniques that limit the values of floodplain properties.270 These 
techniques include zoning restrictions, building codes,271 and setback re-
quirements.272 And some commentators have suggested rebuilding restric-
tions for flood-damaged structures, rolling easements, and prohibitions on 
permanent flood protections such as seawalls and groins. 273 All of these 
approaches would ostensibly force floodplain owners to incorporate the 
costs of these restrictions into property values. 
For example, exactions and impact fees can be viewed not only as a 
means of forcing developers to compensate the community for the new bur-
dens imposed by the development, but also as a rough means of recap-
turing givings arising from past community investments that the devel-
oper seeks to exploit. Specifically, where new development imposes para-
sitic uses on established communities, much of the value of the new de-
velopment is created by preexisting community investments in open space, 
public facilities, infrastructure, and zoning.274 Exactions and impact fees 
supra note 21, at 1531-57. Professor Kades limits his discussion to "windfalls"-Le., 
"economic gains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society 
wishes to reward." Id. at 1491. It is important to distinguish such "windfalls" from the 
concepts of givings and givings recapture. Windfalls implicate the right of society to claim 
from an individual unearned benefits, regardless of their source, for redistribution of those 
benefits to society at large. See id. In contrast, givings are the results of government distri-
butions of benefits to society or some portion thereof, rendering moot, or at least redun-
dant, the question of whether society should claim those givings for redistribution. Profes-
sor Kades's analysis of windfall capture mechanisms illustrates that governments have 
employed a broad array of statutory devices to capture windfalls, whether those windfalls 
arose from pure "dumb luck," government action, or other sources. See id. at 1540-41 
(describing attempts to tax "excess profits" arising from wartime economy and government 
requirements); id. at 1533-35 (describing attempts by local governments to tax benefits 
accruing to landowners from zoning or other land use measures, including Zoning by Spe-
cial Assessment Financed Eminent Domain ("ZSAFED") and Special Capital and Real 
Estate Windfall Taxes ("SCREWTs") practices); id. at 1546-52 (describing Windfall Profit 
Tax on Oil, an excise tax levied on oil producers to capture windfalls allegedly generated 
by oil price deregulation). 
270 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001) (holding that fair market 
value of property taken depends in part on use restrictions imposed by zoning or regulatory 
limitations). 
271 FEMA, for example, has promulgated minimum building code provisions that 
communities participating in the NFIP must adopt for their residents to be eligible to ob-
tain flood insurance under the program. See 44 C.F.R. § 60.1-.26 (2002). NFIP-mandated 
building codes specify such criteria as elevation of new construction, anchoring of struc-
tures, construction with flood-resistant materials, and location of electrical, heating, venti-
lation, plumbing, air conditioning, sewer, gas and water systems. See 44 C.F.R. § 60.3. 
272 See, e.g., South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-
290 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002); see also Esposito v. S.c. Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 
170 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding South Carolina Beachfront Management Act setback re-
quirements against takings challenge). 
273 See supra note 209 and accompanying text; see also Titus, supra note 7, at 1326. 
274 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) ("[V]ery often the 
apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open 
spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.") 
(emphasis added). The value that the new development seeks to exploit has already been 
created in part by the community's prior choices with respect to land use and public infra-
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may permit a community to force new development to pay for a share of 
the givings that would otherwise attach to new development by virtue of 
these prior community decisions and investments. 
Although exactions and impact fees are an extremely rough measure 
that only potentially and indirectly recaptures givings, they are a valid tool 
to prevent developers from fully retaining the benefits of preexisting com-
munity investments.275 But at least with respect to structural flood control 
measures, exactions and impact fees could be used to force new devel-
opment to pay for the increased value conferred upon the development 
through those flood controls. Even though such exactions likely would re-
capture only a small portion of total government flood control givings to 
floodplain property owners, imposing these additional costs would assist 
land markets to incorporate some portion of flood risks into land values. 
2. Givings Recapture Doctrines Under the Just 
Compensation Clause 
Besides explicit statutory measures for recapturing givings, or pre-
venting them altogether, the U.S. Supreme Court has established judicial 
doctrines within Fifth Amendment just compensation jurisprudence to 
prevent the public from overcompensating condemnees for the value of 
government givings. At the most general level, courts have recognized the 
role of government givings in calculating diminutions in property values 
caused by government regulations. As Justice Holmes observed in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, "Government hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without pay-
ing for every such change in the general law," and such diminutions in 
value are justifiable because they secure an "average reciprocity of ad-
vantage" for society and for the burdened landowner.276 In other words, 
structure and facilities improvements. 
275 Professors Bell and Parchomovsky argue that exactions are a poor technique to re-
capture government givings. First, exactions cover only a small segment of givings, and are 
not assessed unless the local government will incur increased infrastructure burdens as a 
result of the new development. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 610. Second, 
to the extent exactions do recapture some out-of-pocket government costs, they fail to 
recapture increases in value of the developer's property caused by government givings. See 
id. at 609-10. 
276 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922); see Cordes, supra note 14, at 648. Closely related to the 
idea of givings is the concept of reciprocity, and in particular "general reciprocity." Whereas 
specific reciprocity concerns the reciprocal benefits flowing from the regulation creating 
the burden, general reciprocity considers the reciprocal benefits and burdens of regulatory 
life in general. Thus, even if a particular restriction might not provide significant specific 
reciprocity for an affected party, there are other instances where the regulated party receives 
benefits at the expense of others. Over the long run, such benefits and burdens tend to even 
out. Therefore, as noted by the Supreme Court on several occasions, it is usually fair to 
assume that a particular regulatory burden is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life" to secure an "average reciprocity of advantage." [d. at 648-49 (citing Lucas 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
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Holmes's average reciprocity of advantage dictum posits that government 
givings benefit landowners in roughly the same proportion that landown-
ers suffer diminutions in property values caused by regulation.277 
Beyond the generalized average reciprocity of advantage mechanism, 
courts have created specific limitations on the just compensation clause 
that attempt to limit overcompensation to landowners for government giv-
ings. Typically seen as general rules for offsetting or limiting compensa-
tion due for takings, these offset mechanisms also represent existing limita-
tions on the ability of government to target and attempt to recapture giv-
ings at the moment of condemnation. These limitations include prohibi-
tions on: 
• compensation for special or subjective value to the condemnee 
or the condemnor; 
• compensation for value resulting because of -or subsequent 
to-the taking; 
• compensation for special benefits accruing to the remaining 
parcel as a result of a partial taking; 
• compensation for value resulting from combination of the con-
demned parcel with other government rights; and 
• compensation for increases in market value caused by shortages 
resulting from government demand. 
The measure of just compensation defies any hard and fast rule. Value 
to any particular owner or condemnor is entirely subjective, depending 
on the uses that party intends for the property, the psychological impor-
tance of owning that parcel, and a host of other factors impossible to de-
termine with objective accuracy. Additionally, the subjective values that 
the condemnor and condemnee attach to any particular parcel are nearly 
certain to differ, often dramatically.278 The condemnee's relatively worthless 
York. 438 U.S. 104. 124 (1978)); cf Cordes. supra note 85. at 690-91 (discussing balance 
between private property interests and need for public regulation of property to secure 
societal benefits). 
277 Likewise. in Kirby Forest Industries v. United States. the Court observed that di-
minutions in property values that do not rise to the level of a taking "must be borne by 
individual landowners as concomitants of 'the advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community ... • 467 U.S. I. 14 (1984). Thus. for the vast majority of government-
caused diminutions of property value. the Supreme Court has regularly recognized that 
property owners will receive some recompense indirectly through other benefits allegedly 
bestowed upon the community by government action. 
278 See Kirby Forest Indus .• 467 U.S. at 10 n.15 (explaining that the Court is "willing to 
tolerate ... occasional inequity because of difficulty of assessing the value an individual 
places upon a particular piece of property"); see also United States v. 564.54 Acres of 
Land. 441 U.S. 506. 511 (1979) (noting that a market-value standard is "a useful and gen-
erally sufficient tool for ascertaining the compensation required to make the owner whole 
[but] ... such an award does not necessarily compensate for all values an owner may de-
rive from his property" and that "fair market value does not include the special value of 
property to the owner arising from its adaptability to his particular use"). 
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undeveloped brushland may have substantial value to government seek-
ing to construct a reservoir or railroad right-of-way.279 Because of the 
impossibility of determining the subjective value of a parcel to the con-
demnee or the government, courts have held that the just compensation 
clause requires the use of objective standards of value-principally the mar-
ket value of the property-and specifically excludes any special values 
that the land may have to either the condemnee or the condemnor.28o 
In addition to the prohibition on compensation for special values to 
the parties, courts have excluded compensation for increments of value 
attributable to the taking itself. In United States v. Miller, for example, 
the Supreme Court held that the condemnees were not entitled to an in-
crease in value to their lands attributable to the government's authoriza-
tion of condemnations for the relocation of a railroad right-of-way and 
the fact that "one probable route was marked out over the [condemnees'] 
lands."281 There, Congress had authorized condemnation of a railroad right-
of-way to relocate a railroad displaced by a separate dam and reservoir 
project. In planning the relocation, the condemning agency marked out 
potential routes, and plaintiffs purchased and developed property along 
those routes, apparently calculating that property values would increase 
after construction of the railroad. The Court rejected the condemnees' claim 
for compensation measured as of the date of the actual taking, reasoning 
that the market value of the property had been increased by speculation 
over the benefits that would accrue if the railroad were relocated near any 
particular parcel.282 In response to such speculation, the Court adopted 
the "scope of the project rule," which prohibits compensation for any 
value attributable to the fact that the condemned tract was "probably 
within the scope of the project from the time the Government was com-
mitted to it."283 Because the original railroad relocation project had 
identified the condemnees' land as one of several potential routes for the 
relocated railroad right-of-way, any increase in value attributable to that po-
tential project was excluded from the just compensation calculation.284 
279 See, e.g., United State v. MilJer, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943) (stating that land-
owners speculated in undeveloped brushland over which railroad project potentially could 
have been built). 
280 See, e.g., 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511-12; Miller, 317 U.S. at 375 (citing 
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 
(1934». 
281 317 U.S. at 377. 
282 See id. 
2831d. at 376-77. The "scope of the project rule" was foreshadowed by earlier just 
compensation cases. For example, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893), the 
Court excluded evidence of increases in the value of property located within the potential, 
but not definite, boundaries of the proposed Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C., on the 
basis that the increases were due to the possibility that the property, if not condemned, 
would be favorably located with respect to the park. See id. at 304-05; see also Kerr v. S. 
Park Comm'rs, 117 U.S. 379, 385-87 (1886) (excluding value increment attributable to 
legislative authorization of creation of park from determination of just compensation). 
284 See Miller, 317 U.S. at 376-77. 
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A third givings recapture doctrine prohibits compensation for any 
value attributable to association of the condemned tract with preexisting 
or dominant government property rights. In United States v. Fuller,285 for 
instance, the Court excluded consideration of values created by the proxim-
ity of the condemned parcel to government properties. There, the gov-
ernment condemned a parcel held in fee simple that adjoined both graz-
ing land leased from the state, and federal land upon which the fee owner 
held grazing permits revocable by the government at will. Even though it 
acknowledged that the proximity of the fee parcel to the government lands 
was an element of value that would be considered on the open market, 
the Court held that the government was not required to compensate for 
value arising from that proximity and the availability of revocable federal 
grazing rights: "These cases go far toward establishing the general prin-
ciple that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate 
for elements of value the government has created, or that it might have 
destroyed under the exercise of governmental authority other than the 
power of eminent domain."286 
The Fuller Court relied heavily on cases holding that no increment 
of value attributable to riparian rights of lands adjacent to navigable wa-
ters may be included in determining just compensation because those 
riparian rights are subject to a dominant navigational servitude held by 
the federal government under the commerce power.287 As a consequence 
of that dominant servitude, the government need not compensate the land-
owner for any diminution of the landowner's former enjoyment of access 
to the waterway.288 
But the Fuller Court did not intend to recapture all government giv-
ings arising from mere proximity to government-funded projects. Instead, 
Fuller excludes only that increment of value arising from the aggregation 
of the privately owned parcel with government lands "to form a privately 
controlled unit from which the public would be excluded."289 Thus, Fuller 
and the riparian rights cases on which it relies can be seen not as recap-
ture of value "created" by the government, but rather as a matter of not 
285 409 U.S. 488 (1973). 
286 I d. at 492. 
287 See id. at 491 (citing United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. 
Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 
386 (1945»; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
288 See United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1961) ("The 
damage sustained [by exercise of government's dominant navigational servitude] results 
not from a taking of the riparian owner's property in the stream bed, but from the lawful 
exercise of a power to which that property has always been subject.") (quoting United 
States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941»; 
Twin City Power, 350 U.S. at 228 ("What the Government can grant or withhold and ex-
ploit for its own benefit has a value that is peculiar to it and that no other user enjoys .... 
To require the United States to pay for this water-power value would be to create private 
claims in the public domain."). 
289 United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973). 
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requiring the government to compensate condemnees for property rights 
the government already owns at the time of the condemnation.290 
In contrast to the close connection between government rights and 
the condemned tract required in Fuller and similar cases, the Court also 
has limited the just compensation clause to exclude market value incre-
ments caused by shortages resulting from mere increases in government 
demand within a particular market. In United States v. Cors,291 for in-
stance, the Court held that the government could not be forced to com-
pensate a tugboat owner for appreciation in the market value of all tugs 
caused by the government's own increased requirements for such vessels 
to service the wartime navy. Importantly, where the givings recapture 
doctrines of Miller and Fuller limit recapture only to givings resulting 
within one project, the Cors Court recognized that the just compensation 
clause may permit recapture of government givings outside of a single dis-
crete project: 
It is not fair that the government be required to pay the en-
hanced price which its demand alone has created. That en-
hancement reflects elements of value that was created by the ur-
gency of its need for the Article. It does not reflect what "a 
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller," ... in a fair 
market. It represents what can be exacted from the government 
whose demands in the emergency have created a sellers' market. 
In this situation, as in the case of land included in a proposed 
project of the government, the enhanced value reflects specula-
tion as to what the government can be compelled to pay. That is 
a hold-up value, not a fair market value. That is a value which 
the government itself created and hence in fairness should not 
be required to pay.292 
290 Cf. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 936-37 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Avenal, the 
Federal Circuit held a takings claim invalid where the owners of oyster bed leases had 
taken advantage of prior government projects that rendered the beds suitable for oyster 
cultivation but later faced loss of cultivation capacity because of subsequent government 
projects. Reasoning that the leased beds were rendered suitable for oyster cultivation only 
because past government projects had raised the salinity of the surrounding water, the 
court opined that the lessees could not "insist on a guarantee of non-interference by gov-
ernment when they well knew or should have known that ... government actions were 
being planned ... that would directly offset their new economic investments." [d. at 937. 
But cf Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-29 (2001) (holding regulatory takings 
claim not barred by post-regulation acquisition of burdened property). Although it ad-
dressed the issues of takings and interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions, and not just compensation or givings recapture, Avenal may indicate the existence of 
a bar to retaining any rights to givings created by unrelated government projects that pro-
vide incidental benefits to affected landowners. 
291 337 U.S. 325 (1949). 
2921d. at 333-34 (emphasis added). Although Cars is largely concerned with judicially 
created givings avoidance or recapture mechanisms, that case also addressed statutory 
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Cors thus appears to justify government recapture of givings with only 
a tenuous connection to government action, where government has inter-
ceded in the private marketplace to such a degree that price increases 
subsequent to that intervention must be attributed to the government ac-
tion. Specifically, Cors attempts to permit the government to avoid com-
pensation for the costs of perceived market failures such as holdouts and 
profiteers in times of national crisis.293 
But the limits of this doctrine, as noted by the dissent, are murky. 
Specifically, the Cors majority could not explain how to unbundle gov-
ernment-created value from owner-created or intrinsic value based solely 
on market demand increases. As the dissent observed, when the govern-
ment made its first seizure of tugs to assist the war effort, the market 
value of those tugs was unaffected by any government interventions.294 
"A subsequent increase in market value, though precipitated by the short-
age caused by the earlier taking, could be a direct result only of the tug 
operators' need for the remaining tugs, not the Government's for those it 
had taken."295 Consequently, because the market value of tugs remaining 
in private hands was at least partly a function of the market's need for 
those tugs rather than the government's, the minority saw no principled 
means of excluding only the market value increments attributable to gov-
ernment need.296 
3. Crafting a Givings Recapture Mechanism for 
Coastal Floodplains 
Combined, the just compensation cases addressed above illustrate that 
givings recapture at condemnation requires a clear and exclusive causal 
nexus between the government action alleged to generate a giving and the 
purported increase in the value of the landowner's property or remaining 
parcel. Thus, in Miller, the Court limited the scope of the project rule to 
properties probably within the scope of the project originally contem-
plated by the government and excluded from the rule's operation proper-
ties brought within the project by subsequent enlargements of project 
scope.297 In the former case, value increases would only be attributable to 
"speculation by [property owners], or by possible purchasers from them, 
givings recapture mechanisms in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The Supreme Court 
held that the prohibition in § 902(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 that "in no case 
shall the value of the property taken or used be enhanced by the causes necessitating the 
taking or use" satisfied the just compensation clause. [d. at 331-32. 
293 See id. at 333. 
294 [d. at 343-44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Kades, supra note 21, at 1540-
46 (discussing difficulty in establishing appropriate rates at which to tax "excess profits" 
during World Wars I and II). 
295 Cors, 337 U.S. at 343 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
296 See id. at 344-45. 
297 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943). 
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as to what the Government would be compelled to pay as compensation."298 
In contrast, where a parcel outside the original scope of the government 
project increases in value by reason of proximity to a government project, 
that increment of value is created by factors other than government de-
mand: 
But the [scope of the project] rule also provides that if project A 
did not initially include property x, the Government must pay com-
pensation for any additional value property x enjoys because of its 
proximity to project A as originally undertaken. This value, 
while in a sense created by the Government, is not attributable 
to the fact that the Government has a unique demand for prop-
erty x and has committed itself to taking property x for inclusion 
in project A, but rather is the value of beneficial uses for which 
there is a private market demand, and, as such, is a true element 
of fair market value. 299 
Under this analysis, the government project would thus be similar in 
effect to tossing a rock-its diameter symbolizing the original scope of the 
project-into a small pool. The water immediately underneath the rock 
as it hits the surface would be within the scope of the project rule. But 
the rock also sends out concentric rings of ripples. While the ripples might 
at first appear to be solely influenced by the impact of the rock, other 
objects within the pool quickly reflect the ripples to create new patterns 
within the entire pool. And only in extraordinary cases will the "pool" be 
still at the time the rock is thrown-other forces constantly generate 
changes and adjustments within land markets that will immediately affect 
how the market reacts to government actions. 
Thus, in 320.0 Acres of Land the Fifth Circuit held that the govern-
ment could not exclude from the just compensation calculus value incre-
ments that had accrued to the condemned properties at issue in the eight-
een years between initial approval of the project and condemnation pro-
ceedings.3°O There, Congress had approved an enlargement of the Ever-
glades National Park in 1958, but did not appropriate significant funds 
for land acquisition until at least 1966.301 Additionally, the Department of 
the Interior, between 1959 and 1962, had informed landowners within the 
298 [d. at 377. 
299 United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1979). The 
320.0 Acres of Land Court further noted that a compensation rule that permitted the gov-
ernment to exclude increments of value attributable to proximity to a government project 
"would place a restraint on the free use and marketability of lands near Government proj-
ects." [d. at 788 n.33. Such a rule would thus ignore that other factors besides mere prox-
imity to the government project would affect parcels not included in the original scope of 
the project. See id. 
300 [d. at 796-98. 
301 [d. at 797. 
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enlarged project area that no condemnations were to begin until Congress 
appropriated sufficient funds for that purpose and in the meantime prop-
erty owners were "free to use and sell their properties as if their land 
were outside a Government project."302 
The court concluded that these three factors-the length of time 
between project approval and condemnation of land ostensibly within the 
project expansion, the lack of commitment by the government to imple-
ment the project, and the assurances that property owners were free to 
sell their lands-prevented the government from using the scope of the 
project rule to exclude value increments accruing to the properties since 
1958.303 In other words, the government's failure to take action permitted 
the infiltration of private market influences potentially unrelated to the 
government project. This, in turn, severed the exclusive causal nexus be-
tween the government project and additional value increments accruing 
to the property. In short, where value increments are not clearly and solely 
attributable to government action, the just compensation clause does not 
permit recapture of those givings as an offset at condemnation. 
The judicial offset or givings recapture mechanisms thus implicitly 
recognize the impossibility of separating value attributable to givings 
from value attributable to private investment or action of the private mar-
kets where there has been any significant interaction between those forces. 304 
For example, while just compensation does not include benefits accruing 
to a parcel by reason of the project necessitating a taking,30S once that proj-
ect has been completed, the government must compensate landowners for 
any increment of value arising from the past project if it later condemns 
the affected property.306 After construction of government-funded improve-
ments, it becomes impossible to untangle value allegedly created by gov-
ernment givings from values created by individual investments in im-
proving property.30? Additionally, the difficulty of determining the value due 
3021d. 
303 See 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 796-98. 
304 Cf. Kades, supra note 21, at 1541-42. 
305 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943). 
306 See. e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1973) ("The government 
may not demand that a jury be arbitrarily precluded from considering as an element of 
value the proximity of a parcel to a post office building, simply because the Government at 
one time built the post office."). But in the vast majority of cases, since the private market 
itself is capable of constructing similar structures, there is no good reason that the govern-
ment should share in the "profits" or any excess value over and above the costs of such 
improvements. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. In such situations, the most that 
the government can be said to provide to the development of such improvements over and 
above their costs is the elimination of some transaction costs of private action that in most 
cases will likely not exceed the separate transaction costs involved with accomplishing the 
same improvements through the government bureaucracy. 
307 Economists likewise have recognized the difficulty of recapturing government giv-
ings resulting from construction of amenities. Economic analysis of urban amenities-
locational amenities such as proximity to city centers, protection by flood control works, 
and access to transportation-illustrate that separating out such givings after the fact is, at 
least for courts, a nigh-impossible task. For an analysis of the difficulty of valuing locational 
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to such givings and that due to private investments renders such an in-
quiry prohibitively expensive and inequitable.3og 
Instead of attempting to employ ex post statutory givings recapture 
mechanisms, a federal givings recapture mechanism could use subsidies 
already built into existing federal programs as the basis for recapturing 
givings across entire coastlines. Specifically, the NFIP provides below-
market-rate flood insurance to floodplain property owners. Rather than con-
tinuing to permit NFIP property owners to retain these subsidies in per-
petuity, the NFIP could be amended to incorporate a givings recapture 
scheme that would permit the government to avoid at least some of the giv-
ings provided to the landowner through subsidized insurance rates. 
First, the NFIP should be amended to recognize explicitly the amount 
of the subsidy-the difference between NFIP rates, subsidized or unsub-
sidized, and what the private insurance market would charge for compa-
rable coverage.309 In order to ensure a clear and unambiguous connection 
for courts, a nigh-impossible task. For an analysis of the difficulty of valuing locational 
amenities-Le., the impact of government-constructed amenities upon property values as a 
function of multiple factors unique to each parcel-see generally THE ECONOMICS OF UR-
BAN AMENITIES (Douglas B. Diamond, Jr. & George S. Tolley eds., 1982), and C. Ford 
Runge et aI., Government Actions Affecting Land and Property Values: An Empirical Re-
view of Takings and Givings (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy Working Paper, 1996). Even 
Fuller and the riparian rights cases rely on preexisting government rights, such as the fed-
eral government's dominant navigational servitude and the right of the government to ter-
minate grazing leases at will, and not property rights or the eminent domain power to 
minimize compensation for government givings. See Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493 (holding that 
condemnee may not require government to compensate for values arising from combina-
tion of condemnee's property rights with rights which government already owns). 
308 The ability of private markets to provide for their own infrastructure improvements 
and the difficulty of separating government givings from increments of value created by 
private investment or action of private markets illustrate why alternative givings structures 
such as assessing charges for givings upon specified events such as a sale or condemnation 
of the property may be ultimately unworkable and inequitable. Professors Bell and Par-
chomovsky suggest one means of assessing givings by providing an initial notice from the 
government that a property owner has received a giving and classifying that giving as ei-
ther payable immediately or upon some later realization event such as sale. See Bell & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 601-08. The property owner would then be assessed for 
the market value of the giving, as determined by government appraisal, subjective value of 
the giving to either the government or the property owner, or self-assessment by the prop-
erty owner. See id. at 605-08. One issue with this approach is that, except in the most clear 
and definite cases, it quickly becomes impossible to separate the effects of the government 
giving from other actions by the private market or individual investment. See, e.g., United 
States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 343-44 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing diffi-
culties of classifying market value increases as caused by government seizures of tugboats 
or by private need for remaining tugboats); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 
(1934) ("Elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occurrences 
which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable 
should be excluded from consideration for that would be to allow mere speculation and 
conjecture to become a guide for the ascertainment of value-a thing to be condemned in 
business transactions as well as in judicial ascertainment of truth."). For example, the in-
determinacy of values of flood control improvements such as levees or beach nourishment 
to beneficiary property owners demonstrates that any attempt to recapture givings in excess 
of the cost of those improvements likely would be an arbitrary exercise. 
309 The federal flood insurance subsidy takes two forms, as discussed above. Pre-FIRM 
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between such givings and subsequent attempts to recapture the subsidy, 
the just compensation clause requires a clear, definite, and unambiguous 
connection between the government action and increases in property val-
ues.310 While attempts to recognize the amount of givings by measuring 
property values directly would generate substantial transaction and liti-
gation costs, use of NFIP subsidies as a proxy for some portion of govern-
ment givings would reduce the costs of defining the amount of the giving 
and demonstrating the necessary connection between the giving and the 
costs the government wishes to offset. 
Second, that subsidy would then be deemed a credit against the fu-
ture purchase of redevelopment rights, conservation easements, fee inter-
ests, or other property rights sufficient to prevent redevelopment of a prop-
erty after a predetermined degree of flood damages or other relevant trig-
gering event.3I1 Such a triggering event would necessarily be an event that 
demonstrated that past government flood responses have proven ineffec-
tive at reducing flood losses for that property. Triggering events could 
include the insured property suffering some level of damage from a cata-
strophic storm, severe damage to surrounding properties, or some level of 
repeated low-value losses that cumulatively indicate that the property is 
unsustainably situated on the floodplain. 
Upon the occurrence of such a triggering event,312 the property owner 
would receive full payment for any insured losses-that is, after all, the 
purpose of insurance-plus full compensation for whatever property rights 
are acquired by the government to prevent redevelopment. Importantly, in 
every instance, the insured would receive full compensation for those 
property rights, partly in the form of accumulated credits for past subsi-
dies under the NFIP and partly in the form of cash payments. 
And by providing insured property owners with explicit accountings 
of the amount of NFIP subsidies they receive before the triggering event, 
the government would maintain the clear and unambiguous connection 
between the past givings and the value the government seeks to recapture 
in the condemnation of the redevelopment rights. In contrast to poten-
tially ambiguous measures of increases in property value due to other 
structures-approximately twenty-five percent to thirty percent of all insured structures 
within the program-receive substantial discounts over rates for post-FIRM structures. See 
supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text. Even post-FIRM structures pay rates below 
what the private insurance market would charge as a result of political influences on rate 
structure and the inability of FEMA to increase rates above actuarial risks for the purpose 
of building insurance loss reserves. See supra notes 162-177 and accompanying text; see 
also Daniel, supra note 177, at 40. 
310 See supra notes 297-303 and accompanying text. 
3\1 If necessary, subsidy rates could even be increased in the event the current amount 
of the subsidy was deemed insufficient to compensate landowners for their redevelopment 
rights, or to speed the public acquisition of those rights. 
312 In the event the property never suffers a triggering event, the program could auto-
matically condemn the relevant property rights after sufficient subsidies have accumulated 
to offset compensation for those rights. 
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types of government givings such as structural flood controls and infra-
structure improvements, the explicit statements of accumulated subsidy 
credits under the NFIP would avoid the problem of separating values cre-
ated by government action from values created by property owners or land 
markets. 
This technique would have several advantages over alternative refonns 
such as eliminating federal subsidies altogether or legislation prohibiting 
redevelopment following flood damage without compensation. First, such 
a givings recapture scheme would avoid or reduce substantially the short-
term costs of property acquisition or, at the very least, reduce the costs of 
insuring coastal floodplain properties in high-risk or environmentally sensi-
tive areas. Because this givings recapture mechanism would acquire 
flood-prone coastal properties over time, rather than immediately, the costs 
of such acquisition would be spread out over many decades. Consequently, 
no single administration or legislature would be required to be solely re-
sponsible for the costs of acquiring large swaths of coastal properties. 
Additionally, due to the accumulation of credits from past subsidization, 
the program should get progressively less expensive to implement over time. 
Second, even if large numbers of property owners refuse to partici-
pate in such a program-assuming opting out is permitted-the program 
could still generate substantial savings for federal taxpayers. While coastal 
floodplain landowners may not want to surrender their future property rights 
in exchange for a present, but largely unrealizable and intangible, reduc-
tion in flood insurance rate premiums,313 such opt-out behavior is not fa-
tal to the proposed property acquisition scheme. Although legislative or 
regulatory limitations on disaster relief likely would be required to pre-
vent opt-outs from shifting their costs to the disaster relief program, those 
who opt out of the program would be forced either to self-insure or to pur-
313 Professor Levmore suggests such apparently irrational behavior arises from the ten-
dency of individuals "irrationally" to value the bird in hand more than two in the bush, 
regardless of whether the value of the two birds in the bush (discounted by the possibility 
of capturing successfully one or both of them) exceeds the value of the bird in hand. Saul 
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 310 (1990) (noting 
that an interest group will probably fight harder to avoid a loss than to gain an equivalent 
windfall, "perhaps because it fights more for what it has than for what it wishes it had or 
because other citizens share a taste for the preservation of the status quo or for some rea-
son related to the general question of why there is an "offer-asking" differential."). In other 
words, without overcompensation for the surrender of presently held rights to future rede-
velopment of coastal floodplain properties, many coastal floodplain landowners will refuse 
to participate voluntarily in such a property acquisition program. See id.; see also supra 
note 39 and accompanying text (observing that many coastal floodplain property owners 
would locate on coast regardless of availability of disaster relief or flood insurance). Im-
portantly, even though voluntary opt-out behavior may place short-term financial strain on 
the NFIP through lost premiums, long-term savings from lowered disaster relief payments, 
fewer demands for coastal infrastructure construction and repair, reduced coastal 
floodplain development pressures, and reduced risks to human life and the environment 
likely would offset such short-term costs. Additionally, if voluntary opt-outs place too 
great a financial strain on the program, program participation could be made mandatory 
within defined high-risk or environmentally sensitive areas. 
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chase more expensive private insurance (if available).314 In any event, so 
long as those property owners and not the federal government bear the 
risks of flood losses, floodplain expenditures by taxpayers would be re-
duced. 
Third, the subsidy/credit approach also preserves investment-backed 
expectations of floodplain property owners and avoids disruptions in the 
land markets by compensating landowners for both the insured flood 
losses and the property rights surrendered to prevent redevelopment. In 
contrast, prohibitions on redevelopment or elimination of all subsidies likely 
would undercompensate landowners. Eliminating all federal subsidies for 
floodplain development defeats expectations of property owners who de-
termined their investments based in part in reliance on the continuation of 
the federal subsidies. Given the increasing use of floodplain property devel-
opment as a retirement home or investment by aging baby boomers,315 
such a disruption in coastal land values likely would have unforeseen 
economic consequences. Likewise, redevelopment prohibitions, although 
they may be characterized as "amortizing the cost to [floodplain] prop-
erty owners of changes in society's approach" to floodplain manage-
ment,316 also would fail to compensate property owners for valuable prop-
erty rights and may raise takings issues that would further limit the abil-
ity of government entities to remove development from coastal flood-
plains.317 Further, redevelopment prohibitions would generate market distor-
tions by imposing wipeouts on property owners whose properties were 
destroyed in the near future, while awarding windfalls to property owners 
who avoided flood damage beyond actuarial estimates. In contrast, a prop-
erty acquisition scheme that compensated landowners at the time of a 
future triggering event, such as substantial flood-related damages, would 
avoid inequities produced by wipeouts, windfalls, and potential market 
distortions by both making insurance payments, for which the property 
owner was paying premiums under the NFIP, and compensating the prop-
erty owner for whatever remaining "equity" remains with the property 
owner's redevelopment rights, at the time of the loss. 
Fourth, the subsidy/credit approach to givings recapture may avoid 
some of the political issues that have plagued efforts to reform federal flood 
management policy in the past. As discussed above, political resistance 
to floodplain controls-even if overcome initially by upland taxpayer senti-
ment-<:an often cause "backsliding" or restriction of those floodplain con-
trols after public attention to the problem of floodplain givings wanes.318 To 
avoid such erosion of regulatory controls on existing and future flood-
plain development, public choice theory suggests that affected landown-
314 See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text. 
315 See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. 
316 Poirier, supra note 48, at 289-90. 
311 See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text. 
318 See supra notes 234-237 and accompanying text. 
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ers must be "bought off" to prevent them from forming a powerful inter-
est group opposing the legislative restrictions on their property use.319 
While other methods of restricting backsliding-such as condemnation 
of rolling easements sufficiently in advance of predicted property losses to 
require only de minimis compensation to condemnees32o- arguably impose 
lower costs on the public fisc, the very cheapness with which such rolling 
easements could be acquired may fail to prevent powerful political oppo-
sition to enforcement of the easements in the event sea level rise occurs.321 In 
other words, a $3 payment to a landowner's predecessor in interest made 
fifty or sixty years prior to a rise in sea level or an increase in the severity 
of coastal storms sufficient to require abandonment of the property is 
unlikely to "buy off' the political interest group of wealthy coastal land-
owners suddenly facing a total loss of their property.322 
In contrast, a givings recapture mechanism based upon an explicit rec-
ognition of existing subsidies may prove an effective bulwark against 
political opposition to land use restrictions in the future. Such undercut-
319 See Farber, supra note 226, at 131 ("The effect of the compensation requirement is 
to buy off the [condemnee] landowners and shift the cost of the project to other groups. 
Politicians will give more weight to costs as a result of this shift only if these other groups 
have more political power than the landowners-which seems unlikely because the other 
groups are likely to be diffuse."); see also Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Com-
pensation, 9 CaNsT. COMMENT. 279, 293-94 (1992) ("[T]he compensation requirement 
will buy off the group otherwise most likely to bring costs [of condemnation] forcefully to 
the attention of the legislators."). 
320 See Titus, supra note 7, at 1322-23 (projecting cost of purchasing rolling easement 
prohibiting bulkhead construction to protect property against sea level rise at approxi-
mately $3 for a $20,000 site suitable for a $180,000 house). 
321 Under this rolling easement scenario discussed above, there are three possible out-
comes with respect to any given property owner: (I) the property owner is undercompen-
sated due to inundation substantially before the projected time used in calculating the dis-
counted present value of the rolling easement purchased by the government, (2) the prop-
erty owner is perfectly compensated when inundation occurs at the time used in calculating 
the value of the rolJing easement, and (3) the property owner is overcompensated because 
inundation never occurs or takes longer than projected in calculating the compensation due 
for the rolling easement. Upon inundation of the property, the undercompensated property 
owners will have a strong equitable case that the rolling easement should not be enforced 
because the public will be unjustly enriched at their expense due to the faulty prediction of 
the length of time before inundation. If the group of undercompensated property owners 
successfully resists enforcement of the rolling easements, the latter two groups may have 
at least "a foot in the door" to argue that they likewise should not be forced to comply with 
the rolling easements. 
322 The National Park Service currently engages in a similar long-term approach in 
many national parks to ease land from private to public ownership by granting "reserva-
tions of use and occupancy" to condemnees or donees of land within national parks, al-
lowing them to remain on their property for a term of years or for life. See St. Amand, supra 
note 7, at 18-19. Though, as St. Amand acknowledges, "[t]he Park Service has encoun-
tered few problems in enforcing the terms of its reservations of use and occupancy, per-
haps because the areas affected are relatively small and easily monitored." See id. at 19 
(emphasis added). But to be effective, restrictions on coastal development and redevelop-
ment must encompass huge swaths of coastline, raising the potential for large and concen-
trated interest groups opposing enforcement of such reservations or similar schemes, such 
as previously acquired rolling easements and problems with enforcing and monitoring 
affected coastlines. 
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ting of political opposition would work on two levels. First, property owners 
would, in every case, receive full compensation-in some combination of 
cash and subsidy credits-for the redevelopment rights or similar restrictive 
easements acquired by the government. That compensation would substan-
tially undercut arguments by private property rights proponents against gov-
ernment regulation of coastal floodplains that deprives property owners 
of the value of their property. Second, by providing mostly cash compen-
sation in the early stages of the program, the subsidy/credit approach could 
potentially build political "momentum" against backsliding since later-
affected property owners would face an ever growing body of previous de-
velopment rights acquisitions under the program. At the same time, the 
number of likely resisters would diminish as property owners are bought out 
over time. Resistance under such circumstances would deprive property 
owners of much of the equitable force of their arguments since they will by 
that time have enjoyed decades of below-market-cost flood insurance at 
taxpayer expense, yet apparently would be seeking to keep that subsidy 
flowing in perpetuity. The combination of political momentum, steadily 
diminishing interest group numbers, and inequity of retaining development 
rights despite having been fully compensated through past subsidies could 
provide future legislatures with sufficient political will to resist attempts 
to return development to the coasts. 
c. Prioritizing Property Acquisitions: The Need/or a Federal Response 
The third major policy response requires the federal government to 
identify high-risk or ecologically valuable floodplain areas in which to 
confine property acquisition efforts. Floodplains by nature defy manage-
ment on a state or local basis and require a comprehensive watershed-
wide or regional approach. Coastal development and erosion control tech-
niques at one point along the shoreline can affect rates of development or 
erosion further along the shoreline. Additionally, development in one 
state's or community's coastal region may draw tourism revenues from 
other states or localities, leading to increased competition for a share of total 
tourism dollars. 323 And poor planning in coastal floodplain communities 
can disrupt evacuation and other flood responses in the event of major 
disasters. 324 The cross-border characteristics of floodplain management 
323 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
324 See COASTAL EXPOSURE AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION, supra note 60, at 9: 
Congestion caused by increasing population density can have a profound effect on 
the efficiency and safety of evacuations. Concerns have also been expressed that 
many evacuation routes are single-lane roadways at sea level, and that the ade-
quacy of evacuation routes are further affected by the deficiencies and decaying 
conditions of bridges. For example, emergency management officials acknowl-
edge that it would be impossible to fully evacuate [sic] densely populated south-
eastern Florida in the amount of time provided by hurricane warnings. 
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require a consistent response throughout each floodplain to prevent flood 
responses upstream or further along the coast from externalizing the costs of 
any particular management policy on downstream or downdrift property 
owners, localities, or states.325 
But by the same token, the need for a comprehensive federal approach 
to floodplain management should not be taken as a license for unlimited 
federal action within the floodplains. Public acceptance of broad reforms 
and funding of flood responses peaks quickly at the height of major flood 
disasters but quickly wanes when the flood has passed.326 Consequently, 
flood responses must be prioritized to promote the maximum return from 
limited public acceptance of ongoing flood mitigation efforts in the ab-
sence of a major flood event. Moreover, limiting the federal floodplain 
management to areas where property acquisition would maximize sav-
ings of federal tax dollars acknowledges the federalism concerns driving 
the traditional reluctance to involve the federal government in state and 
local land use management and planning issues. 
The CBRA provides a model under which the federal government 
has already undertaken the process of identifying floodplain areas in which 
to prevent, or at least minimize, future floodplain development. This con-
cept should be expanded to identify not only areas where development in-
centives should be eliminated, but also those high-risk or environmen-
tally valuable floodplains where the costs of existing development exceed 
the costs of removing that development to more sustainable low-risk 
floodplains or upland areas. 
The criteria for identifying these areas must focus on two issues. 
First, if the area or community has suffered a significant number of repeti-
tive flood losses, it should be a prime candidate for implementation of 
property acquisition programs.327 Repetitive losses signify floodplain ar-
see MILETI, supra note 89, at 7-8 (describing need for improvement in hazard warnings). 
325 It is theoretically possible that a system of tradable floodllittoral flow easement rights 
could be used to adjust responses of updrift and downdrift landowners and communities. 
Updrift floodplain owners and communities theoretically could pay downdrift owners to 
hold some portion of their floodplain undeveloped for the purpose of eroding as the updrift 
community interrupts the flow of sand that would otherwise be transported to the downdrift 
shore. • 
326 See, e.g., Long Island Coastal Alliance, Inc., Preserving Long Island's Coastline: A 
Debate on Policy, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Long Island Coastal 
Alliance 1 (Apr. 22, 1994) (statement of Gerard Stoddard, Chairman, Long Island Coastal 
Alliance) "I don't need to remind anyone that it is now two years and four months since 
the December 1992 nor' easter tore up the Long Island coastline. That length of time is 
important because some say the public's attention span for shore protection is about ex-
hausted when you get into the third year after a storm."); Rutherford H. Platt,' Floods and 
Man: A Geographer's Agenda, in 2 ROBERT W. KATES & IAN BURTON, EDS., GEOGRAPHY, 
RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT 28, 60 (1986) ("The best opportunity to reduce flood 
losses is immediately after a flood or other disaster."); NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, 
supra note 3, at 42 (noting that local communities generally pay little attention to disaster 
mitigation plans, and that draft mitigation plans are too general to be useful, lack coordi-
nation, and overall accord little priority to pre-disaster mitigation efforts). 
327 See HIGHER GROUND, supra note 35, at 128-29 (calling for increased attention to 
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eas in which structural flood controls have failed to limit flood losses and 
consequently federal tax dollars spent building, maintaining, and repair-
ing these structures are largely wasted.328 Likewise, repetitive flood insur-
ance payments identify structures that were improperly sited or built and 
are therefore likely responsible for net losses to the disaster relief and 
flood insurance system.329 
Second, while repetitive losses provide the clearest indicator of whether 
floodplain areas are economically unsustainable, other areas may be at risk 
of catastrophic losses from relatively rare but catastrophic floods. Where 
possible, these high-risk areas should be identified and included in any 
targeted property acquisition program. 
Identification of such catastrophic risk areas may prove impossible 
in many circumstances. Repetitive loss properties have been at least par-
tially identified during the last several decades of participation with the 
NFIP. In contrast, catastrophic risk areas are defined by the presence of 
rare flooding events outside of the experience of most landowners and lack-
ing any systematic record. Although flood elevation modeling, weather pre-
dictions, and anecdotal evidence may assist in identifying some potential 
areas subject to rare catastrophic risks, it is likely that the majority of 
these areas may be identifiable only upon actualization of the catastrophic 
risk itself. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Current governmental responses to flooding suffer from difficulties that 
prevent those programs from succeeding in diminishing flood risk and 
flood damages. Moreover, most federal responses to flooding promote 
direct and fiat givings to coastal floodplain landowners by warping land 
market perceptions of flood risks, thereby raising property values to the 
point that public acquisition of coastal floodplain properties becomes 
prohibitively expensive as a land use management mechanism. But those 
same programs also provide the keys to a federal, market-based response 
to the problem of removing development from floodplains where it is 
economically inefficient, while permitting economically efficient uses to 
continue in place. Specifically, Congress must consider a new approach 
to floodplain land use management that incorporates givings recapture 
mechanisms that will maximize the ability of the government to recover 
from its own past mistakes in responding to floods. 
The NFIP provides an ideal vehicle for givings recapture and prop-
erty acquisition efforts within identified target areas. The NFIP already 
provides below-market-rate insurance to both pre- and post- FIRM prop-
repetitive loss properties for focus of hazard mitigation efforts). 
328 See id. 
329 See id. 
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erties. But that subsidy need not be written off as yet another govern-
mental giving to floodplain property owners. Instead, the NFIP could be 
amended to require explicit recognition of the amount of the subsidy-
the difference between NFIP rates and rates that the private insurance 
market would charge for comparable coverage-and the proportionate 
value of that subsidy in relation to the value of sufficient property rights 
to prevent redevelopment of the property in the event the property suffers 
some pre-determined degree of loss. 
Doing so promotes effective floodplain land use management on multi-
ple levels. First, a givings recapture approach permits the government to 
avoid the Catch-22 of floodplain management, namely that floodplain 
communities typically fail to implement land use controls until after their 
floodplains are developed. Instead of abandoning land use management 
in the face of property values comprised substantially of past direct and 
fiat givings, givings recapture would permit government to fix past mis-
takes and effect meaningful land use restrictions to protect human life, 
property, and the environment from floods and floodplain development. 
Second, givings recapture avoids some of the potential political opposi-
tion-both present and future-to restrictions on floodplain land use. 
Although no single reform can· wholly sidestep these concerns, givings 
recapture at least moots some of the philosophical and technical objec-
tions to restrictive regulation of the coasts by providing full compensa-
tion to affected landowners and permitting use of coastal property with-
out externalizing all costs of so doing to taxpayers. Finally, givings re-
capture injects fairness and rationality into the coastal floodplain man-
agement process. Under such a regime, landowners' reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations are protected, while over time the looming spec-
ter of recapture of past givings should force land markets to incorporate 
realistic perceptions of flood risks into property valuation. Combined, the 
advantages of givings recapture mean that, where necessary, we can 
make a strategic retreat from the coasts that protects human life, prop-
erty, and the environment without sacrificing fairness and justice to tax-
payers and landowners in the process. 
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